University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1997

The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary
Federalism in a Second-Best World
William W. Bratton
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Joseph A. McCahery
Tilburg University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Commercial Law Commons,
Economic Policy Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations
Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal
History Commons, and the Philosophy Commons

Repository Citation
Bratton, William W. and McCahery, Joseph A., "The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World" (1997). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 849.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/849

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

ARTICLES
The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World
WILLIAM W. BRATION* AND JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

203

I.

THE JURISDICTiONAL COMPETITION PARADIGM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

207

THE TIEBOUT MODEL AND ITS TRANSITION TO LEGAL FEDERALISM .

207

1.

The Tiebout Model ..................... .

207

2.

Extension to Regulation .................. .

209

3.

Restatement as Legal Federalism's Race-to-the-Top. .

4.

Ties to Related Devolutionary Theories-Public Choice

A.

.. ..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... . . . . . . . . . .

213

THE DEBATE IN LEGAL FEDERALJSM: THE RACE-TO-THE-TOP
VERSUS THE RACE-TO-THE-BOTIOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

217

THE

TIEBOUT MODEL'S EXTRAORDINARY DEMANDS . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

219

A.

THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM: BUNDLING, PRIClNG, AND OPTIMAL
NUMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

222

THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM: NONEQUILIBRIUM AND UNSTABLE
EQUILIBRIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

225

1.

Statement of the Problem ......................... .

225

a.

Nonequilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

225

b.

Unstable Equilibrium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

227

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

230

and Social Choice

B.

.

Il.

211

B.

2.

Implications.

* Professor of Law and Governor Woodrow Wilson Scholar, Rutgers Scho<JI of Law-Newark and
Visiting Professor of Law, Leiden University.
** Lecturer in Law. Faculty of Law, Tilburg University. We thank David Carlson, Neil Duxbury,
Duncan Kennedy, Brian Langille, Ira Lupu, Gregory Mark, David Millon, Larry Mitchell. Anthony
Ogus, Andrew Reeve, Joel Trachtman, and Geoffrey Underhill for their comments on earlier drafts of
this article, along with the par1icipants in workshops at the George Washington. Maryland, and Rutgers
law schools, Warwick Business School and in the following conferences: Harvard Law School
Graduate Program Conference on New Approaches to International Law, University of Manchester
School of Business Conference on European Regulation, and Philosophy and Public Affairs Seminar at
the University of Warwick. Thanks also to our research :�ssistants Lucian Genritsen, Kristen Roberts,
and Andrew White.

201

202

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
C.

D.

ADDITIONAL FRlCTIONS INHIBITING THE TlEBOUT MECHANISM:
EXTERNALITIES, MOBILITY, AND INFORMATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

231

1.

Externalities and Spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

231

2.

Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

233

3.

Infonnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

234

THE PROBLEM OF ENTREPRENEURiAL INCENTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . .

235

1.

236

The Conventional State as Entrepreneur . . . . . . . . . . . . .

237

EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE TIEBOUT MECHANISM . . . . . . . . . . . . .

239

1.

Capitalization Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

240

2.

Other Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

241

JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN A SECOND-BEST WORLD: THE
NEW ECONOMICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

243

TAX COMPETITION MODELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

244

l.

Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

245

2.

Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

249

a.

Unstable Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

249

b.

Externalities, Information, and Mobility . . . . . . . . . .

250

c.

Entrepreneurial Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

251

Neo-Tieboutian Tax Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

251

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION MODELS OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS
PRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

254

E.

A.

3.
B.

1.

Information Revelation by Local Government Agents in a
Tiebout Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

254

Yards6ck Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

256

SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

259

lMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL FEDERALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

260

A SUITABILITY STANDARD FOR CLAIMS OF COMPETITIVE
BENEFIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

260

2.
C.
JV.

The Entrepreneurial State and the Problems of
Observation and Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.

Ill.

[Vol. 86:201

A.

I.

Implications for Legal Federalism's Devolutionary
Presumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

260

203

JURISD ICTIONAL COMPETITION

1997]
2.

The Suitability Standard, the Race-to-the-Top, the

. . . . . .

262

.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . .

264

Race-to-the-Bottom, and the Prisoner's Dilemma

3.
B.

Scare Talk. .

IMPUCATIONS FOR REGULATORY

COMPETITION . . . . .

1.

Competition t o Confer Legal Status .......

2.

Competition for Factors of Production. .

266

.

. . . . . . . .. ... .

268

a.

Extenwlities and Competitive Environmental PoLicy . . .

270

b.

Optimal Numbers .. . .. . . . . . .. . . ...

.

273

.

274

c. Mobility

CONCLUSION

265

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

d.

Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

275

e.

Entrepreneurial Incentives and Regulatory Capture

.

276

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

277

.

INTRODUCTION
Our federalism has entered a devolutionary phase. 1 We see this in the
2
political rhetoric of federal deregulation, in recent legislative initiatives, such
4
3
as the 1 996 welfare reform act, and in academic discussions. Under the
emerging majority view, relative regulatory advantage within the federal system
lies with state and local government. This reverses a co�nventional wisdom
favoring federal solutions that dates back to the New Deal. The devolutionary
shift results from the confluence of many patterns of thought and action
political, social, legal, and economic.This

article focuses on the point where the

economics, come together to articulate a theory of
legal federalism derived from the economic theory of jurisdictional competition.
Legal federalism looks to the economic theory of jurisdictional competition

last two factors, law and

to provide decisive support for devolutionary initiatives. This economic theory
has been understood in legal contexts to yield two general assertions, which in
tum give rise to three powerful normative implications for federalism. The two
assertions are said to be these:

(1) competitive forces shape a wide range of

I. See Steven D. Gold. Issues Raised by the New Federalism, �9 No\T'L TP>X J. 273. 273-77 (1996);
Peter H. Schuck, fmroduction: Some ReflecTions on The Federalism Debate, 14 Y1-\LE J. ON REG. 1, 5-9
(1996). The term ''devolutionary'' is used in contrast to the tem1 ''deregulatory." although there is an
area of overlapping meaning. A devolutionary initiative contemplates federal withdrawal from a
regulatory field in favor of exclusive occupation by state and local govermnl�nts. Such an initiative is
deregulatory at the federal level; it need not be deregulatory at the state and loc:al level.
2. See, e.g., CONTRACT WlTII A MERICA (Ed Gilliespie & Bob Schellhas eds. 1994).
3. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193.
I I 0 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codifted as amended in scattered sections including 42 IU.S.C. §§ 601-18 ( 1996))
(replacing Aid to Families With Dependent Children with block grants to state:;).
4. See, e.g., Symposium, ConsTructing a New FederaLism, 14 YALE J. ON REG. I ( 1996).
.
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outcomes at state and local levels because public goods and regulations figure
significantly in the locational decisions of factors of production, citizens, and
5
capital (hereinafter refe1Ted to as "factors of production"); and (2) this compe
tition produces a market that aligns regulatory outcomes with citizen prefer
ences in a first-best equilibriwn6 and thereby provides an "empirical answer" to
7
important policy questions, because it permits only public goods and regula
8
tions for which citizens willingly pay to survive in the long run. The normative
impli cations for legal and political theory that result from the economics, thus
characterized, include the following: (1) jurisdictional competition will disci
pline government producers for the benefit of taxpaying citizens_just as price
competition disciplines producers of private goods for the benefit of consumers;

(2) the central government should be viewed as a cartel because just as
collaboration among competing producers reduces price competition and incen
tives to innovate, so too does the removal of regulatory subject matter to a
central government reduce the number of potential competitors and dilute
entrepreneurial incentives; and (3) federal intervention, whether by congres
sional legislation9 or judicial decree, 10 inhibits the operation of the market and
therefore proves at best unnecessary and at worst produces dead weight anticom
petitive costs. At the bottom line, a strong presumption favors locating regula
tory authority with junior (that is, state and local) levels of government.

5. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Politicnl Institutions: Market-Preserving Federal
ism and Economic Developmelll, 1 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 1, 5 ( 1995).
6. A first-best equilibrium (Pareto optimal) exists if there is no other outcome which agents would
prefer. See JACK HIRSCHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY ANO INFORMATION
136-39 ( 1992). According to the theory, this first-best Pareto optimal equilibrium requires satisfaction
of two conditions: the junior-level regulation must not generate significant externalities, and borders
must remain open allowing the free movement of capital and labor. See. e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Federalism and European Business Law, 1 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 125, 127, 129 ( 1 994); cf Thomas
W. Merrill. Chief Justice Relmquist, Pluralist The01y, and the Interpretation of Statwes, 25 RUTGERS
L.J. 621, 640 ( 1 994) (noting that interjurisdictional spillovers and consequent races to the bottom limit
beneficial effects of regulatory competition).
7. See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited am/ Enumermed Powers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez. 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 776 (J 995). Even when the conditions for a l'irst-best
equilibrium outcome are not met the possibility of competition will lead to benelicial experimentation
and regulatory differentiation. !d. at 777; cf George Wyeth. Regulat01y Competition and the Takings
Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 87, 88, 91, 92-94 ( 1 996) (employing the "hypothetical" competitive
omcome as the basis for determining the existence of a regulato1y taking).
8. See Weingast, supra note 5, at 5. A jurisdiction. accordingly. will regulate only if the political
benefits of the regulation are worth the costs imposed by exiting actors. See id. at 6.
9. See. e.g.. Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of rhe Federal
Commerce Power, 3 1 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 556 (1 994) (arguing that the exercise of the federal
commerce power is appropriate only when state regulation of commerce causes inefticient externali
ties); Rich:.1rd L. Revesz, Rehabilitating fnterstate Competition: Rethinking the ''Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmenwl Regulmion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1244-45. 1253 ( 1992)
(asserting a p res umption favori ng environmental regulation at the state level).
10. See Vicki Been, 'Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use £wetions: Rethinking the Unconstitlllional
Conditions Doctrine. 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473, 5 1 I (199 1 ) (arguing against federal constitutional scrutiny
of municipal land use decisions and concluding that. given regulatory competition, those who would constrain
municipal power have the ''burden to explain" why market forces do not provide adequate discipline).
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This article shows that this legal restatement of the economics materially
mischaracterizes the theory actually articulated in economic literature. The
restatement relies on an early generation of economic models, the robustness of
which long has been questioned by advanced opinion in the field of public
economics. These questions have caused the economists to modify their analy
sis of competitive behavior among govemments. Although these modified
models continue to emphasize the advantages of state and local regulation, they
relocate fonnal economic analysis in a second-best world. There concrete
conclusions about the economic benefits of decentralization must be delayed
pending solution of a long list of problems, including unstable equilibrium,
pervasive cost externalization, information asymmetry, and regulatory capture.
Analysis of these problems proceeds on a level of complexity that precludes
global efficiency pronouncements about the location of regulatory advantage
within the federal system. In an all-or-noth.ing debate between centralization
and devolution, this subsequent generation of models supports neither side.
Since this approach is new to legal federalism, it is herein referred to as the new
economics of jmisdictional competition.
The new economics withdraws support from legal federalism's general asser
tion that devolution of regulatory authmity to the state and local level leads to
competitive efficiency. Instead it assists evaluation of the strengths and weak
nesses of particular regulatory initiatives, whether centralizing or devolutionary.
Although the new economics does not preclude reference to the benefits of
jurisdictional competition in policy debates, it does reallocate the burden of
showing these benefits to the proponent of a competitive, junior-level solution.
To meet the burden, such a proponent must establish: (1) the presence of
conditions conducive to competition, because devolution alone does not assure
that competition determines the terms of regulation; and (2) a chain of causation
connecting the competitive lawmaking process and the regulatory outcome to
the satisfaction of citizen preferences, because regulatory competition alone, if
and when it occurs, does not ensure this result. The proponent's argument
should begin with a statement of particular competitive pressures. It should then
establish how the pressures affect the alignment of interest-group politics as
well as other factors that influence regulatory outcomes in the competing
jutisdictions. Finally, the proponent should show how the politics thus described
lead to the desired regulatory outcome.
These complex lessons concerning the economic properties of state and local
regulation have not yet been assimilated into legal federalism. This deficient
economic learning creates a risk of distorted regulatory outcomes, especially at
a time when economics is routinely invoked to support new devolutionary
initiatives. This article begins the needed remedial work. 1 1

11.

Two recent

articles also draw on the new

Michael

1. Trebilcock,

of jurisdictional competition. avoiding the
an all-or-nothing proposition. See Robert Howse &

economics

practi ce of viewing jurisdictional competition as

The Fair Trade-Free hade Debate: Trade, Labo1; and the Environment, 16
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A section by section analysis follows. Part I situates jurisdictional competi
tion theory in the larger contexts of legal federalism and public choice theory.
This discussion begins with the classic Tiebout model of public goods provi
sion!2 describes its expansion into a model of regulatory competition in legal
contexts, and then fixes the Tiebout model's place in public choice theory. This
analysis shows that jurisdictional competition theory's special attractions are its
supposed ability to achieve a first-best equilibrium outcome and to cure state

and local regulatory capture problems. 1 3 Part I then describes the structure and
posture of legal federalism's debate between race-to-the-top and race-to-the
bottom views of jurisdictional competition, and concludes that neither view
offers a useful approach for projecting the economic results of devolution.
Part II examines the Tiebout model's theoretical shoticomings. This discus
sion shows that public economics has never managed to derive a stable equiLib
rium model of competing jurisdictions that meaningfully describes the real
world (or any reasonably approximate hypothetical substitute). Theoretically
speaking, this is a devastating result for jurisdictional competition's advocates
in legal contexts. It leaves them to commend a bizarre sort of federalism in
which central government must intervene to stabilize a dysfunctional, unpredict
able market. The discussion further shows that, even absent this market stabiliza
tion activity, such a central authority would be fully occupied devising
mechanisms to ameliorate frictions that inhibit the Tiebout model's operation
limited information, externalities, and the costs of mobility. Finally, Part II
highlights the hollowness of the model's assumption that government actors
have incentives to act entrepreneurially. Because it lacks a credible description
of a lawmaker's incentives, the model fails to provide a mechanism that
beneficially disciplines government and eliminates public choice problems.
Part III introduces the new generation of formal models of jurisdictional
competition to the legal literature. These models redeploy the theory in a
second-best world, sapping the strength from the efficiency claims routinely
made in legal federalism. The new models show that externalities-universally
accepted as a legitimate ground for federal intervention under the model-are
implicated in most state and local decisions to tax and provide public goods. As
a result, the job of qualifying a devolutionary initiative on productive grounds
becomes much more difficult. The new economics also searches for mecha-

lNT'L REv.

L. & EcoN. 61 (1996) (taking a complex approach to analysis of trade-offs between free

trade and environmental and labor standards); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and rhe Deducribiliry
of State and Local 1(1.\es Under the Federal Income

Tax. 82 VA. L. REv. -H 3. 420 (1996) (reserving

decision on the question of the efficiency consequences of deductibility of state and local taxes for
federal income tax purposes). This article is the first to discuss the implications of the new economics

of jurisdictional competition for the broader legal theory of federalism.

See Charles Tiebout. A Pure Theory of Local Expendiwres, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956).
13. By regulatory <.:apture, we mean the exercise of influence over regulators by rent-seeking private

12.

actors and interest groups, as described in public choice theory. See infra notes 51-54 and accompany
ing text.
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nisms that ameliorate the old model's deficiencies, addressing problems that the
old model assumed away, such as information asymmetry and regulatory cap
ture at the state and local level. Ironically, politics and voting, purportedly
irrelevant under the old model, come back into the picture as a more plausible
model is cobbled together piece by piece.
Part IV articulates the new economics' implications for legal federalism. This
discussion recommends a five-step suitability standard for legal applications of
the theory, and the retirement of the shopworn and misleading concepts of a
race-to-the-top and a race-to-the-bottom. Part IV also extends the lessons of the
economic models, which for the most part concern local public goods produc
tion, to a range of regulatory competition situations. This discussion offers a
typology showing that the old model applies with greater robustness in certain
regulatory competition situations than it does with local public goods produc
tion, but that in other situations, its problems continue.
[. THE

JUR ISDICTIONAL COM PET ITION PARAD IGM

A. TH E TIEBOUT MODEL AND ITS TRAJ-JSITION TO L EGAL r: EDERALlSM
I . The Tiebout Model
Charles Tiebout's economic theory of jurisdictional competition addresses the

4

production of public goods, 1 that is, the actual goods and services produced by
government for which citizens willingly pay, such as national defense, police
and fire protection, roads and sewers, and public education. According to the
"Samuelson condition," public goods are a11ocated efficiently when the sum of
a citizen's marginal rate of substitution of income for the good equals the
marginal cost of an additional unit of the good.15 The Samuelson condition,
however, is not easily met. With private goods, market competition exerts
downward pressure on producers' marginal costs, and market prices provide
concrete information about consumers' rates of substitution. With public goods,
in contrast. no obvious market exerts downward pressure on government produc
ers' marginal costs. Nor does an obvious mechanism force taxpaying citizen
consumers truthfully to reveal their rates of substitution.

16

14. Technically, a pure public good is a good from which consuming individuals cannot be excluded
if they fail to provide their pro rata share of the rent required for production. The provision of public
goods, thus defined. economically justifies the existence of government: given free-rider problems,
producen. of public goods canno1 capture some or aJI of their production cost, and such goods will be
undersupplied absent a taxation mandate. Assessment of a good's status as a public good entails
examination of a range of factors, such as the feasibility of exclusion, the properties of demand, and the
costs and distribmional implications of individually based supply. See ANTHONY D. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E.
STIOLnZ. LECnJRfS ON Pvsuc ECON0.\1JCS 483-87 {1980): Paul A. Samuelson. The Pure Tl1eory of Public
£rpendiwres, 36 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 387, 387-88 ( 1954). ln this anicle. the tenn "public goods'" includes: ( I)
goods conventionally provided by local government in addition to pure public goods, and (2) public services.
15. Samuelson, supra note 14, at 387-88.
16. The free-rider problem that comes up in the arena of collective political action makes it rational

[Vol. 86:201
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The Tiebout model of regul atory competition purports to satisfy the Samuel
son condition by identifying a mechanism that disciplines government produc
ers and matches citizens' preferences to l evels of public goods provision and
taxation. 17 The mechanism is a market-a market for public goods purveyed b y

competing legal governments to a customer base of mobile taxpaying citizens. 18

The model depicts the citizen-voter choice respecting local public goods made
by a city resident contemplating a move to the suburbs and choosing among a
number of towns.

A series of assumptions underli e Tiebout's model: 19
(I)

there exists a large number of communities, and the public goods offer
ings of each reflect the full range of public goods available;

(2)

mobi lity is costless for all relocating actors, who choose a jurisdiction
based on taxes and available public goods;

(3) pelfect information is available respecting the public goods on offer in all
jurisdictions;

(4)

every jurisdiction has an optimal size, defined as the number of residents
for which the bundle of services can be produced at the lowest average
cost;

(5)

communities below the optimal size will seek to attract new residents to
reduce the average cost of providing services; and

(6) there are no externalities, monopolies, or sp il lover effects across jurisdic
t ions

.

With these assumptions in place, the Tiebout model links ctttzen mobility
with preference revelation and predicts that locational decisions will reveal
individual preferences for public goods and levels of taxation. Rational forward
looking individuals, after surveying the range of available choices, will ac t in
accordance with their preferences for location-speci fic bundles of public goods.

for citizens to slate incon·ectly the level of their demand. See Samuelson, supra note

14, at 387.

Demands will be overstateJ or understated depending on the individual's projection of required
paymenls. For example, an actor will overstate hjs or her demand if the actor believes that the demand
leaves his or her level of payment unaffected. and the additional cost of providing the good will fall on
others. See Theodore Groves. lncemives in Teams. 41

ECONOMETRICA 617. 624 ( 1973).
17. Tiebout. supra note 12. at 422.
18. The model has been subsequentJy developed and refined. See. e.g., WALL,\CE E. OATES, FISCAL
FEDER.'\LISM ( 1972); James M. Buchanan & C.J. Goetz. Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An
Assessment of tile 7iehow Model. l J. Pus. EcoN. 25, 39-40 ( 1972) I criticizing the Tiebout model's
failure to consider the ··ract of location" and the "absence of proprietary ownership''): William A.

Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in tile Location of Firms in Suburban Communities,
in

FISCAL ZONING AND LAND UsE CONTROLS 119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eels., 1975)

(extending Tiebout model to include nonresidential land use).

19. Tiebout.

supra note

12. at 419. The model also assumes that the preferences of relocating actors

are not influenced by thl! presence or absence of employment opportunities.

!d.
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The model goes on to predict that this preference revelation process leads to a
market equilibrium. This local public goods equilibrium will be established
because, like producers of private goods and services, local government units
will compete with their public goods offerings to attract new residents. Competi
tion between local governments thus should be promoted because it will lead to
an optimal balance between the level of taxation and the provision of public
goods.

2. Extension to Regulation
The Tiebout model influenced the field of public economics profoundly.
Public economists have been producing formal models of jmisdictional competi

tion ever since it appeared in 1956.20 But, during the latter part of this period,
strategies for dealing with the model's lack of robustness have been the l i tera'

.

?I

ture s pnmary concern.-

The original model has fared better in recent years on the interdisciplinary
playing field of law and economics, in which the rigors of formalization are
relaxed and normative concerns predominate. In further contrast to the model's
development in its home field, where it has remained closely tied to the study of
the production of local public goods, in legal contexts the model has been
applied to a broad range of subject matter. These applications extend the public
goods concept to government's output of regulation in addition to its output of
actual goods and services. Under this expanded vi ew, the public consumes and
pays for regulatory outcomes such as contract enforcement, clean air, safe
products, and stable labor relations. Government is just another producer in the
overall economy, and law is product. The extended Tiebout model fundamen
tally changed legal federalism. When the model first came to legal federaJism
early in the history of law and economics, its applications were in local
22
government law and associated real property topics. The extension to regula-

20. Somewhat contradictorily, the Tiebout model also supports a set of autonomy-oriented policy
prescriptions designed to enhance the chance that local-level competition respecting public goods
production actually occurs. See id. at 423: see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part ll-Localism
and Legal Theory, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 346. 403 ( 1 990). Related arguments have been made in legal
discussions of local government and land use. See, e.g., Been, supra note 10, at 543-45 (arguing against
judicial scrutiny of land use exactions); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1 5 1 9 . 1543-45 (1982) (discussing owner associations). But see Stew:l.rt E. Sterk,
Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions. 45 VAND. L. REV. 83 1 ,
844-45, 850, 857-58 (1992) (arguing that municipalities have rent-extraction capacity despite competi
tion).
2 1 . See infra Part II.
22. See Frederick T. Goldberg, Note, Equalization of Municipal Services, The Economics of Serrano
and Shaw. 82 YALE L.J. 89, 89-104 (1972) (applying the Tiebout model to argue against judicially
imposed per capita equality in respect of public goods provision by local government); see generally,
BRUCE A. ACKERMAJ'-1, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 247-65 (1975) (illustrating and
questioning the model's application in legal concepts); Robert C. Ellickson. Suburban Growth Con
trols: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 506 & n.404 (1977) (citing Tiebout as
supporting ideal of a variety of public goods).
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tion then enabled the model's application to corporate/3 banking,24 and environ
mental law?5 with antitr use6 and product safety following soon thereafter.27
The cumulated applications28 transformed federalism theory.29 Jurisdictional
competition joined the list of more traditional concems,30 and came to be

23. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Ll1w, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251. 254-58 ( 1 977).
24. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REv. l, 12-13 (1977) (identifying competition between federal and state regulators for bank

charters). Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey later controvert Scott's assertion. Hen:ry N. Bmler &
Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677,
707-12 ( 1 988) (drawing on public choice theory to refute the argument that the federal banking agency
competes with state agencies for bank incorporations, but recommending devolution too the state level
for the purpose of competitive benefit). Arthur Wilmarth refutes the Macey and Miller argument,
showing that state-federal rivalry leads to benefits and pointing to beneficial state-level innovation.
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for
Presen1ing the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 1 33, 1 239-55 (1990). Fm a contrasting
approach, see Helen A. Garten, Devolwion and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial Reform, l4
YALE J. ON REG. 65, 65-68 ( 1996) (questioning whether devolution to the states will bring the
deregulatory results Macey and Miller desire, and showing that state regulation of the banks has on the
wbole been more restrictive than federal regulation).
25. See Richard B. Stewart, 171e Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in
Judicial Review of Em•ironmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv.
7 1 3 , 7 14-22 (1977) [hereinafter Developmem] (articulating the race-to-the-bottom view of regulatory
competition); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids ofSacrifice? Problems ofFederalism in Mandating State Implemen
tation ofNational Environmenral Policy. 86 YALE L. J. l l 96, 1212 ( 1 977) [hereinafter Pyra111ids] (same).
26. See Frank H. Easterbrook. Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism. 26 J.L. & EcoN. 23.
23-25 ( 1983).
27. See David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism. 65 B.U. L. REv. I.
l-3 (1985).
28. The law as product field is still "booming." Carol M. Rose. Takings. Federalism. Norms. lOS
YALE. L.J. 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 33 ( 1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL. REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS.
AND POLITICS ( 1995)). Applications of the basic law as product model to new domestic topics continue

to appear. For a recent example. see David A. Skeel.

and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72

TEx. L. REv.

Jr..

Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law

471 (1994) (suggesting that a variant of state charter

competition would be preferable to a federal bankruptcy regime).
29. The volume of applications to general federalism theory has increased notably in the past few
years. See, e.g., Calabresi. supra note 7, at 776; LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 556: Weingast, supm note 5, at S-6.
30. Traditional concerns include diversity and participation, checks on central concentrations of
power, and republican values. See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 1 9 G A . L. REv. 917,
917-18 ( 1 985).

After thus becoming a fixture on the landscape of American federalism, regulatory competition
expanded to venues worldwide. lt has appeared within other federal systems, see Ronald J. Daniels,
Should Provinces Compete' The Case for a Competitil'e C01porate Lt1w Marker, 36 McGILl L.J. 130.
1 50-5 I ( 1 991) (djscussing Canadian corporate law), and quasi-federal systems, most notably in
discussions on strategies for integration wi1hin the European Union, see, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note
6, at 126-36: Gerard Hertig, lmpe1ject Mwual Recognition for EC Financial Services, 114 fNT'L REv. L.
& EcoN. 177, 178 ( 1994) (applying the Tiebout model to support the point that mutual recognition is
superior to national treatment). Regulatory competition also figmes into "globalization'' discussions. Its
assertions strengthen the case for new supranational legal regimes that promote free trade. They then
enable a neat I'Olte face, prompting caution with respect to all other initiatives for transnational
regulatory cooperation or coordination, while simultaneot•sly supporting arguments for national-level
deregulation in response to global competition for investment capital and global product-market
competition. See Joel P. Trachtman, lntemational RegttlatOI)' Competition, Externali;:.ariun and Jurisdic

tion, 34 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 47, 48-49 ( 1 993).
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acknowledged as a basic federalism value.31

3. Restatement as Legal Federalism's Race-to-the-Top
Legal federalism relies upon the Tiebout model to suppon a general predic
tion about the evolution of state and local regulation-the "race-to-the-top"
view. Relying on the model, it makes two assumptions: (1) state and local
governmental actors intensely compete for citizens, factors of production, and
capital; and (2) this competition leads to an equilibrium result respecting
regulation as well as public goods.32 These assumptions promise diverse menus
of public goods and regulation that meet differing citizen tastes,33 along with an
efficient allocation of industrial activity among junior-level jurisdictions?4 Le
gal federal ism then fits the model into a Darwinian evolutionary framework to
predict that, in a dynamic environment, competitive forces will ensure that only
efficient regulation remains in effect35 and over time this race-to-the-top will
ensure improved standards of regulation.36 In contrast, centralization and its
secondary counterpatt of coordination across junior units emerge as the regula
tory equivalents of price-fixing,37 presumptively retarding the competitive evolu
tion of first-best law.38 Accordingly, the proponent of central government
intervention as the solution to a problem must bear the burden of showing why
market forces will not eliminate the problem in due course. 39
Two universally recognized exceptions to this presumption favoring decentrali
zation should be noted. First, borders must be kept open so factor and citizen
mobility can bring competitive discipline to regulation.40 Authority to suppress
anticompetitive lawmaking must be vested at higher levels of government,

3 L See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 76-91 (1995).

32. The race-to-the-Lop. as a legal paradigm. otiginated i n commentary on the U.S. corporate

chartering system. Thus viewed, the market for corporate charters ensures that efficient legal structures
evolve as the states respond to the demands of reincorporating corporate actors. No intervention of the

national government is called for. See Winter. supra note

23, at 290.
33. See Weingast, supra note 5, at 5.
34. See Revesz, supra note 9, at 122 1-22.
35. See Trachtman. supra note 30, at 65-66; Weingast, supra note 5, al 5 (arguing that only those

regulations for which citizens are willing to pay will survive) ;

Regulation and Intemarional Comperitiveness, 102

YALE L.J.

c_f

R ichard

B.

Stewart,

Environmental

2039, 2050 (1993) (arguing that trade

policy should not be modified for environmental concerns. and that present environmental regulation

does not achieve its purposes in a cost-benefit manner).

36. Presumably, a jurisdiction will add to the net regulatory burden of its factors if the political
competitive costs. See Weingast, supra note 5, at 6; Maura B. Perry. Note, A

benefits exceed the

Challenge Postponed: Market 2000 Complacency in Response to Regulat01y Competition for fmema
tional Equity Markets, 34 VA. J. lNT'L L. 7 0 1 . 706 ( 1994)
37. See Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 127.

38. If cenualization and coordination do not retard the competitive evolution, they may at least

disrupt it. Revesz, echoing the insights of the tax competition literature,

see infra

text accompanying

notes 208-18, points out that preemptive central intervention as to one subject matter need only cause

competition to shift to another. Revesz, supra note 9, at 1244-47.

39. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENTUS OF AMERJCAN CORPORATE LAW 1 9 ( 1 993)

corporate law); Been, supra note 10, at 5 1 ! (discussing local government law).
40.

See Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 129.

(discussing
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whether through a centralizing device such as the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution or a coordinating institution such as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade or the North American Free Trade Agreement. Second, this
higher authority must poJjce externalities pursuant to economic theory 's com
mand that the scope of regulation match the domain of its costs and benefits.4 t
Competing govemments have an incentive to regulate so as to facilitate cross
2
border cost externalization by their citizens.4 The classic example occurs when
a jurisdiction excepts from its environmental laws a given type of pollution
knowing that prevailing winds will blow the permitted particles across the
border. Here, not only does the producer extemalize a cost, but those affected by
the extemality have no voice regarding its regulation and have not traded their
sufferance for higher incomes. With externalities, multiple jurisdictions can
even race-to-the-bottom, justifying either intervention by a higher-level unit or
3
intergovemmental cooperation to remedy the situation. 4
4
A third exception, for welfare and other redistributive policies, 4 is widely (if
4
not universally 5 ) acknowledged. Comp�ting local governments have incentives
to encourage new investment and immigration by rich citizens and to discour
age immigration by poor citizens. It follows that a decentralized system likely
leads to a lower level of government-mandated wealth redistribution than its
citizens might otherwise prefer. This third exception would also justify central
ized welfare provision (or central intervention to impose minimum welfare

41.

See id.

at l27.

42. lf a Jaw is not cost beneficial bur i nvolves no externalities, there is at least some local incentive

to change it; if the costs are externalized. there is no local incentive to make a change. Product liability
laws that favor locals exemplify th is.

See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residemial Real
Eswte Finance Law in Ihe 1990s and the Jmpliwtions of Changing Financial Markets. 64 CAL. L. REv.
1261, 1288-89 (1991).

43. See Stewart, supra note 35. a t 2098. The justificat i on for federal intervention p recludes criticism
of the regulatory strategy actually implemented. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and
Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 ( 1 996) (arguing that the Clean Air Act
does not successfu lly force internalization of interstate pollution externalities). In recent years, commen

tatOrs have argued that choice of law behavior in products li ability litigation presents such a case. See
Michael W. McConnell. A Choice·o.f-Law Approach to Products·Liability Reform, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN LiABILITY LAW 90, 9 1 -92 (Walter Olson ed., 1988); Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and

Empirical Analysis of Choice of Lnw, 24

GA.

L. REv. 49,

54 (1989). McConnell recommends a

mandatory federal conflicts rule keyed to the law of the place of the sale. McConnell, supra.

Hay

that the incentive picture is more complicated and counsels caution respecting federalization.

argues

See B ruce

ConflicTs of Law and State Competition in the Product Liabiliry Sys�em, 80 GEo. L..J. 6 1 7 ,
see also Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing 1ivo Assumptions
Abow Federalism and Tort Reform, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 3 7 1 , 373, 378 (1996) (showing there is no
sta te-leve l bias); Gary T. Schwanz, Assessing the Adequacy of State Product Liability Lawmaking, 1 4
L. Hay,

617-18, 651-52 (1992):

YALE J . ON REG. 359, 3 6 5 ( 1996) (arguing that any problem of state-level structural bias is not as
serious as has been suggested).
44.

See OATES. supra note 18, at 6-8.
See LeBoeuf. supra note 9, at 579

(arguing that, given limitations on mobility, local govern
ments will have room to redistribute. even while arguing that regulatory competi tion otherwise is a
useful Lool, without any apparent concern for the proble m of limitations on mobility).
45.
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46
standards).

4. Ties to Related Devolutionary Theories-Public Choice and Social Choice
Some commentators refer to jurisdictional competition theory as a branch of
47
This reflects the theories' common rational-expectations
public choice theory.
methodology, common devolutionary recommendations, and common oppo
nents and proponents. Nonetheless, as the following discussion shows, jurisdic
tional competition theory sharply distinguishes itself from public choice theory
by making a more heroic claim for devolutionary benefits. The succeeding
discussions in Parts II and ill further show that problems in delivering on this
claim create tension between jurisdictional competition and public choice.
The two theories' common opponent is the public interest the01y of govenm1ent
that prevailed in the early post-war era.Public interest theory emphasizes the govern
ment's role as a benevolent maximizer of social welfare both in the provision of
48
traditional public goods and as an economic regulator. It looks to centralization best
to realize the public interest, particularly in the wake of a finding of a market failure.
Given a democratic political framework, centralization alone is not deemed danger
ous. Citizens can limit any expansionary governmental tendencies by express
�9
ing their preferences through interest-group competition in the political process:
Public choice proponents countered that the "public interest" cannot be
meaningfully articulated in the first place, much less utilized as a template for
regulation. Social choice theory supports this view, showing that voting para
doxes prevent the emergence of a public interest preference ordering for public

46. See Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delive1y of Municipal Services, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 946, 959-61 ( 1 987) (reviewing CHARLES M. HMR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE
TRACKS: REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADlTION OF FAIRNESS IN TI-lE STRUGGLE

AGAINST INEQUALITY (!986)) (noting that an economically disadvantaged class may be cut out of local

interest-group politics and arguing that inequality of municipal services favorin g the rich may be
necessary to prevent flight to the suburbs); Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders '
Design, 54 U. CHr. L. REV. 1484, 1499-1500 {1987) (reviewing R<\OUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FouNDERS' DESIGN ( 1987)); Stewru1, supra note 30, at 9 19-20, 925-26. David Shaviro makes an
additional point: because here regulation and the attendant politics come down to a determination of
cash amount, localized preference diversity presents a less imponant value. See Daniel Shaviro, An
Economic and Political Look at Federalism i n Ta�nllion, 90 MlCH. L. REv. 895, 965 ( 1 992).
47. See, e.g., George A. Boyne, Competition and Local Govemmenr: A Public Choice Perspective,
33 URB. STUD. 703, 703 ( 1 996).
48. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN Tn�OLE. A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT

AND

REGULATION 475 (1993).
49. The introduction of public choice theory indirectly strengthened this association between the

public interest and centralized regulation. Olson's model of govemment capture stipulates that smaller,
better-financed interest groups have an advantage when it comes to influencing regulators because they
can more easily surmount collective action problems. MANCUR OLSON. THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF THE GROUP 33-36, 132-35 (2d ed. 1971). This means that
producer interests have a structural advantage over consumer interests and policy causes with more
diffused bases of suppon such as the environment and, for that matter, free trade. The movement of
regulation to higher levels helps to redress the balance by making possible cost economies in the
lobbying effons of the dispersed interests.
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goods, and predicting that n o technical adjustment o f democratic processes can
solve the problem.50 Regulation, accordingly, does not embody a "public
interest," in the sense of an aggregation o f the preferences o f the electorate.
Public choice theory goes on to account for the content of regulation as a
reflection of private interests. The theory asserts that actors rationally employ
the government and fom1 groups to influence, or "capture," it. As risk averse
lawmakers respond to the dominant voices, legislation reflects the demand
p·attems of these interest groups.51 This p1ivate rent-seeking activity prompts
competition among government actors (who occupy a monopolist's position
respecting scarce public goods)52 to become rent distributors and receive interest
group favors.53 This regulatory capture results in dead weight social losses. 54
At this point, the Tiebout model, with its competition-based local public
goods equilibrium, shows up in the analysis to offer a theoretical cure:55 Since

50.

Voting procedures theoretically should aggregate individual preferences into a single consistent

preference. Anow, following earlier theorists, identified a parad ox which

stated that there is no single,

transitive social preference.
Given majority rule, it is possible to cycle
p layers: A,

B, and

through different preferences. Assume that there are lhree

C; and three alternative outcomes:

a , b, and c; and the following preference ranki ngs:

A : abc
B: hca
C: cba
The

result is

SCHAPIRO. PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
SctENCE

of transitive social ordering. See KENNETH J .
46-60 ( 1951 ); see a/so DONALD P. GREEN & IAN

a classic voting paradox. that is, a lack

ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES

7-8 (1994)

THEORY:

A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL

(noting tl1at A.ll'ow's paradox •·rendered all democratic rules of collective decision

C. 0R.DESHOOK. GJ\JvrE THEORY AND PoLmCAL THEORY: AN lNTRooucnoN 55-56
( 1986) (su mmarizing developmentS in game tl1eory most relevant to formal political tl1eory). Cycling occw-s by

potentially suspect"); PETER

virtue of the actors' preferenc
es

remaining fixed over time. With multiple issues to be resolved simultaneously
number of decisiorunakers, social choice models show mat cyclical majotities will occur in
two-thirds of the decision contexts, so long as logically ordered preferences are likely to emerge. Cycling is
only a problem in the simplest of majority rule instimtions-without agenda controls, without strategic voting,
and wit11 an agenda constructed on an ongoing basis; in practice. agenda-setting instirutons and agent
s<Ophistication constrain majority outcomes. See Kenneth Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and
Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 A.t\-1. J. POL. Set. 48, 64-67 ( 1985).
5 l . Producers, in partic ular, likely would make demands of lawmakers-seeki ng subsidies, import
quotas, tariffs, price regulation. or government-created barriers to enll)' (such as licensing requirements). See
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula1ion, 2 BELL J . EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 10-17 ( 1971 ).
by a large

i

52. See Gillette, supra note 46, at 958-59.
53. See James M. Buchanan, Rent-Seeking Under External Diseconomies, in TOWARD A THEORY OF
A. R.ENT-SEEKrNG SociETY 183, 186-87, 190-91 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); R.D. Tollison,
Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 579 ( 1 982).
54. Under this public choice/social choice diagnosis of the infirmities of democratic government,
regulatory capture and excess government growth flourish
prevails in lawmaking con texts.

The

when

discourse about the public interest

rhetorical eq uili brium conceals the determi nan t

rent-seeki ng. See

Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 128.
55. More specifically. Ticbout's analysis was framed as a direct response to Samuelson's conclusion,
see supra note 14 and accompanying text, that i ndividuals would not reveal their preferences for public
goods . The Tiebout model follows from the same behavioral
ll!nd shares

its

OF' ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

assumptions as does

public choice theory

See WLLLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALL.4CE E. OATES, THE THEORY
288 (2d ed. 1988) (commenting that race-to-the-bottom arguments tend to

methodological p references.

i nformali ty and yield indeterminate

results concerning the effects of competition).
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market transactions are the most accurate allocators o f resources, government

should be structured so that regulation fol lows not from discussion of the public

interest but from the responses of at-the-margin producers. Such a market

driven lawmaking equilibrium will also solve the problem of preference aggrega

tion previously identified. To achieve this equilibrium, regulatory authority must

be vested in junior-level units. Increasing their jurisdicti on expands opportuni
ties for competitive lawmaking.56
The Tiebout model's prescription of devolution of regulatory authority to
junior levels of government tracks a conclusion reached independently in
another line of public choice theory. Under this "Leviathan" theory, govern
ment actors-particularly those in central government-use their monopolists'
positions to pursue governmental revenue maximization.57 The degree of central
ization directly corresponds to the size of goverrunent, measured in terms of the
budget. Given the unceitainties of majority rule cycling,58 the rational ignorance
of voters, and confusion amongst politicians,59 political controls will fail to
contain government growth. Thus, the provision of public goods will reflect not
the util ity level of the average taxpayer, but that of the expanding state.
Meanwhile, regulatory capture leads to bigger dead weight costs when higher
levels of government exercise authority.60 Decentralization thus proves intrinsi
cally beneficial because it reduces the scope of the central government mo
nopoly and ameliorates the negative effects of regulatory capture.
An independent line of public economics also yields a devolutionary prescrip
tion. Under this "decentralization theorem," given a public good consumed by
geographical subsets of the population (the production costs of which are equal
as between central or local provision), local government can provide a locally
determined output level at least as efficiently and frequently more efficiently
than central government can provide a uniform level across all jurisdictions.61
More generally, decentralization narrows the variance in the distribution of
preferences, reduces the likelihood of bundled preferences, and ameliorates
some problems of asymmetric information. Thus, locally adapted regulation

56. The revenue-enhancement constraints that prompt competitive responses to citizen (and cus
tomer) preferences likely would be felt more intensely at junior levels.

See ROMANO, supra note 39. at

48.

57. See G EOFFREY BRENNA� & JAMES M. BucHANAN. THE PowER TO TAx: ANALYTICAL FouNDATIONS

OF A FlSCAL CONSTITUTIO/'< 17-24 ( 1980).

58. See supra note 50.

59. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 57, at 17-24: DEN:-IIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II: A

REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE 268 ( 1989).

60. Local authorities are less able to damage the economy: they cannot impose tariffs and quotas on

impons: their licensing arrangements have a limited reach; and their limited resources limit subsidies.
incentives to interest groups, accordingly. decrease as authority vests in junior levels. Easterbrook,

supra note 6, at 1 27.

6 1 . OATES,

supm note 18, at

35. Although

the point of origin is public economics, the proposition

has not been modelled; instead, the greater responsiveness of more local government systems is
assumed.

See

ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS AND

PUBLIC FINANCE 185

( 1996).
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more likely approaches the ideal of consonance with citizen preferences.62 At
the same time, the reduction of the regulating unit's size and the resulting

increase in the number of jurisdictional altematives63 increases the chance that
multiple jurisdictions' regulations will manifest a diverse range of preferences.

The localized experimentation thus fostered64 makes possible a range of regula
tory strategies while simultaneously limiting the negative impact of unsuccess

ful experiments.65
In these combined public choice/public economics theories then, decentraliza
tion leads to two benefits-responsiveness to citizen preferences and product
innovation-whether or not it also precipitates competition. The addition of
jurisdictional competition theory materially strengthens the case in two ways.
Erst, it predicts a first-best equilibrium given junior-level regulation: not only
are citizens' preferences statistically more likely to be satisfied at the junior
level, as the decentralization theorem asserts, but their preferences will be
satisfied on an ongoing basis even under changing conditions. This prediction
gives regulatory competition claims a potentially decisive role in policy debates.
Given the complexity of cost-benefit comparisons between central and junior
level regulatory alternatives, a first-best prediction from juri dictional competi
tion theory allows decentralization to trump. Indeed, the theory purports to
preempt the whole cost-benefit discussion.
Jurisdictional competition theory makes its second contribution in rebuttal to
the argument that devolution simply turns regulatory subject matter over to the
distortive manipulations of state and local interest groups. The discipli nary
effect of competition across states and localities minimizes local capture losses.
Given mobile factors of production, the imposition of costly and restrictive
interest-group legislation in one jurisdiction benefits a neighboring jurisdiction
with a Jess costly regime. As the factors of production vote with their feet, they
affect lawmakers' incentives by making inefficient wealth transfers to favored
groups less attractive than regulations that enhance the wealth of the larger
population.

62. The larger the number of jurisdictions. the greater the number of winners exceeds the number of
losers_ See Menill, supra note 6, at 640. The literature also suggests an incidental consideration: the
costs of reconciling prl!ferences through the political channels of dialogue and voting rises with the size
of the polity_ The larger the group. the more heterogenous and the larger the number of interactions. See
ROBERT BISH. THE POLITICAL ECON01-IY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS 35-37 (1971): Briffault, supra note
20, at 402-03.
63. ALBERT BRETON. CENTRALIZATION, DECEf\'TRALIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO�IPETITION 8
( 1 990). Social tastes and preferences differ, and the differences tend to correlate with geography.
Calabresi, supm note 7, at 775. Smaller units also are more likely to contain populations with majority
preferences that depart from the majority preference of the population of the larger unit. McConnell.
supra note 46, at 1498.
64. ROMANO, supra note 39. at 4-5; McConnell, supra note 46, at 1498.
65_ For a larger governmental unit. such small-scale experimentation proves difficult. Even the
choice of a venue presems a problem. LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 555. 562.
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B . T HE DEBATE IN LEGAL FEDERALISM: THE RACE-TO-THE-TOP VERSUS THE
RACE-TO-THE-BOTTOM

The jurisdictional competition· paradigm crosses the barrier that separates the
public and p1ivate spheres to recast the public sector in private sector terms. The
legal federalism debate over the paradigm focuses on the legitimacy of this
barrier-crossing. Supporters argue that the ensuing race-to-the-top will ensure a
high standard of government service. Opponents answer that competitive govern
ment actors will forsake their public mission and thereby "race-to-the
66
bottom."
To see this race-to-the-bottom perspective, consider how a proponent of a
public interest approach would respond to the race-to-the-top theory. From a
public interest perspective, dismantling federal regulations to encourage junior

level competition amounts to a betrayal of the public trust. With competition,
the content of regulation and the level of public goods and taxation are dictated
by the private preferences of a narrow, arbitrarily identified class of itinerant
at-the-margin consumers, rather than by a dispassionate and responsible calcula
tion of the public welfare. The individual jurisdiction, forced to cater to the
preferences of this narrow class, loses its ability to pursue its notion of the best
interests of the citizens committed to remain wj thin the jurisdiction for the long
term. At the same time, dismantling federal regulations deprives disaggregated
groups of states and localities of the technical ability to regulate multistate
businesses, with the mere th.reat of disinvestment sufficing to move legislatures

to satisfy firms' preferences.(-,7
This race-to-the-bottom view shares an important point with its race-to-the
top opposite: both assume that government actors intensely compete for factors
of production. Under the race-to-the-bottom theory, however, the race proceeds
downward because competition forces the pursuit of policies further and further
removed from the public interest. The characterization invites the remedy of
preemptive centralization. If, for a particular subject matter, the race necessarily
proceeds to the bottom, then a higher level of government should regulate the
matter whether or not competition presently determines the content of regula
tion at junior levels. This view is best known as a justification for the federaliza
tion of environmental law.68
The environmental law literature also contributes a restatement of the race-to
the-bottom position in economic terms. This provides that, without centraliza-

66. See generally Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Expltlining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law. 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67. 74-75
( 1996) (providing a useful typology of race-to-the-top and race-top-the-bottom argumentation).
67. See Stewart, supra note 30. at 919. Stewart also notes that even assuming that state and local

taxes are not the primarily factor in firms' locational decisions, states reasonably might worry that taxes
might matter at the margin. /d. at 949.
68. Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 25, at 1 2 1 1 - 12.
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tion, competition for production factors would leave the states in a prisoner's
dilemma respecting environmental standards.69 The threat of production factors
defecting to a competing state would deter any individual state from promulgat
ing environmental standards consistent with its preferences. The greater the
competition, the greater the disparity between the level of environmental protec
tion in the public interest and that evolving i n practice.70
Proponents of jurisdictional competition have recently rebutted this descrip
tion. They argue that the prisoner's dilemma rests on a set of heroic assump
tions, specifically the presence of fi xed preferences for strict regulation across
many jurisdictions, each of which believe that cost-benefit trade-offs should not
be applied to the subject matter. Competition for factors of production and
collective action problems then undermine the jurisdictions' ability to adhere to
the stated policy, producing a suboptimal result.71 The critics contend that a
more realistic setup would depict a world of scarce resources i n which the
inevitable cost-benefit trade-offs between levels of regulation and income would
prevent the assumption of any

a

priori fixed preference for a given level of

regulation. Without fixed preferences across jurisdictions, a jurisdiction cannot
assume that cooperation will yield higher payoffs, such that a prisoner's di
lemma is no longer inevitable.72 It remains possible in theory; but, say the
critics, in practice it is unlikely that absolute, normatively based preferences,
whether for stricter environmental rules or some other form of regulation.
would exist across jurisdictions?3
69. rei.
70. Furthennore, given a large number of states. the transaction costs of collective action prevent

coordination. The prisoner's dilemma accordingly ripens into a commons dilemma. For additional
applications of this line of thinking, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era:
Progress. Deregulat01y Change. and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L REV.
1.101, l l94 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 1 0 1 HARV. L. REv. 421,
505 ( 1 985). Revesz restates the prisoner's dilemma account in a two-party framework, showing that
when a player has two strategies. lax and strict, a suboptimal lax strategy strongly dominates the
optimal stringent strategy. Revesz, supra note 9, at 1 2 1 6- 1 7 , 1229-32. The suboptimal lax strategy is a
unique equilibrium and will always be selected. See generally DREW FuDENBERG & JEAN TrROLE. GAME
THEORY 9 - 1 0 ( 1 992). Absent cooperation or centralization, then. the outcome is PaJeto inferior.
Furthermore, given 50 states, cooperation through mutual forbearance is unlikely to evolve, even given
infinite repetition of the game. Hay, supra note 43, at 625-26.
7 L Revesz. supra note 9, at 1 2 1 9-24.
72. LeBoeuf offers a different fonnulation of the point. He notes that a state that imposes antipollu
tion legislation transfers wealth away from industry to those who value a clean environment. lf the
redistributive move embodied in the legislation is Kaldor-Hicks superior (actors in the aggregate are
better off although some are left worse oft), then the state can make a second redistributive move (a tax
break, for example) that compensates industry for the cost of compliance, and still be ahead on a net
basis in the end. If the state does not make the second redistributive move, it presumably prefers the
redistributive result of the antipollution legislation. If the state enacts no antipollution legislation. irs
residents presumably prefer r.o devote resources to capital investment. Federal intervention is, accord
ingly, redistributive. LeBoeuf. supra note 9. at 578, 589-90.
73. Stewa1t. supra note 35. at 2058-59; see also GIANDOMENICO MAlONE, MARKET 1NTt::GRi\TION AND
REGULATION: EUROPE AFTER 1992. at 23 (European Union Institution Working Paper 9 1 / 1 0, 1991);
JKonstantine Gastios & Paul Seabright, Regul(llion in the European Conununiry, 5 OXFORD REv. EcoN.
POL 37, 42-43 (1989); Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 1 1 . at 77. Majone and Gastios and Seabright
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The race-to-the-top view has the better of this discussion. Where once the
race-to-the-top and the race-to-the-bottom views competed for attention as
paradigmatic opposites of apparently equal strength, we now see a general
4
presumption i n competition's favor. 7 This result i s said to follow from eco
nomic theoty: regulatory competition pursuant to the Tiebout framework has survived
7
critical theoretical inspection, while the race-to-the-bottom counter has not 5
Table 1 below summarizes, for the record only, the components of the
race-to-the-bottom and the race-to-the-top views. Succeeding Parts o f this
article will show that the new economics of jurisdictional competition super
sedes this binary framework of analysis.
IL THE TffiBOUT MODEL'S EXTRAORDINARY DEMANDS

The Tiebout model's shortcomings are welJ known to economists. Legal
76
scholarship has often acknowledged this point, sometimes along with a bill of
77
particular theoretical and practical problems. Even so, in this case the process

assert that a prisoner's dilemma at the international level alone does not provide a sufficient justification
for a delegation of regulatory authority to a supranational LeveL Meanwhile, a prisoner's dilemma
characterization remains structurally appropriate when the motivation for the dominant strategy entails
a negative externality. See Hay, supra note 43. at 625-26.
74. A recent competition-favorable statement by a once-prominent voice on the race-to-the-bottom
side signals the shift See Stewart supra note 35, at 2079-82; see also Revesz, supra note 9. at 1244-45
(favoring environmental regulation at the state level). A similar movement can be seen in European
commentary. See MAJONE. supra note 73, at J 7 ; Gastios & Seabright, supra note 73, at 37. 42-43. The
degree of acceptance of competition as a regulatory tool can be indirectly conlinned by reference to
commentaries that avoid denunciations of competition even as they postulate gains from centralization
or coordination. Here, centralized regularion instead is advocated as the means to the end of harmo
nized regulatory standards that bring cost efficiencies. See David Chamy, Competition Among Jurisdic

tions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on rhe ''Race ro the Bottom · · in
the European Communities, 32 1-JARV. INT L LJ. 423, 426 (J 991); Stewart, supra note 35, at 2043-44.
'

National governments even have raced against one another to provide regulation benefitting consumers.
Joel R. Paul, Competitive and Non-Competitive RegtdatOIJ Markets: The Regulation of Packaging
Waste in the EU, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 355, 378-79 (William W. Bratton et aL eds.,
1996) (hereinafter L"'T' L REGULATORY COMPETITION].
75. Revesz. supra note 9, at 1212-13.
76. See. e.g., Briffault, supra note 20, at 427 (externalities and jurisdictional size); Ellickson, supra
note 22, at 1552 (mobility); Goldberg. supra note 22, at 98-108 (optimal size, mobility, extemulities);
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice 1\t/odel: An
Application to Constitwional The01y, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 506 (1988) (mobility and information costs);
Rice supra note 27. at 54-55 (mobility and number of jurisdictions); Shaviro, supra note 46. at 964
(costly exit): Stewan. supra note 30. at 923, 927 (limited mobility).
77. The most extensive treatments appear in the areas of local government and real property law, the
subject matter closest to that of public economics. See Been, supra note 10. at 5 1 1 : Briffault. supra note
20, at 399-403; Ellickson. supra note 22, at 1547-49, 1552: Gillette, supra note 46. at 955-62:
Goldberg, supra note 22. at 98-108. The exception is Revesz. supra note 9, at 1235-38 (discussing
environmental law). These discussions acknowledge that the Tiebout model has encountered difficulties
in its home field, but they address only narrow questions. They thereby avoid confronting the negative
implications of the model's sticking points and ultimately reinforce its robust appearance in legal
contexts. Been. supra note 10. at 5 1 1 -39. writes in terms only of land use, but she thoroughly reviews
the public economics. (n endorsing the Tiebout model, she relies on the couclusions of empirical
,
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TABLE I. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION: THE BINARY ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Race-to-the-Top

Economic welfare

Goal of regulation

Race-to-the-Bottom

Social welfare

Causality/competition as

Yes

Yes

determinant of terms of

Intense competition

Intense competition

regulation

determines terms of

determines terms of

regulation, given

regulation, given authority

authority at a low level

at a low level

Quality of regulation given

High

Low

competition

Regulation embodies

Capital purchases

citizen preferences; no

regulation; prisoner's

prisoner's dilemma

dilemma across
jurisdictions

Centralization/horizontal

Undesirable

Desirable

coordination

Rent-seeking causes

Holds out cost advantages

social costs for the

for influence activities by

benefit of private

large groups lacking

interests and impairs free

financial resources; cures

markets

market failure; saves social
costs through
harmonization of
regulation

Decentralization

Desirable

Undesirable

Unleashes competition;

Encourages capture by

deters capture; fosters

monied interests;

innovation; first-best

encourages market failure

equilibrium evolves
Extemalitics

Wealth redistribution

studies. !d. at 516-17

&

nn.

Undesirable

Undesirable

Justify centralization or

Justify centralization or

cooperation

cooperation

If desired

Desirable

Central function

Central function

203...04. We draw a different conclusion. See infra notes 157-70 and

accompanying tex!.
Revesz, supra note 9, passim, re-evaluates the robustness of the Tiebout model in the context of

in the process. He
model, id. at 1242-44, but only for the limited purpose of refuting the race-to-the

environmental law. making extensive references to public economics literature
endorses the Tiebout

bottom assertion and asserting that theoretically regulatory competition is consistent with the maximiza
tion of social welfare. His evaluation. accordingly,

does not address parallel questions about the
presumptively imports regula

race-to-the-top that we ask here: ( I ) whether decentralized organization

tion shaped by the operation of competitive forces, and (2) whether competition. once operative,
presumptively leads to a first-best regulatory equilibrium. Oddly, Revesz draws extensively on

a tax
competition model which shows that Tiebout-type regulatory competition within the environmental
realm cannot be expected to result in a first-best equilibrium. See id. at 1238-46 (relying on Wallace E.

Oates & Robert M. Schwab. Economic Competition Among Jurisdicrions: Efftciency Enhancing or

Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. Pus. EcoN. 333 (l 988)). For our discussion of the implications of this
model, see

infra notes 275-90 and accompanying text.
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of intellectual arbitrage from economics to law has been sticky.78 Mention of
the model's infirmities rarely ripens into acknowledgment of their negative
implications for legal federalism's economic presumption favo1ing decentraliza
tion.79 The literature instead assumes that the model, although having problems
as to particulars, remains robust in its broader outline. Scholars within public
economics have undercut the basis for this assumption. They have criticized
sharply and successfully the model's robustness, narrowing it and leaving it in a
tentative form. Legal literature has not appreciated the implications of these
developments. We seek to complete this stalled arbitrage exercise in this and the
following Part of this article.

We also note that interdisciplinary scholars have made cutting-edge contributions to t.he economics
of regulatory competition. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation

Puzzle,

I

J.L.

EcoN. & ORG. 225, 233-65 ( 1 985)

(offering an empirical study of charter competition);

Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models of Local Government: Exit, Voting, and the Land Market,

URB. ECON.

6 J.
3 1 9 , 333 ( 1 979) (developing a model of linkages between ex.ir, voting, and the land

market). Two outstanding category-specific refutations of regulatory competition arguments also should
be mentioned: Hay, supra note

43 (refuting in detail claim of race-to-the-bottom in common law of

product liability), and Sterk, supra note 20 (questioning the existence of competitive constraints on land
use exactions).

78.

Legal scholars have failed to retrieve and assimilate past analysis of the Tiebout problems. It is

well known wit.hin the legal literature, for example, that the Tiebout model cannot be applied directly to
the real world because its assumptions never have been relaxed successfully in subsequent economic
literature. It is less well known t.hat one commentator, Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook, paused to
note that the bundle of Tiebout model assumptions may be redeployed as a tool for identifying legal
subject matter ill-suited to application of the model. See Easterbrook, supra note

26, at 34-35 (noting

fact sensitive standard for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate subject matter); Rice, supra
note 27, at

54-55 (same); see also Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the

Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmenwl Regulatory Aurhority, 14 YALE J. ON
REG.

23. 3 1 -32 ( 1 996) (expanding the list to include the problem of regulatory capture). The commen

tary in question has rarely been cited for that cautionary point, and it has not become the custom to
conduct a preliminary suitability evaluation of each topic. Nor does one find suitability standards set

9. at
1247-53: Trachtman, supra note 30, at 59-60. We think that even minimal fidelity to t.he economics

out in the existing typologies of regulatory competition situations. See Revesz, supra note

requires that Easterbrook's suitability standard not only re-enter t.he discourse. but become central to the
process in a restated and expanded form.
Given a body of literature thus constituted, it is unsurprising that clearly erroneous applications of
the theory crop up. For a definitive rebuttal of one such suggestion, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition

Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational Srrucrure in Financial and Securities Regula·
tion,

50

Bus. LAW.

447, 448-49 ( 1 995) (considering and rejecting regulatory competition as a

justification for a proposal circulated in securities law that consolidation of overlapping regulation of
derivative and other products by federal banking, commodities, and secw·ities agencies would be a bad
idea because the prevailing system implicates beneficial interagency regulatory competition).

79. [t is not uncommon for scholars ro mention its serious difficulties and then proceed .immediately
26, at 34-35 (arguing that application of the model is

to apply the model. See Easterbrook, supra note

appropriate given mobility, a large number of jurisdictions, and no externalities); LeBoeuf, supra note

561 (criticizing the model for artificially assuming sufficient jurisdicLions such that every
42, at
1294-96 (criticizing the model for failing adequately to consider Lhe impact of external eftects). It also

9, at

individual could choose one to provide his "desired bundle of public goods"); Schill, supra note

has been reasoned that the existence of a market can be infened despite imperfections from t.he
··possibility of relocation." Wyeth. supra note 7, at

9 L n . I O . Macey presents one exception. Macey,

supra note 76, at 507 (arguing "the traditional argument thar jurisdiction::tl competition leads to t.he
efficient production of public goods appears to be overstated"').
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Recall that the Tiebout model depends on a long list of assumptions when i t
implies that competitive forces detennine the shape of regulation a t junior levels
of government and sets regulation on an evolutionary path to a first-best

equilibrium.80 This Part discusses the consequences of relaxing these heroic
assumptions in the ordinary course of testing the model's robustness. Scrutiny
begins with the most important assumption on the Tiebout list-that a large
number of communities actively seek an optimal population-and shows that
this assumption conceals both an insuperable practical problem and a devastat
ing theoretical problem. The practical problem is that the model envisions a
dynamically changing population of political subdivisions that bears no resem
blance to the embedded jurisdictions of the second-best real world. The theoreti
cal problem is that the model yields one of two formal results:81 nonequilibrium
or unstable equilibrium. Therefore, the model lacks rea] world predictive value.
Additional f1ictions envelop the model upon relaxation of its assumptions
respecting externalities, mobility, information, and entrepreneurial incentives.
As these points of friction are acknowledged, the list of exceptions to legal
federalism's devolutionary presumption grows so long as to be fatally destabiliz
mg.

This analysis supports two conclusions. First, legal federalism should be

uncoupled from a general presumption favo1ing devolution. Junior-level regula
tion does not necessarily lead to competitively driven lawmaking and, even
when it does, the competition does not necessarily produce regulation that
meets consumer preferences. Second, the model 's infitmities signal opportuni
ties for gain through centralization or coordination. The complexity of the
resulting picture implies that a positive theory of jurisdictional competition
should even-handedly address the desirability of both vesting and divesting
central or coordinating authority.
A . THE PRACTICAL PROBLEM : BUNDLING, PRICING, AND OPTIMAL NUMBERS

The Tiebout model's problems begin with the Samuelson condition for
efficient supply of local public goods. 82 Strict compliance with the Samuelson
condition requires that individuals sort themselves among different jurisdictions
so that homogeneity of demand within each jurisdiction results. 83 Such indi-

80. See supra text accompanying note 19.
8 1 . Tiebout, supra note 12, in fact does not state a formal model.
82. See supra text accompanying note 15.
83.

This includes the assumption that all residents pay equal taxes. A mixed community is said to be

per se inefficient because public goods provision therein responds to an average of at least two types of
demand. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Economics of the Local Public Sector, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
{Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987).
Rubinfeld asks whether the heterogeneity results change if we introduce a Lindahl taxation scheme
(defined below) when the tax paid per unit equals the marginal benefit from the public good at a given
level of provision. The Tiebout mechanism, however, fails to achieve efficiency here. Even though each
type of individual, by moving to a jurisdiction with equal tax, increases her welfare. it makes more
sense to redistribute income without forcing overconsumption of public goods. /d. at 582-83. Rubinfeld
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 5 7 1 , 582
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vidual soiling proves difficult to effect because of the complex packaging of
public goods and regulations. Although private goods tend to be produced and
sold separately, public goods tend to be jointly produced and made available on
a bundled basis. Public goods are not individually priced and regulation tends to
apply across the board. These complex packages influence the choices of public
goods consumers, who display greater heterogeneity than those in standard

product markets.84

The Tiebout model's analytical solution to this supply and demand matcrung
problem ties in the dissatisfied citizen's move to a community that meets her
preferences. Given a number of jurisdictions sufficiently large to meet every set
of prefere1nces (along with costless mobility and complete infonnation), bun
85
dling will not prevent preference satisfaction. The problem is that the model
achieves this analytical solution by assuming it.
The model stipulates that each jurisdiction has an optimal size and that a
large numlber of jurisdictions offer a large range of public goods and services.
These two stipulations interact dynamically. Competition for a large number of
public goods presupposes a large number of jurisdictions. Each additional
public good increases the required number of jurisdictions. In dynamic condi
tions, new jurisdictions will have to be frictionlessly formed to meet new
demand for particular public goods packages. How many jurisdictions would it
take to brimg about this first-best result? As the number of public goods becomes
very l arge, the number of jurisdictions would equal the number of individuals

also suggests that this argument can be extended to instances involving large numbers of individuals
with differing incomes and tastes. He asserts that given optimal numbers of communities and costless
mobility the tax system will be nondistorting, hence there might be an efficient equilibrium. The
difficulties wi!th this scenario lie with the standard list ofTiebout mechanism problems. !d. at582-83.
Lindahl was concerned with how to set public spending such that all consumers agree unanimously.
Erik Lindbal, 'Positive Losung, Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteurung , ( 1919) (Lund), reprinted in
CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (R.A. Musgrave & A.T. Peacock eds., 1958). He defined
government in terms of an auction. When setting tax levels for public goods, the government would
offer a tax ra.te to the consumers who would correspondingly respond with different shares reflecting
their levels of spending. New shares are again is.sued by government reflecting the preferences of
different consumers. The Lindahl process continues until unanimity is reached, a Lindahl price being
one to which everyone has agreed. This mechanism has been formalized. See GARETH D. MYLES,
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 272-79 ( 1995); see also ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 509-12.
84. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and rhe Competiri1•e !deal: An Essa_v on the Political
Economy of iLocal Govermnenr, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUBUC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23
(John M. Qu1igley ed., 1983). Heterogeneity of preferences occurs not only across populations but
within given individuals over time. The citizen who prioritizes school expenditures at one stage of her
life later may prefer expenditures for senior citizens. For this citizen, the Tiebout model implies a move
to another community (or requires that the preferences of every member of the citizen's community
change simultaneously). But. of course, the mobility option may become more costly wit11 advancing
age. See David E. Wildasin & John D. Wilson, lmpe,fect 1\llobility and Local Goremme111 Behavior in
an Overlapping-Generations Model, 60 J . PuB. £coN. 177, 180-81 ( J 996) (developing a formal model
that reveals attempts by local governments to capture rents from older, less mobile citizens lead to
inefficient migration patterns).
85. Note that as the venue moves from the local level to the state and national levels, the application
of the model becomes less and less plausible. See, e.g. . Rice. supra note 27. at 54-55.
'
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within a population.86 The analytical result, then, is that the optimal competitive
govemmental structure can be achieved only in an atomistic universe in which
the number of jurisdictions matches the number of individuals and firms. In
other words, the optimal size of each jurisdiction approaches one. Such a
universe is a theoretical spontaneous order in which trading markets effect all
regulatory adjustments. This environment maximizes the advantages of regula
tory competition: individual preferences and governmental actions are in iden
tity; diversity is complete; and interest-group capture of government cannot
occur.87 Thus, this one-on-one world does not suffer any bundling problem
because it effectively privatizes public goods.88
This solution to the bundling problem, however, leaves the Tiebout model
facing an insuperable practical problem: such a spontaneous order, though
theoretically attractive, lacks feasibility.89 Given different scale economies for
different public goods, their production will necessitate some minimum jurisdic
tional size. Beyond the problem of minimum size90 lies the problem of optimal
size.9 1 Even if an optimal size could be ascertained as a practical matter, it

86. See ATKJNSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 528-29; MUELLER, supra note 59, at 157.
87. Interestingly, if a sufficient number of such jurisdictions were formed to bring us to a first-best
world of matched preferences, the idea of inteijurisdictional competition would lose much of its force.
BRETON, supra note 61, at 230-3 1 . In this world all incoming residems share the preferences of the
incumbents; all outgoing residents by definition have nonmatching preferences and target a pre-exjsting
matching jurisdiction. Although the sorting process may be incomplete, there remains no need for new
competitive initiatives from government. Competition need not be involved even i.n the case of
movement into a jurisdiction with a suboptimaJly low population. That jurisdiction may indeed have an
incentive to compete. But, given a reservoir of jlllisdictions containing too many residents, complete
infom1ation, and costless mobility. the jurisdiction need not necessm·ily compete to reach optimal size.
Even if inducements to move must be offered to residents of the overcrowded jurisdictions, no

competitive response by those jurisdictions wi II follow. !d. at 23 1 .

88. See Truman
ECONOMETRICA

F Bewley, A

Critique of TieboLif's Theo1y of Local Public Expenditures. 49

7 1 3 , 729-35 (1981).

89. Other cases of spontaneous order can be mentioned. See, e.g., David R Johnson & David Post,
Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1 391-95 (1996) (analogiz
ing to the medieval law merchant, leaving the development of regulation in cyberspace to spontaneous
order); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, the American Common Marker and Public Choice, 6 HARV. J.L.

& Pus. PoL·Y 119, 12 1-25 ( 1982) (suggesting better product liability protection would result from a
free market approach).

90. This point has been expressed formally. Stiglitz offers the example of two communities, each
populated by people with the same preferences but where the rwo populaces have differem preferences.
ln this model, there are three public goods and two utility functions. If rwo separate communities are
fonned, each will produce the prefen·ed public good; however. if the community is merged, the third
public good could be produced and as a result individuals will enjoy the benefits of economies of scale.
There are. of course, potentially diminishing returns to scale, but Stiglitz argues that in most circum
stnnces people will be bener off. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theor
y of Local Public Goods, in THE
EcoNOMICS OF Puauc SERVlCES 274 (Manin S. Feldstein & Robert P. Inman eds. 1977); see also
.

Bewley, supra note 88, at 717-18 (discussing problem that consumers do not take economies of scale
into account when moving in context of two person, two region, and one public good example).
9 1 . This condition has been described in economic theory. Under the "theory of clubs." optimal size

is a function of the marginal gains that population increases bring to existing residents. See James M.
Buchanan, An Economic Theor
y of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA I , 12 ( 1 965). Signjficantly. however. practical
application of this theory brings a confrontation with sticking points that parallel those impairing the
Tiebout model-externalities and spillovers, heterogenous citizen preferences. heterogenous public
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would be a size so large as to undercut the large number of jurisdictions
required by the Tiebout model.92 Finally, putting optimal numbers aside to
focus on reality, we see that a path-dependent process of geographical and
political evolution determines both the size and number of j urisdictions.93 Any
jurisdictional competition by means of the Tiebout mechanism, accordingly,
supports only second-best efficiency claims.94
B. THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM: NONEQUILIDRIUM AND UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM

1 . Statement of the Problem
The Tiebout model's devastating theoretical problem is its fai lure to display
the properties of a general competitive equilibrium except under an even more
restrictive set of assumptions. Tlus shortcoming, which comes into view upon
the restatement of the problem presented by the Tiebout model's assumed
optimal numbers i n formal economic terms, denudes i t of predictive capacity.

a. NoneqiUilibrium.

Let us relax the Tiebout model's assumption

of an infinite

number o:f jurisdictions, and instead assume the existence of only two jurisdic
tions occupied by three evenly distributed types of residents. Given these
assumptions, no matter how keenly the two governments compete, some resi
dents always will be dissatisfied and will have an incentive

to fo1m a new

goods, income discrepancies, and citizen mobility each may cause problems. See RICHARD CORNES
& ToDD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF ExTERNALITfES, Pusuc GooDs AND CLUB Gooos 367-69 (2d ed.
1996).
Club models and local public goods models should be distingllished. Although club models are
concerned with the provision of local public goods, they focus on the pricing of externalities arising
from production within a group. Theoretical and empirical work on clubs concentrates on the condi
tions under which a competitive equilibrium emerges in a club economy. In a club economy it i s
possible, given broad assumptions, to generate a competitive (or price-tak.ing) equilibrium. See Suzanne
Scotchmer, Public Goods and the Invisible Hand, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 93 (John M. Quigley &
Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994). In club models the consumer pays a fixed enn-y cost. In contrast, in
local public goods models, assuming taxation of real estate, the entry cost can be adjusted by
consuming k�ss land or housing, making it much more difficuh to structure a competitive equilibrium.
See infra text accompanying notes 95-114.
92. Rubird'ield, supra note 83, at 577.
93. !d. at 578-80.
94. See Daniel L Rubinfeld, Commems on Chapter Four, in MODERN Pusuc FINANCE. supra note
91, at 120, 1 21-22. ·'First-best" outcomes yield zero welfare losses. A second-best world is one in
which co.nstraints respecting either incentives or institutional context prevent the achievement of a
first-best outcome. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1 67 (1988). For
another useful definition. see David P. Baron, The Economics and Politics of Regulation: Perspectives.
Agenda, and Approaches, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY: OLD TOPICS, NEW DIRECTIONS 10, 1 2
(Jeffrey S. !Banks & Eric A. Hanushek eds., 1995) (stating ·· ·second-best' refers to institutional
restrictions or restrictions arising from asymmetric information or observability. and 'optimal' refers to
the choice of the best policy relative to those restrictions''), and Roger Guesnerie. The Genealogy of
Modem The-oretical Public Economics: From First Best ro Second Best, 39 EuR. EcoN. REv. 353,
354-55 ( 1995) (arguing that second-best modelling has introduced essential new ideas to the field; for
example, the study of nonconvexities has shown the possibility of efticiency-enhancing income
redistributio111).
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jurisdiction to improve their positions. No equilibrium will result.95
Frank Westhoff has demonstrated a Tiebout equilibrium i n a model assuming
a finite number of jurisdictions, but only given additional assumptions.96
Westhoff's model assumes that there are multiple localities of a finite number,
that resident votes determine government policy, and that tbere are two goods,
one public, one private.97 The model also assumes a continuum of individual
types, each ranked according to their marginal rates of substitution between the
public good and the private good.98 Under these assumptions, the model shows
that for any exogenous positive integer M there exists a Nash equilibrium99 with

M jurisdictions. 100 Westhoff, however, assumes consumer preferences are single
peaked-a questionable assumption.10t If one relaxes this assumption, the
0
equilibrium is lost. 1 2

95. See Bewley, supra note 88, at 721.
96. Frank Westhoff, Existence of Equilibria in Economies with a Local Public Good, 14 J. ECON.
THEORY 84, 85-90 ( 1 977).
97. These assumptions ensure that the resident chooses between more and less public goods,
avoiding social problems.
98. See Westhoff, supra note 96, at 84.
99. A 'Nash equilibrium' is a profile of strategies that players select wh.ich are the best response to
the strategies the other players are likely to choose. See D AVID M. KR.Ers, A CouRSE IN MtCROECONOMIC
THEORY 404 ( 1 990). Conceivably one could formulate a Tiebout equilibrium in two different ways-a
Nash equilibrium in which no single individual wishes to join an already existing jurisdiction, or a more
demanding equilibrium in which there exists no group of individuals that can make each of its members
better off by forming a new jurisdiction. See Joseph Greenberg & Shlomo Weber, Srrong Tiebout
Equilibrium Under Restricted Preferences Domain, 38 J . ECON. THEORY 1 0 1 . 1 0 1 -03 ( 1 986). Westhoff
shows the first, less demanding equilibrium on the assumption of a continuum of individuals. See
Westhoff, supra note 96, at 85-86. However, the second, more demanding notion of equilibrium
presents more difficulties. See Greenberg & Weber, supra, at 102. Greenberg and Weber attempt to
demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium by endogenzing the number of conununities. /d. at 106.
100. See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 544-46.
1 0 1 . Preferences for a single public good are usually single-peaked. The single-peakedness of
voters' preferences means a common criterion of tastes has emerged to provide a basis for the analysis
of alternatives. The single-peaked requirement ensures that a majority voting equilibrium will always
occur. See PETER C. 0RDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY, AN iNTRODUCTION 164-66
(1986). The problem, of course, is that a real world public goods equilibrium would have to encompass
multiple public goods.
102. See Bewley, supra note 88, at 727. Nonequilibrium may be the result in cases of myopic
majority voting. See ATKiNSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 544-46; Buchanan & Goetz. supra note
18, at 28-29; Westhoff, supra note 96, at 85-90. Epple, Filimon, and Romer add that Westhoff,
investigating the model's properties, was pessimistic about the prospects for developing a model in
which a unique stable equilibrium exists-the model derives a stable equilibrium only when there are
multiple equilibria, and a unique equilibrium always will be unstable. Dennis Epple et al., Equilibrium
Among Local Jurisdictions: Toward

an Integrated Treatment

of Voting

and

Residential

Choice, 24 J .

Pus. EcoN. 2 8 1 , 282 ( 1 984). Epple, Filimon, and Romer themselves take the position that while the

difficulty of relaxing the mobility assumption is fatal to most theorizing about local public goods, a
unique public goods equilibrium can exist in limited situations. !d. at 283. More specifically. they argue
that an equilibrium level of housing can result when consumers select the amount of housing and vote
for the level of public goods provision when there are restrictions on preferences and the technology of
the public goods supplied. Jd. at 307.
For another approach to establishing a Tiebout equilibrium, see BRYAN ELLICKSON COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM: THEORY AND APPLICAllONS 144 ( 1 993) (discussing "the basis for the 'homogeneous
community' condiLion '' as being "a natural consequence of allowing for increasing rewrns with an
,
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This analysis reveals the first of two unrealistic requirements for an optimal
public goods outcome under jurisdictional competition: consumers must be
presented with a range of choices large enough to include the optimal package
for each type of consumer, and history, geography, and scale economy disable
the real world from offering the number of jurisdictions large enough for the
task. 103

b. Unstable Equilibrium.

Tiebout's depiction of optimization through the at

traction of new residents implies a normative consequence of encouraged
migration. Indeed, increases in mobility theoretically enhance economic wel

fare. 1 04 This mobility, however, also entails spillovers with negative implica
tions for economic welfare, resulting in an unstable equilibrium.
To see this, assume that a number of jurisdictions provide the same public
good for two types of residents, one hi gh-income and the other low-income.
Assume also that demand for the good is income elastic and positively corre
lated with demand for real property, and that jurisdictions finance production of
the good with a flat-rate property tax. The high- and low-income types thus
consume the public good at different marginal rates of substitution. The ultimate
question follows: under the assumptions of the Tiebout model, will high- and
low-income types sort themselves .into separate jurisdictions with homogeneous
populations, yielding a first-best equilibrium?
The answer is no. To see this, assume that such sorting occurs between time

t=O and t= 1 so that by t= 1 aH low-income types reside in low-income
jurisdictions and high-income types in high-income jurisdictions. This equilib
tium will be unstable. Between t= 1 and t=2, low-income types will have an
incentive to migrate to the high-income jurisdictions. There low-income types

infinite variety of product types") and Bryan Ellickson, Competitive Equilibrium with Local Public
Goods, 2 1 J. EcoN. THEORY 46, 48-55 ( 1 979) (offering an "approximate" local public goods equilib

rium with heterogenous consumers). The problem here concerns the degree of distance between the real
world local government approximation and the lheoretical competitive case. Professor Rose-Ackerman
comments that "(i]n spite of Ellickson's optimism about the importance of his results, it would seem
that in general the approximation will not be very close." Susan Rose-Acketman, Beyond 11ebow:
Modeling The PoliTical Economy of Local Government, in LOCAL PROVISiON OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE
TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER 1\VENTY-fiVE YEARS 55, 60 (George R. Zodrow ed., 1983); see also Andrew
Caplin & Barry Nalebuff. CompetiTion Among Institutions, 72 J. EcoN. THEORY 306, 331-33 ( 1997)
(employing index theory to prove existence of equilibrium in a multidimensional Westhoff model).
103. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 77, at 3 1 9 ; Rubinfeld, supra note 94, at 1 2 1 ; Frank Westhoff.
Policy lnferencesfrom Community Choice Models: A Cawion, 6 J. URB. ECON. 535 ( 1 979). It could be
added that within each homogenous community, the cost per resident of each public good must be the
minimum. See Suzanne Scotchmer & Myrna H. Woodcrs. CompetiTive Equilibrium and the Core in
Club Economies with Anonymous Crowding, 34 J. Pus. EcoN. 159, 162 ( 1 987).

104. Factor movements are normally a basis for ef1iciency gains. PAUL R. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 20-27 ( 1 990) [hereinafter RETHINKING]. Krugman, writing in the context of

international economics, has demonstrated that labor generally increases its income by moving from
one region lO anolher. PAUL R. KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY 184 ( 1 994) (hereinafter PEDDLING].
The gains from this out-migration more than com;>�nsate the labor that remains. but payment of such
compensation to the labor that remains does not always occur.
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can consume smaller properties, paying lower taxes than the high-income types
nonetheless enjoying the same, higher level of public goods. At the same time,
however, high-income types will have no incentive to migrate to low-income
jurisdictions as they will obtain fewer public goods with l i ttle tax savings.1 05

More generally, given egalitarian access to public goods i n each locality and the
payment o f different levels of real estate tax based on income-based preferences
for consumption of real estate, the provision o f the public goods will result in
1 6
wealth redistribution, 0 a result the high-income types do not prefer. 107 The

built-in inducement for low-income migration thus makes any equilibrium
8
unstable. 10
This spillover problem can be solved by giving jurisdictions the discretion to
select their residents and, in theory, taxes and zoning regulations can be aligned
to do the selecting. While such a solution sacrifices the Tiebout model's full
mobility assumption, it does permit the attainment of a stable equilibrium.
Bruce Hamilton's model formally shows how to attain this stable equilib

rium. 1 09 It assumes:

(1) that the housing supply is perfectly elastic;
(2) that residents within each jurisdiction have homogenous preferences for
public goods;
(3) that residents are perfectly mobile;
(4) that local governments offer a diverse range of tax and expenditure
measures to satisfy all preferences; and, critically,

105.

High levels of externalities likely would accompany any existing equiljbrium. See Rubinfeld,

supra note 94, at 123.

I 06. With an income tax, even one without progressive rates, a redistribution still benefits poor
residents. To see this, assume a nat income tax of 20%. Preferences for the public goods exchanged for
the tax will vary depending on the income level of the taxpayer. Presumably, the redistributive effect
benefits poor taxpayers. The opposite could be the case if the jurisdiction imposed a poll tax. Whatever
the tax system, open access to public goods will be redistributive.
107. Of course, some income redistribution occurs under the auspices of local government. ll is
possible to hypothesize how a modest amount of this could accord with the preferences of high income
types. See Kaplow, supra note 1 1 . at 472-79.
108. In addition, excessive migration to a single target jurisdiction may entail externalities and result
in a suboptimal equilibrium characterized by crowding-out..The Tiebout model's other assumptions
that movement by one individual has no effect on the welfare of other individuals, and that, given the
presence of public goods. an additional resident benefits the target community-foreclose any possibil
ity of tbis problem. MUELLER, supra note 59, at 157. Neither assumption. however. seems plausible as a
general proposition. A converse condition of suboptimality could arise when a locality directs itself to
the auraction of new residents through public goods competition. Governments seeking to aurae!
residents risk the progressive lowering of tax<�tion until they are unable to finance the public goods
package. Stephen Woolcock, Comperition Among Rules in The Single European Jvfarket. in 1NT'L
REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note 74. at 289, 300-0 I. Suboptimal allocations of public goods
result.
109. Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Ta:wrion in a Sys1em of Local Governments, 12 URB.
STUD. 205, 205-06 (I 975).
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(5) that each jurisdiction has a zoning ordinance requiring each resident to
consume a stated quantity of housing, with quantity vary ing from jurisdic

tion to j urisdiction.
The zoning ordinance builds in a price mechanism. The ordinance bars poor
residents who would consume smaller, cheaper houses and thereby gain a
surplus of public goods benefits over taxes paid. At the same time, it allows rich
residents who desire to consume an amount of housing larger than the jurisdic
tional minimum to move to a jurisdiction with a minimum zoning requirement
that equals their housing preference. Rich residents thereby avoid paying higher
than average taxes that would confer a public goods benefit on other residents.
Thus, the ordinance forces each resident to pay an equal share for the jurisdic
tion's public goods, becoming the functional equivalent of a nondistortionary
1 10
bead tax.
The Hamilton model removes the instability caused by the free movement of
residents of different income levels across jurisdictions, and thereby yields an
equilibrium. Here citizen mobility leads to an efficient result because citizens
are precluded from adjusting their property consumption level in response to the
property tax levels within a given jurisdiction. To adjust, they must move.
The problem with the Hamilton model is its long and unrealistic set of
1
assumptions. 1 1 It makes little sense to assume that communities are homog
enous both in terms of demand for local public goods and housing, or to assume
that there is an exact correlation between housing tastes and income. The model
also mirrors the Tiebout model by demanding a number of communities large
enough to match the tastes of all individuals for both housing and public goods
112
Finally, and just as critically, the model tolerates no political
consumption.
bias favoring old residents over newcomers. Such a bias, often present in the
real world, leads to strategic zoning and tax appraisal regimes designed to force
newcomers to pay a greater than pro rata share of public goods cost, destroying
1 13
the equilibrium.
In sum, there emerges a second unrealistic condition for a public goods

1 10. See Bruce W. Hamilton. Capitalization of !ntrajurisdictional Differences, in Local Tax Prices,

AJ\1. EcON. REv. 743, 745 ( l976) (showing that average costs will equal marginal costs in this
system).
I l l . This equilibrium result highlights the regressive implications of Tiebout preference satisfaction
for community life. If one tries to hypothesize a Tiebout-Hamilton world, the first thing that comes to
mind is the contemporary gated community.
1 12. The last requirement means that profit-maximizing entrepreneurs must be free to produce new
communities to satisfy the demands of the residents. In addition, the public good must be produced at
minimum average cost with respect to population. See Rubinfeld, supra note 83, at 59 1 .
1 13. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note I 02. at 6 1 (noting that the efficiency guarantee fails i f any one
of the Hamilton model's assumptions is dropped. forcing the specification of a political model);
Michelle J. White, Fiscal Zoning in Frag111enred Metropoliwn Areas, in FtsCAL ZONING AND LAND UsE
CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 3 1 . 97-99 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., l 975) (asserting
widespread strategic zoning disrupts the Hamilton eq�.:ilib1ium and .leads to suboptimal public goods
provision).
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equjlibrium. In addition to an optimal number of jurisdictions, the provision of
public goods in each jurisdiction must be tied to a strict membership criterion.
Applying this to the real world, one cannot expect any equilibrium. The
numbers fall short of the optimum. And even if the numbers did not fall short,
any equilib1ium would be unstable. The public sector (at least as known in
American history) is institutionally unequipped to replicate the gatekeeping of a
private club. Unsurprisingly, many economists have concluded that the Tiebout
mechanism succeeds only in cases so stylized that they lack reali sm . 1 1 4

2. Implications
The Tiebout mechanism's failure theoretically to yield a stable equilibrium
raises a question as to its viability as a practical policy tool. The question is

serious as a matter of economic theory, for in economics the study of efficiency

presupposes a stable institutional framework. As a result, questions respecting
5
stability take precedence over questions respecting efficiency.1 1
To put it bluntly: The Tiebout model, viewed in isolation, provides no basis
for predicting that competitive behavior by government leads to optimal prefer
ence matching. Instead, the model predicts instability-competition may make
residents better off or worse off depending on a dynamic and complex mix of
factors that competing goverrunents cannot control. With trus result, economic
theory wi thdraws its support from an unqualified presumption favoring devolu
tion. It remains possible to articulate a powerful economic case for a particular
devolutionary initiative. Such a case, however, will require a much more
complex foundation than that offered by the Tiebout model.
Given the instability attending Tiebout competition, a minimalist federal
government would have to perform a number of stabilizing functions. Certainly,
it would have to monitor junior-level competition and be prepared to intervene
in the event of instability. This regulatory function, in part, would parallel that
played in the private sector by an antitrust authority. 1 1 6 A need for additional
stabilizing tasks becomes apparent as one accounts for additional Tiebout
imperfections, identified in the economic literature and discussed in the follow
ing section of this article. The central government also would have to address
tax and other fiscal externalities, infrastructure development, research and
development, wealth redistribution, and local government structure . 1 1 7
The last factor, local government structure, opens a Pandora's Box o f junior-

114.

LAFFONT. supra note 94, at 57. At best, he says, Tiebout's approach would decrease the

heterogeneity of populations

living in the same locality, but ultimately leave one to determine how
other motives-such as workplace. natural adv antages, and exogeneity of sites-affect the location of
agents. See id. : Bewley. supm note 88. at 7 1 3 - 1 4 : Pierre Pestieau, The Optimality Limits of the T
iebow
Model, in TKE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM l73, l 84-85 (Wall ace E. Oates ed., 1977):
Rubin feld, supra note 83, at 589, 591.
I t 5 . BRETON, supra note 61, at 240-4 1.
1 16. That is, it would prevent predatory pricing , conspirac ies and cartels, and trade barriers. !d. at
250-5 I .

1 17. !d. a t 2 5 1 -62.
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level public choice problems and associated failures in the market for regula
tion. One should expect this list of failures to be lengthy. To see why, recall the
problem with which this Part began-the example involving bundled public
goods and heterogenous consumer preferences. The model's failure to yield an

equilibrium except on stylized assumptions reveals that this problem cannot be
solved. The "law as product" analogy becomes attenuated as a result. Competi

tion respecting public goods presents a level of complexity respecting suppl y
and demand that far outstrips anything respecting ordinary goods and services.
Although this complexity does not prevent such competition from occurring, it
does reduce the disciplining effect of consumer preferences on producers.

118

As

this expected disciplinary effect diminishes, the Tiebout model fails in its
essential purpose as a preference-matching device, and public choice problems
return to center stage.
C. ADDITIONAL FRICTIONS INHIBITfNG

THE

TIEBOUT MECHAN1SM: EXTERNALITIES,

MOBILITY, AND INFORMATION

Even i f some higher power were to intervene to cure the problems surround
ing the Tiebout model ' s optimal numbers assumption, it still would not emerge
fit for immediate application in federalism contexts. The model's first-best
results depend on a number of additional, equally unrealistic assumptions. To
relax these assumptions is to describe a series of frictions that retard the real
world operation of the Tiebout preference-matching mechanism. This section
takes up three of these assumptions: no externalities, complete mobility, and
perfect information. The section that follows takes up a fourth: that actors in
government have incentives similar to those of free market entrepreneurs.

1 . Externalities and Spillovers
The Tiebout model unrealistically assumes the absence of externalities. Legal
federalism concedes the necessity of relaxing this assumption and accepts a
limit on decentralization (through increased regulation) for the policing of
externalities . 1 1 9 The externalities mentioned most often are the physical condi
tions giving rise to to1t liability. The economic concept of externalities, how
ever, encompasses a much broader uni verse of behavioral effects. In a theoretical
first-best regime, the impact of all costs and benefits of public goods production

I 18. Many public economists find Tiebout's location model to be an unsatisfactory solution to the
problem of ascertaining individuals' preferences respecting public goods. See Dieter Helm & Stephen
Smith, The Decentralized State: The Economic Bo1ders of Local Government, in EcONOMIC BORDERS
OF THE STATE 275. 281-82 (Dieter Helm ed . 1989): Gordon A. Hughes, Ra£es, Reform and the Housi11g
Marker, in THE REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE IN BRITAIN 109, 1 16 (S.J. Bailey & R.
Paddison eds., 1987).
119. The same relaxation must follow for spillovers. which are positive extemalities. Restating the
point. to bring about internalization, larger and la�ger jurisdictions are required, reducing the menu of
choices. See Briffault. supra note 20, at 427.
.
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Any departure from this

first-best-fiscal or physical-implicates the broader economic concept of an
externality. Real world practice at the state and local level falls short of the
first-best in limitless ways. Taxes may fall disparately on out-of-state owners. 12 1
Alternatively, the actions of one jurisdiction may benefit other jurisdictions or
their citizens ("spillover" effects), justifying adjustment by a central author
ity. 1 22 More broadly, given incomplete markets and imperfect information-as
tend to obtain outside the constrained models of neoclassical welfare economics
individual actions often have external effects. Tllis occurs whenever one's
actions impact on the interests of others and one fails to account for such
impact. 1 23 Adverse selection and moral hazard problems represent well-known

120. See infra text accompanying notes 1 73-97. This point has been expanded into a simple theory
for locating the Level of government appropriate for any particular regulatory problem-the geographi
cal area affected by the regulation should detennine the level of government. See James M. Buchanan
& Gordon Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL fOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERN
MEN"r 1 1 3-16 ( 1965). For an application of this point to environmental regulation, see Butler & Macey,
supra note 78, at 25.
1 2 1 . See infra note 1 8 5 and accompanying text.
122. In product markets, externalities can occur when the calculus of a given consumer has an
.impact on the future choices of other consumers. Sometimes the value of a product is tied to the number
of purchasing consumers. The utility of telephones increases with the number of users; with computers,
increased use brings increased selection of technically compatible goods; with many other machines,
increased use means scale economies in spare parts manufacture and a larger supply of experienced
repair personnel. Such products exhibit "network externalities'' wherein existing users benefit from a
positive externality when a future consumer opts for the product and increases the size of the network;
the externality becomes negative when another consumer tenninates use. Joseph Farrell & Garth
Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76
AM. EcoN. REv. 940, 942 ( 1 986).

These spillover effects among consumers mean that one consumer's private calculus has no neces
sary relationship to an optimal result. When network externalities influence supply and demand,
decentralized, individually maximizing decisions will be path dependent. See, e.g., Philip H . Dybvig &
Chester S. Spart, Adoption E
xternalities as Public Goods, 20 J. PIJB. EcoN. 23 1 , 23 1 -33 ( 1 983);
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. EcoN. PERSP. 93,
1 12-13 ( 1 994); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro. Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network
Externalities, 94 J. PoL. EcoN. 822, 830-33 ( 1 9 86). Suboptimal equilibria may result as there may be
excessive unifonnity among products or excessive diversity, or an inferior product may come to
dominate the market. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of Q WERTY, 75 AM. EcoN. REv. 332,
335-36 ( 1 985) (discussing the develpment of the widespread ' use of the allegedly inferior QWERTY
keyboard design). Bur see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys. 33 J.L. &
EcoN. l , 4, 19-20 ( 1 990) (arguing that if a superior keyboard design was available, the best long-term
financial interests for keyboard producers would be Io internalize the external costs of training on the
new, superior keyboards). The simple picture of product competition that informs the Tiebout model. in
contrast. assumes that value behavior by consumers leads directly to optimality. This assumption is not
safe to the extent that the choices of consumers of law have significant network effects. [n t.he latter
case, junior-level diversity may be more costly than beneficial. Michael Klausner argues for the
application of models of network externalities to legal technologies. See Michael Klausner, Corpora
tions, Corporme Law. and Networks of Comracts, 8 1 VA. L. REv. 757 ( 1 995); see also Chamy, supra
note 74, at 441-55 (considering extemal effects in the analysis of a hmmonization model for European
corporate law). For a general argument against employment of the network models in legal contexts,
see Michael 1. Krauss. Regulation vs. Markets in the Development of Srandards, 3 S. CA L. !NTERDISC.
L.J. 78 1 , 797-808 ( 1 994).

123. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 28-29 ( 1 994).
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examples. 1 24 In all such circumstances, free market transactions will not be
Pareto efficient 125 and accordingly, in theory, a higher authority may intervene
26
to improve collective economic welfare. 1
As previously discussed, the costless mobility assumed in the Tiebout model

potentially causes externalities. If different levels of income preponderate in
different localities, a policy looking to competitive matching of public goods
packages and individual preferences can have unintended effects of wealth

redistribution, can result i n overcrowding, or can disrupt fiscal policy. 1 27 Addi
tionally, publiC economists have written extensively on fiscal externalities inci
dent to state and local taxation. 128 Significantly, these scholars employ a modified
version of the Tiebout mechanism to show that downward competition to
externalize presents a significant problem at the state and local level.
The point for present purposes is this: Externalities hold open a wider door
for appropriate regulatory intervention by central government than the legal
federalism literature assumes. A question thus arises as to the plausibility of a
theory of government built on a global devolutionary presumption ex ante
subject to adjustment for externalities by a central authority acting ex post. Once
the economic interest suffers damage, any ex post adjustment may be too little,
too late.

2. Mobility
The Tiebout model assumes full mobility of all factors of production. Since
movement is costly, this assumption is also implausible. Unfortunately for the
model, formal showings confirm that even the slightest relaxation of this

assumption leads to ineft!cient public goods production. 1 29 Furthermore, for
jurisdictional competition to be widespread in practice (whether with efficient
results or not), the full mobility assumption can be only slightly relaxed.
Mobility allows an actor a choice of regulatory regimes, breaking the monopoly

on regulation held by the actor's jurisdiction of origin. 1 30 It therefore must be

124. fd. at 30-3 1 ; see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 201, 206, 224-27 ( 1996) (showing empirically that some states have legal regimes that attract
migrant deadbeat debtors, assisting them in frustrating their out-of-state creditors).
125. See David G. Carlson, On the Efficiency of Sec11red Lending, 80 VA. L. REv. 2 t79, 2184 ( 1994)
(describing the impossibility of Pareto efficient contract).
126. STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 27-32.
127. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 179-97 and accompanying text.
129. See Wildasin & Wilson, supra note 84, at 194-95. Wildasin and Wilson's model assumes that
local governments seek to maximize property values and posits two types of citizens: younger mobile
types for whom mobility is costless, and older types whose attachments and other location-specific
capital make mobility costly. !d. at 178-79. The model shows that governments will have an incentive
to extract rents from the Jess mobile residents. Indeed, within this model's confines a central tenet of the
Tiebout model is completely reversed; location changes of mobile residents prompted by a desire to
escape fiscal exploitation themselves add to social costs. ld. at 194.
I 30. This assumes that significant choices are beld out. The literature tends to ignore one possible
sticking point. Most models assume two tiers of government, central and local. In our system, however,
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immediately feasible for jurisdictional competition to occur in practice. 1 3

1

Consider the mobile individuals who cause public goods provision to be
competitive public goods provision in Tiebout's model. Significant transaction
costs will attend their changes of domicile. These costs will vary depending on
both the distance of the move and the relative conditions of local housing and
employment markets. The cost thus relates directly to the geographical size of
the home and target jurisdictions. The larger the community, 132 the greater the
cost barrier to move, and the less mobile its citizens become.133
Furthermore, pecuniary costs may not be the most significant barrier to
individual mobility. Family, community, and cultural ties also may make move
ment an undesirable response to dissatisfaction with public goods, taxes, or
regulation. At some level, then, the localism supposedly promoted by jurisdic
tional competition theory retards the mobility that it presupposes. 1 34 Finally,
even among localities, the potential scope of competitive discipline will always
be limited by the immobility of land. 135

3. Information
The Tiebout model assumes perfect information about the characteristics of
all public goods in all jurisdictions. This assumption, like those of no externali
ties and full mobil ity, must be relaxed. Unfortunately, relaxation of this assump
tion makes it technically impossible for the model to deliver on its claims.
Like much of law and economics, j urisdictional competition theory implies
that, assuming an appropriate initial allocation of wealth, every Pareto efficient
allocation can be attained through the use of market mechanisms. The mathemat
ics that undergird this result stress the importance of convex indifference
curves.136 That is, market-driven Pareto efficiency depends on the assumption
that the law of diminishing returns and diminishing marginal rates of substitu-

federal, state, and local. The fact that a particular county's public goods offeri ngs
particular consumer may not induce a move if the resident dislikes the state in which

there tend to be three:
are first-best lo a

the county is located. See BRETON, supra note 6 1 , at 1 91-92.
L 3 1 . Although Tieboutian sorting depends

on

actual movement, governments may feel competitive

pressure absent actual movement. By analogy to the critical influence of the potential entrant on the
behavior of the monopolist, threatened exit may motivate reform with actual exit signalling

unwilling

ness to compete. /d. at 237. For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying note 256.
132. The mobility assumption,

model's

accordingly,

becomes

more

and more of a

sticking

point as the

venue of appljcarion moves from the local level to the state and national levels. Rice, supra

note 27. at 54-55.

comparison, the smalter the community, the more likely the
a specific public good will spill over to other communities,
causing externalities across communities and non-Pareto allocations.
1 3 3 . MUELLER, supra note 59, at 155. In

benefits accrujng from the provision of

134. In comparison, large numbers of local governments and high mobility lessen both the

signifi

cance and likelihood of participation in local government processes. Briffault, supra note 20, at 407.
1 3 5 . Local governments remain free (to some extent) to usurp land rents. See Macey. supra note 76,
at 506-07; Sterk, supra note 20, at 844-45, 850, 857-58.
136. Indifference curves are convex if the straight line that connects any two points on it lies above
the curve. DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 37 ( 1990).
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tion ordinarily obtains. With sufficient nonconvexities, in contrast, markets will
not be competitive. 137
Whenever information is imperfect, nonconvexities will pervade. Information
is a fixed cost that must be incurred regardless of its eventual use. The return on
a single piece of information is thus always zero, and to the extent this
investment in information is costly, a net loss always results. Such fixed costs in
information give rise to nonconvexities, and theoretically justify intervention by
. governmental authority. 138
Economists contend that several conventional assumptions about the convex
ity of private goods cannot be extended to markets for local public goods.139
That is, clearing prices for public goods usually cannot be shown. Accordingly,
one cannot safely assume that public goods are competitively priced. This
implies that markets for public goods (to the extent they exist) will be sticky.140
In other words, if those who relocate have imperfect information about the
range of alternatives (and investment in the acquisition of perfect information is
not cost-beneficial), then they cannot match their preferences with the best
suited locality, and a first-best equilibrium does not emerge from the local
public goods market . 1 4 1 To the extent that actors know the bounds on their
information sets, they will tend to assign their preference orderings respecting
jurisdictions in accor dance with factors other than public goods and regulation.
In the alternative, citizens may move based on limited public goods information
and prompt uninformed regulatory competition. The resulting mismatch between
preferences and public goods could be less efficient than the ex ante mismatch.
D. THE PROBLEM OF ENTREPRENEURLAL INCENTIVES

\Vhen the Tiebout model asserts that factor movement causes public goods
producers to minimize costs, it implicitly 1·ecasts government actors in the
behavioral mold of private sector entrepreneurs. This section considers the

137. STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 45, 55-56. It was thought that consumers and producers normally
would satisfy the assumption of convexity. !d. at 56.
138. Id. at 52-54. Nonconvex.ities are also associated with adverse selection and moral hazard
problems.
139. ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 520; LAFFONT, supra note 94, at 60-76.

140. Like the externality problem, the information problem could be ameliorated through central
government intervention. Here the device would be investment in a central information-sorting
repository (and mandatory disclosure of any nonpublic information). But, unlike the case of extemali
ties, controversy would follow the suggestion of central intervention. Compare ROMANO, supra note 39,
at 91-108 (suggesting that due to markel incentives to disclose, participation in the securities laws'

mandatory disclosure system should be optional) with FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORr\TE LAW 290-291 (1991) (suggesting that mandatory disclosure
is justified because incidental benefits to third parties stemming from disclosure creaie systematic
incentive to underdisclose).
141. A recent study shows that voters in a metropolitan area frequently lack infommtion about tax
and service alternatives. See David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional

Boundaries: An lndividual·Level Test of the Tiebout Model. 5 1 J. PoL. EcoN. 73, 9 1 -93 (1989).
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plausibility of this description, identifying an additional source of friction that
retards and distorts real world occurrences of jurisdictional competition.

1 . The Entrepreneurial State and the Problems of Observation and Verification
The Tiebout model does not explicitly assume the existence of a local public
goods entrepreneur. Analytically, it need not do so. Entrepreneurship respecting
public goods logically results from the operation of the model's mechanism of
consumer choice. 142 In the model's vision of things, local government agents
must act entrepreneurially or they will lose their entire populations. Obviously,
however, to the extent that this competition does not occur in practice and
contrary to the model's prediction, local officials will not be disciplined to
behave as entrepreneurs.
Might maverick entrepreneurs jump-start the competitive process? Consider
the possibility of a local government takeover tycoon who applies the model to
tum

real world frictions into an arbitrage profit. The scenario is simple. First,

the tycoon identifies jurisdictions with high-cost, inefficiently produced public
goods. Then the tycoon buys real estate in the most inefficient of these jurisdic
tions. Next the tycoon invests in getting eJected to office in the chosen jurisdic
tion, and, once in office, cuts production costs drastically. Finally, the tycoon
sells the previously purchased real estate and collects an arbitrage profit. This
individual has a high-powered incentive to invest in information acquisition,
and, like a stock market arbitrageur, ameliorates real world problems of asymmet
ric information. Given extreme levels of ineftl.cient goods production, even
product bundling should present no problem. Efficient management alone should
cause taxes to fal1 and real estate prices to rise, securing the arbitrage profit.
But a problem remains. A second assumption lies concealed within the
Tiebout model's complete information assumption-an assumption that resi
dents and potential residents can both observe and verify the quantity and
quality of local public goods. For some local public goods, this will be the
case-the public swimming pool, school buildings, streets, and fire trucks are
there for all to see. Concrete, asphalt, and steel, however, are unlikely to
influence the marginal consumer of local public goods. Residents care more
about school quality, but it is much harder to discern. The cmdeness of the hard
statistical evidence-such as student teacher ratios, training records, even col
lege board scores-prevents the extraction of valuations. Consumer verification
becomes a serious problem and, as a result, the conditions necessary for an entrepre
neurial arbitrage model do not emerge. Nonverifiability, then, helps explain the
absence of cost-reducing entrepreneurship with respect to local public goods. 143
Serious doubts result for a core proposition of the Tiebout model, that

142. This outcome rests upon the assumption that local public goods are verifiable information. See

CAROLiNE M. HOXBY, Is THERE AN EQUITY-EFFICIENCY TRADE-OFF IN SCHOOL FINANCE? TTEBOUT Al'\ID A
THEORY OF THE LOCAL P\JBLIC GOODS PRODUCER 5 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 5265, 1995).
143. Td. at 7.
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commumtles with populations below the optimal size will compete for new
residents. The model, deeming this proposition to be safe, depicts government
as a rent-seeking black box, 1 44 and side steps the problematic exercise of

describing supply-side incentives in the public goods market. 145 This approach

is implausible. The problem of verifiability, taken together with the other
frictions that retard the Tiebout mechanism's operation, emerges to undermine
this assumption of intense competition for citizens. Accordingly, a plausible
case for jurisdictional competition requires a particular description of supply
side incentives.

2. The Conventional State as Entrepreneur
An informal comparison of incentive profiles of private sector entrepreneurs
and local government actors further i l lustrates the severity of this supply-side
problem. Both actors produce for pecuniary and other personal gain. The private
sector actors must do so competitively because of the presence of other private
sector actors selling the same goods or services, and because of the diminished
returns and risk of bankruptcy that come from excess production costs and high
prices or low sales. When govemment actors produce public goods and regula
tion, in contrast, the consequences of management failure are less catastrophic,
diluting the incentive effect. These actors produce for votes or other political
capital. If they fail to compete, their jurisdiction does not disappear (unlike an
economically uncompetitive firm).146 Fiscal improvidence can, of course, lead
to bankruptcy for a government unit. Unlike the case of a ·firm, however, the
absence of product competitiveness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause
of bankruptcy. Generally, then, agency problems i n the production of public
goods can be presumed to be more substantial than those within firms; self
interested production does not necessarily imply product entrepreneurship.
Public economists have attempted to ameliorate this problem by restating the
assumption respecting supply-side motivations. For example, in some models,
property value maximization replaces population maximization. 147 This ap
proach resonates better, but it solves the problem of supply-side incentives only
by making the further, implausible assumption of identity between the jurisdic
tion's government actors and its real estate interests. 148 Other models analogize
to private sector profits and assume a government desire to maximize tax

144. Cf Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scort, The Political Economy of Private Legislmures, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 595, 596 (1995) (criticizing "black box" treatment of regulatory output of private
legislatures such as the American Law Institute).
145. Of course, new residents can lead to scale economies. But that does not complete the incentive
story; the scale economies must be tied to the political or economic interests of the lawmakers.
146. Revesz, supra note 9, at 1233-35.
147. See, e.g., Jon Sonstelie & PauJ Portnoy, Profit Maximizing Communities and the Theory of
Local Public Expendimres, 5 J. URB. EcoN. 263, 266-67 (1977).
148. C.f Wildasin & Wilson, supra note 84, at 179 (considering this point and concluding that
because developers and landowners generally have snme influence in each jurisdiction, the land value
maximization assumption '·is of greater interest than might at first appear to be the case").
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revenue.149 This change also yields a more plausible model because government
actors require operating revenues. 150 But an entrepreneurial state still does not
emerge. Questions arise about the intensity of the revenue constraint, its connec
tion to particular outcomes, and the role of competition in shaping those
outcomes. 1 5 1 Indeed, given Dennis Epple and Allan Zelenitz's generally ac
cepted conclusion that citizen mobility cannot completely eliminate government
monopoly power, 1 52 a tax maximization incentive invites the perverse result of
a Leviathan state.

In sum, one cannot assume an entrepreneurial state. 1 53 As a result, the
Tiebout model fails to achieve its intended goal of incentive compatibility.1 54
Under the economic theory of the second-best, the Tiebout model's black box
must be opened to address directly the problem of motivating government
actors to supply public goods i n accord with citizen interests. This exercise has
two critical implications. First, i t undercuts the claim that the Tiebout mecha-

149. See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
150. A conceptual antecedent is noted in Dennis Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of
J. PoL. EcoN. 1 197, 1 1 98-99,

Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89

1206-10 (1981). That model greatly contributed to the move from the Tiebout mechanism, noting that
long-run individual sorting into communities will not ameliorate the problem of fiscal rent extraction� It
assumes an exogenous number of communities, inflexible community boundaries, and inactive landown
ers and developers. The role of politics is introduced by virtue of the fact that local government, given
passive owners and residents, will attempt to maximize its tax revenues by usurping maximal land
rents.

But cf J.

Vernon Henderson,

The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs, 93 J.

POL. EcoN.

248, 257-58 (1985) (calling this the Tiebout model with bad politics).
A related line of literature should be distinguished. This line of public choice theory shows that
bureaucrats are able. through agenda control, to expand public goods output beyond the level preferred
by the median voter.

See, e.g.,

WrLUAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT 36-58, 1 69-86 (1971). In those models, tax revenue maximization implies overproduction
of public goods. In the tax competition models, i t is just as likely that underproduction of local public
goods resu Its.

1 5 1 . It also would seem safe to project a variable relationship between this revenue incentive and the
See BRETON, supra note 6 1 , at 236-37.
152. Epple & Zelenitz, supra note 150, at l199.
153. Perhaps it may be created i n the future under a different set of institutional arrangements. See

incentive to expand expected voter consent.

infra text accompanying

notes 222-28. Even when incentives to compete clearly are present, additional

incentive problems may inhibit the evolution of first-best legal products. With the network models,
described above, we saw that a demand-side problem may cause suboptimal equilibria to evolve and
product innovation to be choked off in situations of intense product competition. Supply-side problems
also may crop up. Product innovation presupposes an incentive to invest in research and development.
With .industrial competitors, prospects of a patent monopoly bolster the incentive. The patent deters
entry by competitors, ensuring a potential retum on investment in research and development. The basic
patent model assumes that there is an optimal way LO stimulate finns to invest in research and
development, which is deemed necessary for product innovation.

Strategy and Cmwth in a New Market, 1 0

BELL

See-A.

Michael Spence,

Investment

J. ECON. I, 1-2, 9-10 ( 1979). Conversely, if an

innovation easily can be copied by a rival, then new technologies will not efficiently replace old
technologies. Legal innovation leads to the production of a public good, and carries no patent
protection. Ian Ayres. applying this point to corporare law, suggests that competing states will have
insufficient incentives to invest the resources in product innovation. !an Ayres, Supply Side Inefficien
cies and Competitive Federalism, in lNT'L REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note 74, at 239, 254.
154. Paul Seabright, Accountability and Decentralization in Govemment: An Incomplete Conrracrs
Model, 40 EUR. EcoN. REv. 6 1 , 63 ( 1 996).
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nism solves the problem of regulatory capture. Second, it substitutes an incen
tive picture in which market competition shares a place with the conventional
political factors of interest-group influence and voter accouliltability. t ss
The result is a very different, more complex working model of competitive
government. In this model, government actors act entrepreneurially when tax
revenues, export earnings, jobs, technology, or other positive externalities yielded
by the attraction of factors of production also yield appropriate political ben
efits, either in the form of electoral advantage or satisfaction of the demands of
favored interest groups . 1 56 Part Ill shows that these elements distinguish the
new generation of formal models of jurisdictional competition.
E. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE TIEBOUT MECHANISM
How, given the Tiebout model's nonequilibrium and unstable equilibrium
results and its disabling frictions, can we explain the legall literature's ongoing
endorsement of its predictive power? One explanation lies in a thick stack of
studies of its testable implications. Proponents claim these studies provide
strong support for the core proposition that jurisdictions use tax and public
goods packages to compete for residents, apparently ove1rcoming the model's
sticking points. 157
We have two comments to make about these studies. First, the proponents'
characterization of the results as strong support is itself too strong. The results
are, at best, suggestive, and make very little progress toward affi rmatively
showing a crucial missing element-entrepreneurial behavior patterns in govern
ment actors. Second, even if the studies offered strong SUJpport for the Tiebout
model's jurisdictional competition assertion, such support would not compen
sate for the model's failure to yield stable equilibrium resullts. The model makes
two primary assertions, one descriptive and the other normative. The studies for
the most part address the descriptive assertion that jurisdictions compete for
residents. The normative assertion, which the studies do not address, is that this
rivalrous behavior will lead to a first-best result by matching public goods
packages with citizen preferences. This is the assertion undercut by the model's
failure to yield a stable equilibrium.

155. This has of course been suggested many times in the law review Jite1rature. For recent instances,
see Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MrcH. L. REv. 570, 638-5 1 (1996), and
Swire. supra note 66, at 94.
156. Or, in the alternative, the particular actor cuts an advantageous deal with the responsible
government actors directly. We would add a factor-the satisfaction incident to enhancing public
welfare. It is less certain that an entrepreneurial incentive relationship can be assumed as a systematic
proposition. [ndeed, where it does exist it can be ephemeraL Unlike firms, which must hew to the profit
incentive over time, the objectives of government suppliers change over time with voter preferences.
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 77, at 329. Of course, under a loose Tielooutian view of the world,
sorting through migration brings homogeneity and thus political stability. The opposite result, however,
flows from Rose-Ackerman's model: migration causes the identity of thee median voter to change,
resulting in an unstable equilibrium. Jd.
157. Been, supra note 10, at 5 1 7 , 527-28.
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I . Capitalization Studies
One line of empirical work on the Tiebout mechanism appears to support the
normative assertion. This line began with Wallace Oates's famous study show
ing that tax and property levels are capitalized i n property values. More
particularly, property values are negatively related to property tax levels and
positively related to education expenditures. 158 This result, which has been
confirmed many times, 159 supports the model's description of demand-side
awareness of the contents of tax and public goods packages. At first glance, one
might believe the study also supports the normative assertion. Oates suggested
that consumers can use real estate prices as guides to jurisdictions with the best
public goods provision because high real estate values imply a surplus value of
0
public goods benefits over the tax cost. 1 6 According to this view, housing
prices measure both the amount that relocating citizens wilLingly pay for public
goods and the differential attractiveness of communities.161 Thus conceived,
they seem to bear a familial resemblance to prices on the New York Stock
Exchange. Stock prices do more than indicate the point at which buyers and
sellers come together; stock prices also provide an empirical measure of manage
ment performance over time that on the downside can trigger a cliscip1i nary
device such as a hostile takeover. By analogy, the real estate market provides an
empirical equilibriating market for local public goods, along with an informa
tional focal point that facilitates the market disciplinary mechanism of citizen
exit.
Unfortunately, the analogy to the securities markets does not fully carry. Real
estate price behavior certainly influences migration decisions. The problem is
that real estate pricing does guarantee preference matching. Indeed, to the extent
that housing prices capitalize the value of the public goods package a,nd confirm
consumer awareness of that value, the prices simultaneously negate the exis
tence of a Tiebout equilibrium. Because real estate consumers treat local taxes
as the price they pay for public goods, capitalization could not occur in a world
with a Tiebout equilibrium. Theoretically speaking, in equil ibrimn, marginal
demand equals marginal cost. In a Tiebout public goods equilibrium, the value
of public goods benefits exactly equals the taxes levied to produce them. Given
the equality of benefits and costs, no excess value or dead weight cost could be

158. See Wallace E. Oates. The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property
Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J . PoL. EcoN. 957,
966-67 ( 1969). Thus, a jurisdiction with high property values will have low property tax levels but high
education expenditures.

159. The literature has been summarized. See Been. supra note I 0, at 521-23; Keith Dowding et al.,
Tiebow: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 3 1 URB. Snm. 767, 775-779 ( 1994). The numbers
yielded as to the quantum of capitalization vary widely across the literature. See Dowding et al., supra,
passim. Estimates vary between zero and 100%, with most results fixing capitalization at between 30%
70%. ld. at 776. In addition, several methodological shortcomings have been t:tncovered and
See id. at 775-76.
160. OATES, supra note 1 8 , at 968.
1 6 1 . BRETON, supra note 6 1 , at 238-39.

and

corrected as the literature has developed.
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162
Oates, then, inadvertently confirmed the
capitalized in real estate prices.
163
ce,
rather
than
the
presence,
of
a
Tiebout equilib1ium.
absen
The real world's failure to deliver optimal numbers explains the result.

Presumably, given a sufficiently large number of communities and public goods
packages from which to choose, no rational citizen would willingly pay a
premium over the intrinsic value of the public goods offered in any particular
jurisdi ction. Instead, she would move to a jurisdiction that matched her prefer
ences. In contrast, the combination of a limited number of communities, a high
demand for public goods, and taxes set at the cost of public goods implies that
the aggregated jurisdictions fail to satisfy demand. As a result, real estate prices
rise as the value of the benefit is capitalized 1 64 (or go down if the tax burden
16
exceeds the value of the public goods). 5

2. Other Studies
Other Tiebout studies focus exclusively on demand-side motivations, and
attempt to measure the extent to which tax and public goods considerations
influence migration. Here, aggregate census data indicate that fiscal factors
influence population movement. Summarizing the principal results, first, high
tax rates do not attract migrant groups; second, migrating people of color are

162. Matthew Edel & Elliot Sclar, Taxes, Spending, and Property Values: Supply Adjustments in a
Tiebout·Oates Model, 82 J. PoL EcoN. 941, 946-47 (1974).
163. Dennis Epple et al., A Search for Testable Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis, 86 J. PoL.
EcoN. 405, 406 ( 1978). The Hamilton modification of the Tiebout model, see supra text accompanying
notes 109- l l . also refutes the suggestion that real estate values serve as a price mechanism in a local
public goods market. Recall that the model reaches a stable equilibrium result by stipulating a zoning
regulation that functions as a nondistortionary head tax. ln so doing, it concretely demonstrates that the
Tiebout model's central problem is the lack of a price mechanism. Dowding et al., supra note 159, at 778.
Epple & ZeJenitz, supra note 150, at 1212-13, revive the Oates claim, asserting that statistically
significant estimates of capitalization evidence the presence of a Tiebout mechanism. BRETON, supra
note 6 I , at 238, objects to this reading. Citing Dennis Epple, Allan Zelenitz, and Michael Visscher,
Breton notes that they assume an equilibrium and that nothing can be sunnised about an equilibrium's
properties from an equilibrium analysis of disequilibtium states. On the other hand, notes Breton, given
a scarcity of desirable locations, it hardly is surprising to see results indicating capitalization of higher
rental values. /d.
164. Edel & Sclar, supra note 162, at 942 (studying data on house prices and finance in Boston over
two decades and concluding that there was movement towards equilibrium in respect of education
provision over the period, but constant capitalization of highway expenditures). But see George R.
Meadows, 'flues, Spending and Property Values: A Commellf and Further Results, 84 J. POL. ECON.
869, 878-79 ( 1 976) (criticizing Edel and Sclar's methodology and rerunning Oates's New Jersey
numbers to show some movement toward equilibrium during the period of the study).
l 65. The Tiebout equilibrium view appeared i n the tax policy literature long after the refutation
centered on capitalization. Given a Tiebout equiJibrium and benefits equalling public goods, there is no
basis in tax policy for allowing a deduction for local real estate taxes. See 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SUvfPLICJTY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 63 ( 1 984); THE PRESIDENT'S TAX
PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAI RNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY 63 ( 1 984); Charles R. Hulten &
Robert M. Schwab, A Haig-Simons-Tiebow Comprehensive Income Tax, 44 NAT' L TAX J. 67, 68-71
(1991). For an exposition of the tax policy implications and relative merits of the equilibrium and
capitalization views, see Louis Kaplow, supra note 1 1, at 420-57. Kaplow is skeptical about claims that
perfect capitalization occurs in the real world, though not about a long-run capitalization effect. /d. at
447-48.
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sensitive to levels of welfare provision; and third, results are mixed on whether
white migrants are sensitive to levels of welfare provision. 166 There is a
methodological problem with these studies, however. Because they use census
data to measure individual motivations� the studies remain open to the introduc
tion of additional variables. Micro-level studies of relocation motivations
conducted through questio�naires-potentially solve this problem, but suffer
from a cheap talk possibility.1 67 In any event, the micro-level studies reach
conflicting conclusions as to the influence of tax/public goods packages. 168
Still other studies show that people sort themselves by location, causing a
trend to homogeneous populations in particular jurisdictions. Consistent with
the Tiebout hypothesis, this result supports an inference that the sorting occurs
due to tax/public goods package preferences. Another inference can be drawn,
however. Statistically speaking, given many jurisdictions and random (as op
posed to intentional) sorting, a relatively more homogeneous subset will emerge
9
despite preferences for tax/public goods packages. 1 6
These studies, taken together with the capitalization studies, do support the
idea that people pay attention to tax/public goods packages. But they only take
us one step beyond the general assertion that citizens have preferences respect
ing taxes and public goods. The supply-side assertion that local government
actors actively compete for residents with tax/public goods packages remains
sorely in need of empirical confirmation. That assertion receives only indirect

166. We rely here on the collection and recounting of the literature in Dowding et al., supra note
159, at 779-82.
167. /d. at 784-85. That is, most empirical micro-level studies have a very narrow focus, omitting

analysis of the effects of local government, thus weakening their scope of application.
I 68. Compare David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional Boundaries: An
Individual Level Test of the Tiebour Model, 5 1 J. PoL. 73 ( t989) (studying Louisville area and
concluding that tax/service is unimportant) with Stephen L. Percy & Brett W. Hawkins, Further Tests of
Individual-Level Propositions from the Tiebow Model, 54 J. POL. 1149 ( 1 992) (studying metropolitan
Milwaukee and concluding that housing values concern individuals the most, with secondary concerns
including tax/service packages, crime, and schools). Studies of micro-level data on household choices
distinguish between the fiscal influences on the choice to move and on the choice of a destination after
deciding to move. Results conflicL Compare William F. Fox et al., Me1ropolium Fiscal Structure and
Migration, 29 J. REGIONAL SCI. 523, 532 ( I 989) (finding that fiscal factors tend to influence tbe decision
to leave) with Brian J. Cushing, The Effect of the Social Welfare System on Metropoliwn Migration in
the US, by Income Group, Gender and Family Structure, 30 URB. STUD. 325, 334-35 ( 1993) (.finding
that while AFDC payment levels do not appear to influence departure decisions of low-income persons
there is evidence that persons with high AFDC payments attracting low-income households and
repelling non-poor female households). For a summary of micro-level work, see Dowding et al., supra
note 159, at 782-87.
169. Dowding et al., supra note LS9, at 774. There also are some equivocal results in the stack of
studies. See Robert M. Stein, Tiebout's Sorting l-lypothesis, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 140, 155 (1987) (testing
Tiebout by regressing tax/service package differentiation against mean municipal heterogeneity and
finding no significant relationship other than racial sorting). A final body of studies, more directly
connected to the Leviathan assertion of public choice theory than to the regulatory competition
literature, shows that big government tends to cost more per capita, and smaller government tends to
cost less. The problem with this stack is that it measures expenditures but not efficiency. They can mean
either that smaller units provide the same public goods packages for less or that demand tends to drop
where jurisdictions are small. See Dowding et al., supra note 159, at 769-7 1 ,
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support from the studies The studies show that mobile residents respond to
.

fiscal variables. Such a finding suggests that governments will be sensitive to

mobi iity. From there an inference of rivalrous behavior does arise. 170 But the

strength and character of the behavior pattern remains speculative, and hence a
long list of real world frictions stands between the behavior pattern and the
projection of a concrete regulatory result. Therefore, there remains every reason
for skepticism about policy presumptions that rely on competitive behavior.
III. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION

IN

A SECOND-BEST WORLD:

THE NEW ECONOMICS
The development of a robust version of the Tiebout model stood high on the
public economics agenda for more than a quarter century. But lately only a few
continue to pursue the development of a workable, self-standing Tiebout mecha
nism. Jurisdictional competition still figures prominently in research in the field,
however. This work, herein termed the "new economics," models jurisdictional

competition in a second-best framework . 1 7 1 It continues to employ the Tiebout
mechanism, but only for limited purposes or in a substantially modified form.
This work also pursues alternative conceptions of competiti vely disciplined
local public goods production. In the end, the new approach relegates the
first-best Tiebout model to the sidelines as a compelling vision of an unattain
able state of the world.

172

One line of research, the tax competition literature, employs a modified
version of the Tiebout mechanism to model the problem of externalities in a
federal system. These models employ a capacious concept of externality that

170. BRETON, supra note 6 1 , at 239.
1 7 1 . Under a first-best approach, the idea of perfect competition means that markets that are
competitive will induce efficient outcomes. See JEAN-JACQUES LAfFONT, FUNDAIYlENTALS OF Pusuc
ECONOMlCS 2-4 (1988). But the Arrow-Debreu paradigm that underlies the first-best approach has been
challenged over the last 1 5 years by the new industrial economists who contend that the perfect
competition conception of the market is undermined by the failure to take into account the absence of
perfect information, the costs of acquiring information, and nonconvexities. !d. at 1 67-90. These
theorists argue that, given the presence of information convexities, the level of government intervention
required to produce Pareto allocations cannot be as limited as the second welfare theorem recommends.
See STIGLITZ. supra note 123, at 58.
This new body of research in economics and political science also takes moral hazard, adverse
selection, and political opportunism into the analysis of economic policy choice. See, e.g., LAFFONT &
TIROLE, supra note 48. This approach provides a means, in a second-best context, to determine the
bargaining situations that might yield optimal regulatory outcomes. The second-best approach also
shifts attention to the establishment of productive grounds for alteting the institutional features of
regulatory policy.
172. As we have seen, see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text, given a fixed number of
geographically defined jurisdictions, efficiency claims must take the status of second-best. With fixed
boundaries, a unique equilibrium respecting public goods production is unlikely to emerge. Rubinfeld,
supra note 94, at 124. We caution that the point of view we describe is not universally held within the
economics community. There is, for example, a body of neo-Tieboutian tax models. See infra notes
208-15 and accompanying text; see also WtLLIAM A. FrscHEL, REGULATORY TAKJNGS: LAW, EcoNOMICS,
AND POLITICS 268-69 (1995) (endorsing the vitality of the Tiebout model with a citation to law and
economics sources).
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includes intrastate economic and political distortions in addition to all cost and
benefit consequences of public goods production that cross state lines. The
models caution about distortive effects that can be expected when junior levels
of government compete in a federal system. The models indicate that, given
competition, the productive provision of public goods must include the delinea
tion and correction of these externalities. The problem cannot be assumed away,
as in the Tiebout model, nor treated as a limiting factor and otherwise ignored,
as in legal contexts. Confronting the problem, meanwhile, implies central
government intervention.
A second line of literature concentrates on local-level information asymme
triies and pursues the same objective as Tiebout modelling-the design of local
government mechanisms that match preferences and public goods production.
Some of these models employ the Tiebout mechanism, acknowledging its
shortcomings and experimenting with curative supplements. Other models aban
don the Tiebout mechanism altogether. Instead of using competition as an
outside force that solves political problems by avoiding them, these models
address the democratic process and experiment with means to inject more
competition.
As a whole, the new approach withdraws economic theory's support for the
legal literature's general presumption that competitive forces ensure that devolu
tion enhances welfare. This literature teaches that legal federal ism has not as yet
as:ked the ri ght questions about the economic welfare effects of devolution.
A. TAX COMPETITION MODELS
In a first-best economy, taxation and public goods provision meet the Samuel
son condition, 173 and aU costs and benefits are restricted to the providing
jurisdiction. 174 Tiebout-type models meet this condition by stipulating exclusive
use of a residential head tax. 175 With a bead tax, there can be no interjurisdic
tional tax spillovers; and, given the assumptions of perfect mobility and an
unlimited supply of states, no state can export its tax burden.176 These results
lead some observers to encourage interstate tax competition.177 They argue that tax
competition enhances welfare by forcing state governments to lower tax rates, and
limits efficiency losses by constraining the self-serving activities of politicians.

173. John D. Wilson. Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a Theoretical Basis

for a Race to the Bottom?, in

l

fATR TRADE AND Ht\IUviONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?:
E. Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAIR

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 393, 397 (Jagdisb Bhagwati & Robert

TRADE).

174. See supra text accompanying note 15 (explaining that the Samuelson condition is fulfilled
when the sum of each person's willingness to pay for another unit of a public good for her marginal
benefit equals the cost of producing that additional unit).
175. See supra notes l09- l l and accompanying text.
176. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Designing Tax Policy in Federalisl Economies: An
01�erview, 60 J. Pus. EcoN. 307, 3 1 5 (J996). The fonnal showing is in the Hamilton model.
177. Reference to the Leviathan school of public choice theory provides affirmative support for this
assertion. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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The new generation of tax competition models abandons this first-best tem
plate, however. Like the Tiebout model, they assume that state governments
compete for mobile citizens and capital. Unlike the Tiebout model, these
models depict jurisdictions in competition for tax dollars rather than citizens
and situate the Tiebout mechanism in a world of myopic government actors.
The models show that economic distortion results when government decisions
about the provision of public goods fail to consider secondary effects (both
internal and external) to the taxing state. J 78 They further show that government
competition for factors of production aggravates this distortion. The models
suggest a range of policy remedies.

1 . Basic Model
The basic model, hereinafter the Gordon model, 179 assumes a two-tiered
federal structure in which residents live in one state and sell their factor inputs
and purchase goods and services throughout the federation. State governments
hire factor inputs to produce goods and services, and meet their revenue needs
by taxing factors, goods, and services. Social welfare is defined as an aggregate
of: (1) the social welfare function for all people within the federation, (2) the
after-tax prices for goods, services, and factors, (3) the provision of public
goods, and (4) a state-by-state congestion factor180 tied to prevailing price
levels. Taxes may be based on the residence of the taxpayer or on the sources of
transactions. Each state sets its own tax rate under a constraint of a mandatory
balanced budget.
In addition, the state government must satisfy the re-election demands of
local citizens. The model specifies a political objective function sensitive to the
political power wielded by groups in state politics . 1 8 1 The maximization of the
political objective function determines the state's tax rates, subject to the budget
constraint. As with the Tiebout model, households and factors are mobile across
jurisdictions. Finally, the model assumes each state government to be myopic182
concerning the allocative effects of its tax rates on other states' tax rates and on
18
citizens' relocation decisions. 3

178. Suzanne Scotchmer, supra note 91, at 93, 1 1 5 .
179. Roger H. Gordon, A n Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism, 9 8 Q.J. EcoN. 567
( 1 983); see also John D. Wilson, Optimal Property Taxation in the Presence of Inrer-Regional Capital
Mobility. 1 8 J. REGIONAL ECON. 73, 75 ( 1985).
1 80. In public goods models the terms crowding and congestion are used to describe the same
phenomenon. The congestion factor has both positive and negative relationships. On the one hand, a
positive factor implies that there is a utilization measure based on the number of voters and the units of
public goods provided. On the other hand, a negative factor suggests a propottional increase in the use
or l evel of consumption of the public good. See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 9 1 , at 348.
1 8 1 . Gordon, supra note t79. at 577 (modelling the simple case of median voter politics across all
states); see also Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, Economic and Political Functions of Tax Structure,
78 AM. EcoN. REv. 701, 706-10 ( 1988) (expanding the model to encompass coalition politics).
182. Gordon, supra note 179, at 577.
183. Equilibria have been demonstrated for competitive federalist economies thus modelled. See
Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, Jeux Sans Frontieres: Ttu: Competition and Tax Coordination When
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According to the model, although an island jurisdiction could set an optimal
tax rate, interstate effects prevent a state in a federation from so doing, leading
to suboptima1ly low provision of public goods. 1 84 The model describes five
types of distortive effects: tax exportation, regressivity, "not-in-my-backyard"
(NIMBY) tax devices, tax spillovers, and "beggar-thy-neighbor" tax competi
tion.
The first effect, tax exportation, occurs when tax burdens and public goods
are distributed unequally. In one case the effect is interstate: taxes paid by
out-of-state citizens and firms provide public goods consumed in-state. The
other case is intrastate: the controlling voting coalition within the state enjoys
most of the public goods benefits while sharing the taxation burden with
disenfranchised local citizens (as well as nonresidents). In either case, officials
will have an incentive to export the tax burden. 1 85

The second distortion is the system's bias toward regressive results. Given
factor mobility, exit or threatened exit by upper-income households tends to
keep tax burdens and public goods benefits evenly balanced. Because the poor
pay less tax, maintenance of the balance forecloses provision of public goods
benefits to them. Thus, the model effectively blocks redi stributive welfare
1
provision for the poor. 86
The third problem concerns congestion. Myopic states can raise tax rates to
encourage exit by unwanted businesses and residents, leaving the remaining
residents better off. This NIMBY phenomenon likely arises when production
processes that benefit society in the aggregate offend those within the jurisdic
tion.1 87

The fourth distortion follows from indirect effects of increases or decreases in
tax rates. One indirect effect occurs intrastate and concerns the taxing state's
fiscal policy. A change in tax rates will alter private sector consumption levels,
causing an indirect tax revenue effect; similarly, tax rate changes w i l l affect the
prices of factors, and the cost of running state government will rise or fall as an
indirect result. The second category of indirect effect is the cross-border spill
over. Given mobility, consumption and factors may migrate elsewhere when a

Countries Differ in Size, 83

AM. EcoN. REv. 877. 880-85 ( 1993): Jack Mintz & Henry Tulkens,

Commodity Tax Competition betwee11 Member Srates of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency, 29 J.

PuB. ECON. 133. 149-56 ( 1986).

1 84. See also David E. Wildasin, Some Rudimentary "Duopolity" Theory. 2 1 REGIONAL SCI. & URB.

EcoN. 393 (1991) (showing the relationship between the ability of a jurisdiction to export taxes and
market constraints).

This treatment assumes that a highly elastic supply of capital makes it difficult for

j urisdictions to export the costs of public goods to nonresident owners, resulting in a distorting impact
on the tax structure and underexpenditure for local public goods.
185. Inman and Rubinfeld, supra n ote 176, at 316, argue that thi s effect is most likely to be
significant with taxes on consumption. Mobility decreases the effect of taxes on capital and labor. /d. ;
see also Leslie E. Papke, lmerswte Business Tax Differential and New Firm Location: Evidence from
Panel Dara, 45 J. Pus. ECON. 47, 67 (1991) (capi tal taxation induces capital mobility).
186. For documentation of this effect, see Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, Federal Deduccibiliry,
and State Tcu Structure, 1 2 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 109, 124 ( 1993).
187. Inman & Rubinfeld. supra note 176, at 314, 317.
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state raises its tax rates . This migration may impact other states positively
causing their tax revenues to rise and their cost of public sector inputs to fall . 1 88

The home state accordingly has a disincentive to tax a mobile base, 1 89 even
though such a tax may otherwise create transaction cost efficiencies. 1 90
The fifth distortive effect involves the terms of trade in the home state. Price
changes following tax rate changes impact the incomes of local residents . 1 9 1
There results an incentive toward lower taxes on mobile inputs, increasing the
disposable incomes of the members of the state's dominant coalition. When
more than one state vies for such mobile inputs, there results the "beggar-thy

neighbor" effect characteristic of the classic race-to-the-bottom. 1 92 Subsequent
models focus on interstate competition for scarce capital and yield similar

results. 193

188. An extensive literature on capital taxation explicates this effect. See Roger H. Gordon, Can

Capital lncome Taxes Survive in Open Economies ?, 47 1. FIN. 1 1 59, 1160 ( 1 992);

David

E.

Wildasin,

!nterjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy, 25 J. URB. EcoN. 193,

194-98 (1989).
1 89. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 176, at 3 1 5.
190. In models allowing for only one type of tax. these spillovers will cause an incentive to
underprovide local public goods. See George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowsk:i, Pigou, Tiebout,
Property Taxation and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods, 1 9 J. URB. ECON. 356, 358-66
( 1986).
1 9 1 . Aggregate income changes of privat•e finns are assumed to be zero both before and after any
rate change. Inman & Ruhinfeld, supra note I. 76, at 312.
192. See supra text accompanying note 69. The Oates-Schwab model of an environmental race-to-the
bottom, see Oates & Schwab, supra note 77, is the classic example. According to Inman and Rubinfeld,
supra note 176, at 317, tax spillovers and tenm.s of trade effects are unlikely to be significant respecting

consumption taxes. Factor taxes, however, atre a different matter. Here there is empirical support for
significant effects. See William Morgan et al. A Regional General Equilibrium Model of the United
States: Tax Effects on Facror Movements and Regional Production, 7 1 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 626, 6 3 1
( 1 989) (computable general equilibrium mod.el showing that regions can increase residents' income by
substituting a lump sum tax for existing taxes on mobile labor); John H. Mutti et al., The lncidence of
Regional Taxes in a General Equilibrium Fr.amework, 39 J. PuB. ECON. 83, 91-98 (1989) (computable
general equilibrium model showing that a one percent decrease in a region's tax on business capital
leads to a significant migration of capital into the region, significantly impacting the region's revenue);
R. Wassmer, The Use andAbuse of Economic Development Incentives in a Metropolitan Area, 46 PRoc.
NAT.L TAX Ass'N 146 (1993) (showing extensive use of tax subsidies).
193. Zodrow and Mieszkowski, supra no1te 190, at 358-68, develop a model in which jurisdictions
compete for capital investment by holding down a source-based tax to finance local public goods. See
also Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of lnvestme'llt and Savings in a World Economy, 76 AM. ECON. REv.
1086, 1094-97 ( 1986) (arguing that when other tax instruments are available, a local government of the
Zodrow-Mieszkowski type will make use of resident-based taxation in lieu of source-based taxation).
For a contrasting vision, see John D. Wilson, A Theory of inter-Regional Tax Competirion, 1 9 J. URB.
EcoN. 296 (1986), i n which an individual juriisdiction relies on a properry tax which is distonionary and
may restrict he
t public good level because of the perceived marginal excess of the local tax. Jn Wilson's
model, there are many small jurisdictions, each relying on a uniform tax rate and facing an exogenously
given net return to capital. A fixed supply of capital in the overall economy is assumed. !d. at 298.
Given tax competition, there will be underprovision of local public goods even if all households would
be better off by a simultaneous increase in the amount of public goods in all jurisdictions. Wilson shows
that tax competition will lead to a prisoner's dilemma, as taxes are driven too low by the state's attempt
to capture flows of mobile capital. ld. at 303-04. A prisoner's dilemma results because each symmetric
corrununity understands an increase in local tax spending will cause a loss of local capital. See also
Sam Bucovetsky & John D. Wilson, Tax Comperition with Two Tax Instruments, 21 REGIONAL SCI. &
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These tax competition models signal that jurisdictions must coordinate with

each other to achieve a Pareto superior outcome. 1 94 Alternatively, central govern
ment intervention may be justified. But the literature avoids suggesting broad
brush centralization, instead positing discrete interventions. The central

government might, for example, require resident-based taxes for all states, with
a

consequent diminution in incentives to extema1ize.195 The central government

might also correct state-level distortions by strategically l inking central taxes to
corrective grant-in-aid reallocations. 1 96 Finally, given source-based taxation

URB.

EcON. 333, 345-49 (1991) (arguing that when both residence- and source-based taxation are

available, local governments provide efficient levels of local public goods).
194. See Jeremy Edwards

& Michael Keen. Tax Competition and Leviathan. 40 EuR. ECON. REv.

1 1 3 , l l9-26, 130-31 ( 1 996) (arguing that international tax coordination is required when the tax on

mobile capital is the only revenue source available to policymakers; and suggesting that when
policymakers are neither wholly benevolent nor wholly unconcerned about the welfare of citizens, it is
clear that, irrespective of whether the tax base is fully or partially mobile, a small multilateral increase
in the tax on mobile capital from the noncooperative equilibrium will increase the welfare of the
representative citizens): Guy Gilberd

& Pierre Picard, Incentives and Optimal Size of Local Jurisdic

tions, 40 EUR EcoN. REv. 19, 28-33 ( 1 996) (showing that optimal size of a jurisdiction in respect of
public good production relates to the magnitude of uncertainty on cost and spillover effects).
Coordination tends to be viewed as a superior alternative to centralization because it keeps authority
at junior levels. But coordination is not easily sustained on a spontaneous basis-a central authority
will have to design a reward and punishment system i.n order to induce cooperation. Kliba.noff and
Morduch foi1J1ally show that the cost of inducement may exceed the benefit of coordination. Peter

Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch, Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency, 62 REv. EcoN. STUD.
223, 231-35 ( 1995). In this model, "coordination will be worthwhile only if external effects

are

at least

as large as tbe largest possible private ne.t benefit." !d. at 234.
195. Inman

& Rubiofeld, supra note 176, at 318-19. Administration would present a problem,

however, because each jurisdiction would have to monitor its residents' out-of-state transactions. In
addition, local tax regressivity would remain unconstrained. Wage and income taxes piggy-backed on a

centrally administered tax regime are suggested. Consumption taxes would present more of a problem
due tbe possibilities for unobservable out-of-state activity. /d. at 3 1 9 . A restriction to residence-based
taxation would reduce interstate tax exportation but allow possible intrastate exportation across political
coalitions. Inman and Rubinfeld argue that a restriction also would deter NIMBY competition on the
theory that the activity to be discouraged through a tax disincentive now by definition is owned by a
resident; to the extent nonresidents conduct such activity they could not be taxed. !d. at 3 1 9 . Other
competition would be discouraged "since mobile capital . . . is uniformly taxed across locations under
the residency principle." !d. at 319.
196. !d. at 320-21 . For example, to combat beggar-thy-neighbor tax breaks on investment capital,
the central government could tax the benefitted factor or good at its source and redistribute the proceeds
in a "locationaUy neutral" fashion. /d. at 321; see also Robert P.

Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Tize

EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New European Community: An Issuefor Economic Federalism, 1 4 lNT'L
REV.

L. & EcoN. 147, 150-51 (1 994) (arguing the same point for the EC); David E. Wildasin. Income

Redistribution in a Common Labor Marker, 8 1 AM. EcoN. REV. 757, 761-65 (1991) (arguing that the
federal government could, to ameliorate

fiscal externalities arising from migration flows, design optimal

transfer payments to lower-level jW"isdiccions effectively to internalize the externalities, and pointing out that

the rates should be nonuniform to reflect divergent preferences): David E. Wi.ldasin, lnterjurisdil:tional Capiral

Mobility: Fiscal Exrenwliry and a Corrective Subsidy, 25 J. URB. EcoN. 193, 196-98 ( 1 989) (employing a Nash
equilibrium approach with immobile agents, viewing tax competition as an externality, and constructing a

corrective subsidy). Inman and Rubinfeld acknowledge a substantial feasibility problem: the economic incen
tives that lead to inefficiency at the state level may lead to inefficient central government correctives. Inman
Rubinfeld, supra note 176, at 3 1 1 - 1 5 . They look to strong national political parties and executive power

&

a�

counterweights to the inefficient tendencies of legislative logrolling; and as a final backstop, they suggest
embedding a restriction to resident-based taxation in the constitution. /d. at 328-29.
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across jurisdictions of unequal size, a minimum tax rate may have a beneficial
effect. 197
2. Evaluation

This theoretical case for interstate coordination or central intervention be
comes practical only to the extent that these models describe signjficant eco
nomic distortions in the real world. 198 Thus evaluated, these tax models have a
marginally stronger claim to plausibility than do preceding applications of the
Tiebout mechanism. This conclusion follows from considering the models'
success in confronting the unresolved problems of earlier Tiebout literature
the matters of unstable equilibrium, externalities, limited information and mobil
ity, and entrepreneurial incentives.

a. Unstable Equilibrium.

Some highly technical progress with the unstable

equilibrium problem has occurred in the tax competition context. Jack Mintz
and Henry Tulkens derive a Nash equilibrium in a model o f two jurisdictions,
each of which conditions its optimal tax policy on the othe:r's tax policy. This
model, however, only derives discontinuous reaction functions in the two
jurisdictions. That is, the competing state's response some1times departs from
the result expected by the acting state, sometimes preventing a Nash equilib
rium. Moreover, any equilibria reached in the model are not Pareto optimal. 199

197. lt has been shown that the asymmetrically sized states will reach a nolflcooperative equilibrium
in which the small state sets a lower tax rate than the large state, resulling in a higher level of tax
revenue and spending in the smaller state. Kanbur & Keen, supra note 183, at 8 8 1 . The Kanbur-Keen
model shows that unequal state size aggravates the inefficiency problem that would exist if the states
were of equal size. This unusual analysis focuses on the role of size of jurisdiction as a source of
inefficiency, inviting application to a range of issues, such as location decisi.ons of multinationals or
transfer pricing policies among affiliates. In the Kanbur-Keen analysis, the model consists of two states.
Taxes are based on source and enforcement is imperfect. ld. at 879. Each citizen can either purchase a
unit of commodity in her own state where it is available for t or can travel to the bordering jurisdiction
where it can be purchased for T, incurring travel and other transaction costs. The consumer will
purchase the unit in the next jurisdiction only if the surplus she enjoys exceeds that from buying the
unit locally and the surplus is nonnegative. With open borders between states, the question arises of
how to select the tax rate that maximizes revenue, given that each country will account for the tax rate
of the other. ld. at 879-80. Asymmetry emerges between the responses of the small and large state. We
start at t=O with low tax rates in both states and open the borders. Given the low rate, the home state
optimally sets its tax above the outside rate, given that at the margin it is no;t worth attracting certain
citizens. As other rates increase, the home state optimally responds by increasing its rate by half. This
suggested rate, however, is subject to change when the increase of tax is sufficiiently high; then, the best
response is to increase the tax rate by a discontinuous reduction. ld. at 88 L The model suggests two
significant strategic responses. First, the increase in cross-border shopping provides a basis for the large
state to increase taxes without loss of revenue to the small state. For this reason, the small state may
increase its own tax rate without fear of lost trade to the neighbor state. The upshot is that if strategic
responses are taken into account, it will be apparent that an increase in transport costs will have little
impact on the cross-border shopping. It follows that it is also not too risky for the lower tax state to
induce measures which make it more costly to cross-border shop.
198. The view of those responsible for these models is that they are practical. See Inman &
Rubinfeld, supra note 176, at 316-1 8, 322.
199. Jack Mintz & Henry Tulkens. Commodiry Ta.,t Comperirio11 Between Member States of a
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The model also has been criticized for its high degree of generality. The critics
insist that even if M intz-Tulkens can show the emergence of a noncooperative

equilibrium in pure strategies, their insight offers few general characterizations
or conclusions?00
The mainstream tax literature accordingly must join the Tiebout literature in
assuming that a stable equilibrium exists in a federalist economy.201 The tax

models then consider the effects of different fiscal policies upon the assumed
equilibrium. The assumption weakens their predictive power. The models can
predict distortions likely to occur if the federal system is competitive. But they
cannot establish that the system is keenly competitive in the first place. Even so,
the models retain a powerful critical function for legal federalism, in which a
beneficial competitive system is now routinely assumed.

b. Externalities, Information, and Mobility.

ln the legal Tiebout world, exter

nalities remain on the sidelines as subject m:1tter inevitably left over for central
government treatment. In the tax models, externalities take center stage as the
subject to be modelled. The comparison shows that the number of problems
requiring central government treatment is longer than the legal Tiebout litera
ture leads one to expect.
Information presents less of a problem for the tax models than for the original
Tiebout model. The tax models stipulate myopic government actors, implying a
limited information world. In addition, the most important piece of information
in a tax model-the tax rate of the competing state-is observable. Questions
remain, however, about the quantity of information real world government
actors have about the fiscal effects of these observable tax policies, and about
the probable actions of other states and the preferences of their dominant
coalitions.
Mobility still is the mainspring with the tax models, with emphasis shifting
from citizen residency to capital transactions. There is also a reversal. With pure
Tiebout models, less mobility and less competition imply more distortion in
public goods production. With the tax competition models, less mobility and
competition imply fewer externalities and less distortion. Either way, the mobil
ity assumptions need empirical support if these models are to have policy
import.202 With the tax models, as with pure Tiebout models, it comes down to a
matter of degree. Most observers will acknowledge a minimum degree of

Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency, 29 J. Pus. EcoN. 133 ( 1 9 86). Each jurisdiction taxes a traded
good and provides a local public good. The features Oof the model reveal that tax changes in one
jurisdiction will impact the tax and price level in other jurisdiction. Because these effects are ignored by
self-interested policymakers, inefficiency emerges.
200. Kanbur & Keen, supra note 183. at 878-79.
20 l . See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 176, at 313.
202. There also may be an analytical problem. See Sam Bucovetsky, Rent Seeking and Tax
Competition, 58 J. Pus. ECON. 337, 337 ( 1995) (arguing that an optimal equilibrium will emerge only if
no migration of capital or labor were requ1red to achieve efficiency, otherwise tax competition leads to
too little migration).
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mobility-induced fiscal distortion (for example, there is a we11-known connec
tion between consumption taxes and cross-border shopping). Studies offer
additional support. Labor has been shown to move across state lines in response
to tax-related changes in the prices of goods and services ?03 Other research
similarly reveals that tax changes induce capital movement,204 but here the
2 5
results are 1ess compe11.mg. 0
c.

Entrepreneurial Incentives.

The tax models, like the Tiebout precedents,

assume that entrepreneurial incentives motivate governmental actors. Within the

tax context, this assumption proves more plausible. Although government actors
universally need both tax dollars and residents, in an underfunded and over
crowded world it is safer to assume a desire for additional tax dollars than a
desire for additional residents.206 Questions remain about the degree of need,
the connection between needs and particular outcomes, and the role of competi
tion in shaping those outcomes. The problem, however, proves less troubling
because the tax models concede interest-group influence as an objective func

tion. The stipulation that the dominant coalition prefers a given tax result technically
solves the incentive problem because it ties the result pursued by government actors to

the ballot box and hence to their interest in their own careers.Z07
3 . Neo-Tieboutian Tax Models
A minority view in the tax competition literature stands in contrast to the
models just described. More pa1ticularly, the Krelove-Myers models208 purport
edly show that state government activity does not imply fiscal distortions due to
externalities and spillovers, and that tax efficiency does not require central
intervention. These models assume that:

( 1 ) local taxes are limited to head taxes

and taxes on rents;

(2) alJ households have identical preferences and endowments; and
(3) all governments set tax rates to maximize residents' welfare and recognize that
resident welfare must be equal to welfare in competing neighboring regions.
Russel Krelove's model posits a market corrective to tax extemalization?09

In the model, a state causes the burden of a local tax on rents to fall disproportion-

203. Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy The Importance of Local Fiscal Conditions in Analyz.ing
Local Labor Markers, 97 J. PoL. EcoN. 1208, 1227-28 (1989); Gregory I. Treyz et al., The Dynamics of
U.S. !memal Migrmion, 75 REv. ECON. & STAT. 209, 213-14 ( 1993).
204. See [nman & Rubinfeld, supra note 176, at 3 J 6.
205. Leslie E. Papke, lmerstate Business Tax Differemial and New Firm Location: Evidence from
Panel Dma. 45 J. Pus. EcoN. 47, 48-49 ( 199 1 ) .
206. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08, 147-57.
,

207. The models' maj01ity rule. median voter approach precludes a more complex description of
interest-group politics, however. Such models also have been ctiticized for predicting less srable
outcomes than are observable in the real world. See William R. Dougan & James M. Snyder, Jr.,
interest-Group Politics Under Majority Rule. 61 J. Pus. EcoN. 49, 50 ( J 996).
208. See Russell R. Krelove, Efficient Tax Exporting, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. 145 ( 1992); Gordon M.
Myers, Optimality, Free Mobility, and the Regional Authoriry in a Federation, 43 J. Pua. EcoN. .I 07
( 1 990).
209. Krelove, supra note 208, at 153.
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ately on out-of-state property owners. The resulting low-cost public goods
package attracts an influx of new residents. These new residents enter the labor
market and bid down wages. Therein lies the correction: wages fall in the
amount of the tax subsidy provided by the out-of-state owners.
2
Alternatively, in Gordon Myers's model, 10 1Lhe government realizes in ad
vance that the tax subsidy will attract new migrants, and voluntarily transfers
cash to out-of-staters to prevent the depression oJf wages. In the end, no state has
an incentive to export its tax burden because countervail ing movement of
factors of production into the state over time will have an equilibriating effect
Z11
that eliminates the advantage of subsidized pubEc goods production.
The insight that household relocation could neutralize tax exportation has
undeniable power. The models nevertheless fai l to undermi ne the position of the
mainstream models because the result depends on a long line of additional
assumptions. Robert Inman and Dan iel Rubinfeld question the speed with
12
which Krelove-Myers household relocation would occur? If it occuned slowly,

there would remain room for fiscal myopia on the part of local politi ci ans ? 1 3

Inman and Ruben field also note that the mainstream models allow for a greater
range of local tax devices and heterogenous c:itizen preferences, more com
monly known as politics . Given multiple types of citizens, the Krelove-Myers
214'
Finally, Inman and Rubinfeld
equilibrium generally would not be e:ffi c ient.
question the validity of an assumption that local governments explicitly con
sider the effects of their fiscal decisions on relative household welfare across
localities. Local government officials acting in accordance with this assumption
are hyperrational beings who perceive all external effects and subject them in
215
advance to the equilibJiating analysis of the Krelove-Myers model.
Inman
and Rubinfeld accurately conclude that the Gordlon models' myopia assumption
better reflects reality

.

The Krelove-Myers models have to expunge the political factor accepted by
other tax competition models in order to solve the problem of fiscal externalities

210. Myers, supra note 208, at 108-109.
2 1 1 . Krelove also offers a contrasting approach for shaping the remedy of corrective taxation. See
Russell R. Krelove, Comperirive Tax Theory i11 Open Ecouomies: Consrrained lnejjiciency and a
Pigovicm Remedy, 48 J. Pus. EcoN. 361, 369-74 ( 1 992) (suggesting that governments be forced to
internalize by effectively creating a market for rights in the tax base). 8111 see Thomas Piketty. A
y Problem. 40 EuRO. ECON. REv. 3, 7 ( 1996)
Federal Voring Mechanism ro Solve rhe Fiscal-Extemalir
(arguing that "this solution [is problematic in] that it relies on the existence of a federal agency which
has the power to set the tax rate for attracted capital and enforce it. which requires both the natiooal
political preferences (to compute the optimal tax rate) and amounts of foreign capital attracted by each
country (to charge the tax) to be publicly verifiable. Such conditions seem very unlikely to be met in
practice at the internutional and EC level: information about international capital movements is highly
decentralized, and various actors (including governments) have little incentive to reveal it (the same is
true. to a lesser extent, for national political preferences).'').
212. See Inman & Rubinfeld. supra note I 76, at 324.
213. Id.
214. Moreover. given elasticity of supply of all factors of production. there literally will be no rents
to tax. returning us to the eftlcient but infeasible world of the Tieboutian head tax. !d.
215. Td. at 323.
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first-best presumption respecting junior

level authority. Even then the solution depends on the assumption of homog
enous preferences and a universe l imited to two tax devices. The Krelove
Myers models also aggravate the old Tieboutian problems of information and
entrepreneurial incentives. The hyperrational Krelove-Myers politician operates
in a world of homogenous preferences under a job description requiring that the
tax regime gives locals no welfare advantages over nonresidents. Such behav
ioral characteristics approach those of the public interest theory's benevolent
politician! The resemblance stands to reason. Krelove-Myers, like the Tiebout
model, purports to claim a complete and spontaneous solution to local-level
public choice problems. For that to occur, a benevolent hand, whether visible or
invisible, has to be at work somewhe:re.
Furthermore, the interpolation into a tax model of a fully-informed, public
spirited government actor does not by itself guarantee a first-best result. Relying
on this assumption, a recent model by Thomas Nechyba reveals that c itizen
migration can frustrate such government actors' attempts to reform distortive
local tax regimes.2t6 The Nechyba model assumes that politicians know about
the interjurisdictional effects of the taxes they set, but that citizens, who have
immobile real estate holdings, mobile incomes, and heterogenous preferences,
are myopic about the effects of their locational decisions. This model also
assumes that politicians, subject to a balanced budget requirement, set taxes by
choosing a proportion of a flat real property tax and a flat rate income tax. The
model demonstrates the results of one jurisdiction's politicians' attempt to
improve its tax system by increasing the proportion of the less distortionary
income tax. Unsurprisingly, citizens whose income is proportionally high com
pared to the value of their real estate react by moving out. Meanwhile, immi
grants attracted to the reformed tax system have low incomes in proportion to
their real estate, and may include both high- and low-income types.217 The shift
to the less distortionary tax causes the overall income of the jurisdiction and its
tax base to shrink. Furthermore, an income tax, even if uniformly employed
across jurisdictions, will not result iin a stable situation because politicians i n
each jurisdiction will have an incentive to lower the income tax and permit the
voters to increase the property tax instead. Local politicians, in effect, are
locked into the property tax despite its distortions? 1 8

216. Thomas J. Nechyba. Local Property and Swte Income Taxes: The Role of !nleljurisdictional
lOS J. POL. ECON. 3 5 1 , 360-66 ( !997).
217. The opposite results if the proportion of propeny tax is increased. THOMAS NECHYBA, EXIS
TENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM AND STRATIFICATION IN HLERAROliCAL PlJBLlC GOOD ECONOMIES WITH VOTING
19-20 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 190, 1996).
218. !d. at 24. Interestingly, if there existed opposition to the property tax, there mjght exist a
Competition nnd Collusion.

prisoner's dilemma in that politicians would be forced to introduce simultaneously an income tax, but
every party would have an incentive to breach the agreement. See Nechyba. supra note 216. This type
of agreement is unlikely unless there is a third party which could monitor and police the agreement (for
example, the state government). Because the state government can legislate a uniform tax and transfer
the monies back to the local level, it is assumed that the state behaves as an enforcement body for the
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B. ASYMMETRJC INFORMATION M ODELS OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS PRODUCTJON

Another, more tentative, line of public economics reconstructs the paradigm
of jurisdictional competition for a second-best world in tenns of the economics
of asymmetric information and mechanism design. This approach proposes
revelation mechanisms that cause government actors truthfuUy to reveal their
costs, inducing them to produce local public goods at a marginal rate. The
model supplements the Tiebout mechanism, acknowledging its inadequacy
without implying its complete rejection. Other models bypass the Tiebout
mechanism entirely, determining that it fails to offer a viable profile of an
efficient public goods producer? 1 9 These models substitute a political jurisdic
tional competition story220 in which voters cast ballots instead of voting with
their feet.221 Emphasis thereby devolves on information asymmetries that im
pair the vote's disciplinary effect.
I . Information Revelation by Local Government Agents in a Tiebout Context
Caroline Hoxby has developed a model that attempts to cure the Tiebout
model's infirmities and enhance the responsiveness of local govemment in a
Tiebout world by adding a preference-matching mechanism drawn from Jean
Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole's theory of optimal regulation.222 On its own,

this mechanism does not make the Tiebout mechanism robust, but it takes a step
in that direction.
Hoxby presents the example of a school board that actively pursues the goal
of providing quality educati on priced at marginal cost. This profile follows from
two key Tieboutian assumptions. First, residents sort themselves into different
school districts until reaching an equilibrium,223 and second, public goods
producers have an incentive to limit costs because competition will drive
high-cost providers out of the market in the long run.

politicians' collusive agreement. For the record, Nechyba assumes that such a state grant system
effectively responds to voter dissatisfaction with the property tax regime, particularly because it
represents a low-cost method to satisfy voter demands (and thus avoids the migration effects) while
satisfying their own preferences.
219. See supra Part II.
220. These models build on the political model introduced by Epple and Zeleni.tz. See Epple &
Zelenitz, supra note 150. Epple and Zelenitz showed that sorting does not ameliorate the problem of
fiscal rent extraction. /d. at 1204-10. Unlike early Tiebout work, they assumed an exogenous number of
communities, inflexible community boundaries, and inactive landowners and developers. /d. at 12000 I. The role of politics was introduced by virtue of the fact that local government, given passive owners
and residents, will attempt to maximize its tax revenues by usurping maximal land rents. !d. at 1216.
221. A simple experiential point further supports this switch-voting in elections offers a le:>s costly
alternative to migration. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking,
Tax-Selling. and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. EcoN. REV. 25, 26 ( 1 995).
222. HOX13Y, supra note 142, at 9 - 1 1 (expanding upon the theory p esented
r
in LAFFONT & TtROLE,
supra note 48, at 375-401). More technically, Hoxby attempts to locate a second-best equilibrium
through the design of an optimal revelation mechanism that maximizes expected social welfare subject
to an incentive constraint.
223. Otherwise, there would be an incentive for resident groups to migrate to high quaUty school
districts.
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An information problem hobbles the school board as it tries to produce
quality education at the margin. Although both the board and the residents of
the school district can observe school quality, they cannot verify school quality.
The school administrator (an agent of the board) does report actual costs, but
the board does not know the parameters of the cost function. Such incomplete
information permits easy rent extraction by the administrator and leads to
diminished effort.224
The industrial organization model, developed by Laffont and Tirole, shows
that an information-revelation mechanism can lead to acquisition of truthful
information about the cost parameters of a regulated

firm.225 This theory

hypothesizes a regulator who must set a price for a firm's output without
necessary information about its marginal cost The firm possesses this informa
tion but has no incentive to report it. The theory shows that the regulator, armed
with a probability distribution respecting the firm's marginal costs, can design a
price menu based on an optimal combination of rents allowed to the firm and
surplus supphed to the consumer. The price menu operates as a screening device
that sorts high-cost and low-cost producers and facilitates the maximization of
expected economic welfare under conditions of information asymmetry?26
In her school model Hoxby assumes two types of school administrators,
effLcient and inefficient. The problem is that the efficient school-that is, the
school with low-cost or high-demand parameters-can mimic the inefficient
school, exploiting an information asymmetry so as to decrease its effort level
for each level of improvement in its cost or demand parameters. To solve the
problem, Hoxby has the school board offer the admjnistrators a Laffont-Tirole
menu of contracts?27 The wrinkle in the menu comes with its provision for an
offer by the regulator (here the school board) to both types of producers (here
the school administrators) of a side payment. Given this offer, the efficient
school will provide truthful information concerning its cost and demand param
eters and the average cost to produce the good because it has an incentive to

224. Assuming that there are low- and high-cost school administrators, the informational asymmelry
allows low-cost types who might be forced to invest in productivity gains to capture rents. The social
costs of these rents may prevent high-cost types from making productivity enhancing investments.

225. Laffont and Tirole have developed a theory of incentives iil regulation that focuses on the role
See LAFFONT & TtROLE, supra note 48,
at 19-47. Given information constrainLs, regulators cannot easily observe the discretionary actions of
of the transmission of information between fim1s and regulators.

the firm that impact the costs of quality of its products. This asymmetry of information gives the finn an
advantage and imposes substantial inefficiencies in regulalOry outcomes. Hence, the existence of
infonnation problems requires regulators to employ regulatory instruments designed to gather inforrna
tion and lessen informational asymmetries. The theory of incentives, in particular, allows regulators to
design incentive compatible contacts that induce firms voluntarily to transmit their private information.

See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, THE ECONOMICS OF
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 153-58 (1989).
226. It also facilitates maximiZ<ltion of welfare under the incentive and individual rationality
Truthful revelation can lead to optimal outcomes.

constraints of the regulated firm. Under an incentive-compatible regime the regulator is positioned to
offer an optimal Lrade-off between control of rents to the firm and the transfer of surplus to consumers.

227. See LAFFONT & TtROLE supra note 48. at 82-83.
,
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select a low subsidy and a high marginal side-payment. In contrast, a high-cost
school will choose the converse combination. The price menu approach allows
the school board to account for this observable but unverifiable information
about the schools' cost parameters in setting the budget.228
Hoxby couples this Laffont-Tirole incentive mechanism with a short-mn
Tiebout mechanism, thereby offering a solution to one of the Tiebout model's
major information problems-the unverifiable quality of many public goods. If
this were the only information problem impairing the Tiebout mechanism's
viability for poljcymaking, this might be the awaited breakthrough. Significant
frictions other than information asymmetries, however, also must be confronted.
For example, under the model's assumptions, the school board desires to
produce at the margin, otherwise population loss will drive the jurisdiction out
of business. Th.is keen entrepreneurial incentive requires that every other assump
tion on the Tiebout list remain intact.229 Those assumptions, however, do not
describe the real world. Consequently, there is no basis to assume that the
sclh.ool board has an incentive to design a revelation mechanism in the first
place.230 The model's accomplishment must be narrowly stated: Given a Tiebout
mechanism on the demand side, in theory, a mechanism can ameliorate supply
side information problems and realign supply-side incentives in a productive
direction.

2. Yardstick Competition
Yardstick competition models seek to ameborate the Tiebout model's shortcom
ings by substituting the vote for mobility as the competitive mechanism. More
specifically, these models posit that a form of jurisdictional competition exists
when voters demand that their governments provide pub! ic goods of cost and
quality equalling that in other jurisdictions. In so doing, these models draw on a
specific branch of the agency literature focused on information asymmetries: the
theory of toumaments?31

228. The importance of a revelation mechanism is that it effectively inlroduces a cost and quality
indiex to assist the board in reducing costs and increasing school qua.liry.
229. Indeed, if that were the case we would be in a first-best world and the school administrator
would share the school board's incentive to produce at the margin for fear of losing her job due to
bankruptcy. In such a scenario, the administrator has every incentive to tell the truth, eliminating the
information asymmerry1
230. The device presumably would have to be imposed by a higher governmental authority as a
process and structure reform. Some problematic preconditions to the operation of the Laffont-Tirole
paradigm also might be mentioned. The model assumes that the regulator has the first-mover advantage
by means of a take-it-or-leave-it offer. As this assumption is relaxed, a commitment problem arises and
it becomes impossible to predict that the bargaining process will always result in an efficient outcome.
ln the alternative, the regulated firm may test the regulator's commitment to a policy by refusing to
participate, leading to a temporary breakdown of negotiations. In this case, the regulator will find it
difficult to make credible commitments for the entire policy period, for example, by refusing to make
future offers to the firm. See Baron, supra note 94, at lO, 13.
2 3 1 . In contrast with standard incentive devices. tournaments look to the relative perfonnance of
each agent rather than individualistic compensation schemes. This literature was developed originally
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The leading treatment comes from Timothy Besley and Anne Case.232 This
two-peliod, rnultijurisdictional model, like the Hoxby model, follows the pat
tern of the game theory models developed in industrial organization literature.

The model assumes that voters' choices and incumbent behavior are determined
simultaneously, and that incumbent politicians decide whether to increase taxes
based on the tax policies of other jurisdictions. Asymmetric information obtains,
with politicians possessing better information233 about the cost of supplying
public goods than voters. There are two types of politicians: those who respond
to voters and do not engage i n rent-seeking behavior, and those ·who finance
their careers at the expense of voters' interests,234 thereby adding to the

mar

ginal cost of public goods.
Politicians set tax levels in response to three possible external shock values
low, medium, and high. The asymmetrically informed voters must determine
their incumbents' type based on performance.235 The model stipulates that the

to examine the conditions of labor market competition. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams,
1 3 BELL J. EcoN. 324 ( 1 982); Edward P. Lazaer & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as
Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. PoL EcoN. 841 (1981). It bas been extended to analyze the role of
competitive compensation schemes in economies with imperfect infonnation. See generally Barry J.
Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General The01y of Compensation and
Competition, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 2 1 passim ( 1983). The tournament models concern information
problems in principal-agent relationships. They assume that while the input of agents is not directly and
costlessly observable, it is possible to establish an incentive scheme or reward structure tied to
individual output. They make a substantive advance in offering a lower-cost method to capture
information (and reduce risk levels) while remaining sufficiently flexible to accommodate different
environments. See Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. EcoN. 319, 323
(1985). The models also provide a means to screen agents. Some shortcomings should be noted.
Although the models capture the idea that compensation schemes can lead tO increased effort when
there is sufficiently high motivation (as in the case of Jaw firm rat races), they do not always guarantee a
first-best level of effort. See Nalebuff & Stiglitz, supra, at 41. Moreover, experimental work suggests
that the theory is robust in predicting average behavior across tournaments but is less successful in
predicting behavior in a single tournament. See Clive Bull et al., To11maments and Piece Rates: An
Experimental Study, 95 J. PoL. EcON. 1 , 3 (1987).
When the discussions of the tournament literature involve political agents, the model is adapted to
focus on competition between governments. Pierre Salmon, DecenTralisation as em Incentive Scheme, 3
OxFORD REv. EcoN. PoL. 24, 29-34 (1987). This analysis as�umes that the essential problem is that
voters lack full information concerning the quality of the politicians' input and that they use the
performance of other politicians as a benchmark regarding their own politicians' policies (Laxation).
BRETON, supra note 6 1 , at 234; see also Pierre Salmon, The Logic of Pressure Groups and the Srrucrure
of the Public Sector. 3 EuR. J. PoL. EcoN. 55 ( 1987).
232. The Bes1ey and Case model addresses the literature on the 'flypaper effect' (money sticks
where it hits). whir.:h points to the possibility that bureaucrats, because of their control of the agenda at
the local and state Level. can expand the level of public goods output beyond the demand of the median
voter. Deemed hostile to the Tiebout literature, this literature suggests that jurisdictional competition is
insufficient to provide needed fiscal discipline. See Wallace E. Oates. Federalism and Government
Finance, in MoDERN PUBLIC FrNANCE. supra note 9 1 , at 1 2 6 . 135.
233. The model follows recent work on asymmetric information and the political agency problem.
See Kenneth Rogoff. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, 80 AM. EcoN. REv. 2 1 ( 1990).
234. Besley & Case, supra note 221, at 30. lt is assumed that the politicians know each other's type.
235. The voters observe their elected politicians' tax-setting behavior in the game's first period. It is
assumed that voters prefer to minimize their expected second period taxes and so base their beliefs
about the politicians' type on period one behavior. lei. Because the transmission of infom1ation is noisy,
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voters have an indirect informational means to assess the incumbents' perfor
mance. Specifically, they observe the tax policy and public goods performance
relative to other jurisdictions. Voters rely on this infom1ation in setting a
benchmark to measure the incumbents' performance,236 thereby determining the
incumbents' type and suitability for re-election.
A range of both pure and mixed strategies emerges in Besley and Case's
formal analysis. 237 The following examples represent a few of the results.
Assume that voters do not have access to information about tax and public
goods production in other jurisdictions. These voters likely will re-elect an
incumbent when the incumbent sets an intermediate-level tax, assuming a
stochastic shock of a sufficiently high value to ensure that an incumbent who
selects this level is indeed a good type. At the same time, however, a bad
incumbent may falsely signal quality and gain re-election by nominally reduc
ing his rent. Change assumptions so that the voters have access to information
about the tax level in an identical, neighboring jurisdiction, and three possibilities
emerge: (1) if both incumbents are good, then there will be no added tax cost of public
goods; (2) if both incumbents are bad, then both will reduce rents when the cost shock
i one incumbent is bad and the other is good, the bad incumbent
is medium; and (3) f
will be discovered if she sets a higher tax than the good incumbent; in this case,
because of the yardstick mechanism, taxes fall in the second period.
Thus, a re-election mechanism can discipline incumbents by forcing them to
increase their effort level. Besley and Case note an analytical inconsistency
between this approach and the Tiebout approach. In a Tiebout world, where
citizens migrate according to their tax and public goods preferences, citizens
dissatisfied with the incumbent's first period tax level presumably vote with
their feet rather than cast ballots in period two. On the other hand, Besley and
Case note the possibility of a hybrid model in which higher taxes lead to capital
lfl. igbt, depressing property values and prompting general voter dissatisfaction.
This model, then, breaks with the Tiebout approach at a technical level.
Significant commonalities, however, persist at an aspirational level. The yard
stick competition approach shares the Tieboutian preference for decentralized
government and the view that competition between governments can lead to
superior outcomes. Indeed, the emphasis on information asymmetries comes
coupled with an assertion that better information gives state and local govern
ment an efficiency advantage. Compared with an aggregated national informa
ltion base, a local information base is said to provide better guidance for the
design of regulatory policies and incentive structures because the smaller
population allows politicians to know more about voters and vice-versa.
iincomplete. and expensi ve citizens will not likely monitOr the performance of politici ans. Neither
pol i ticians may be trusted. The voters accordingly need an alternative source
of credible i nformation .
236. Of course, other mechanisms exist to di scipl ine pol itici ans. such as party control. /d. at 30 n.IO.
237. The scenario leads to a perfect Bayesian equil ibri um (this genc:rates an equilibrium in which
voters and p olitici ans have rational expectations). /d. at 30-3 1 .
.

iincumbents nor opposition
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Besley and Case conclude that their tax-setting/vote-seeking story embodies
an insight superior to that of the Tiebout mobility story. Their conclusion
resonates in the real world. Projected election results certainly concern politi
cians more than resident and capital movement, and politicians certainly set
taxes with voting results in mind. But acknowledgment of the approach's
relative superiority does not, by itself, signal robustness for policy purposes.
Here is the question: given present institutional arrangements, to what extent
do voter performance comparisons determine slate and local election outcomes?
Besley and Case address this question with an empilical study of tax setting and
gubernatorial results?38 The results show that tax changes in a neighbming state
positively and directly effect a state's tax equation239 and that a tax increase
increases the probabibty of incumbent defeat. Unfortunately, these interesting
results neither support a conclusion that votes cause state and local spending
levels to reflect citizen preferences,240 nor reveal whether state and local
regulation is otherwise unimpaired by interest-group rent-seeking. Under this
model, if bad types predominate, then bad outcomes follow whatever the level
of voter information. In that event, state and local governments have no apparent
advantage over central govemment other than a local information base that
proves better outfitted for interest-group rent-seeking.
C. SUMMARY

The new approaches to jurisdictional competition send a complex signal. The
tax competition models modjfy the Tieboutian assumptions to depict in detail
market failure at the state and local levels. The models tell us that productivity
gains through devolution cannot be assumed, even given Tieboutian assump
tions. No plausible showing can be made without an exhaustive review of
possibilities for distortive fiscal effects.
The asymmeoic inf01mation models show us that jurisdictional competition
models may look quite different in the future. Hoxby's interpolation of the
Laffont-Tirole model of incentive-compatible regulation solves one of the many
infmmation problems assumed away in the Tiebout model. In doing so, how
ever, this model does not synergistically clear away all the other sticking points.

238. Besley and Case examined tax changes in neighboring jurisdictions and incumbent governor
defeats using rax data for two tncome classes-joim-filers without dependents who earned $40,000 and
$ 1 00,000 respectively in 1977. !d. at 34; see also Anne C. Case et al., Budget Spillovers and Fiscal
Policy Imerdependence: Evidence from the States, 52 J. Pus. ECON. 285, 302-03 ( 1993) (showing that
expenditure changes respond to spending decisions made in other jurisdictions).
239. For example, a one-dollar increase in neighbors' taxes results in roughly a twenty-cent increase
for the home state. Besley & Case, supra note 221. at 38. These results reflect the assumption that given
the different measures of state taxes, individuals likely will respond differently to changes in economic
and demographic factors.
240. Also, the model must be contextualized to account for the range of demographic and economic
conditions that impact the tax increases in certain states. The existence of both anticipated and
unanticipated shocks means that, unless voters are capable of making the correlation between the two
forn1s of shock, it is assumed that they respond to change whether or not it is anticipated. /d. at 40.
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The yardstick competition approach more closely approaches this goal by
focusing on the vote as the disciplinary mechanism. However, we still do not
realize the ideal of responsive local government. The model makes some
troublesome assumptions: first, that voters evaluate their government by compar
ing it to similarly situated governments; and second, that common voter prefer
ences prevail across jurisdictions?4t Clearly both conditions exist to some
extent in the real world. But it stretches credulity to suggest that they exist to a
degree sufficient to solve public goods incentive problems. Although it may be
possible to design a junior-level democratic institution that induces beneficial
rivalrous behavior, as yet no one has come close to succeeding.
Finally, the models' focus on inforn1ation asymmetiies suggests a route to the
ultimate test of the robustness of law as product. If the analogy is robust, then
conrection of regulatory and political information asymmetries should, by itself,
solve junior-level public choice problems. If law is not product, then transpar
ency by itself will not ensure its efficient production.
IV. lMPLJCATlONS FOR LEGAL FEDERALfSM
This Part sets out recommendations for legal federalism that follow from the
pmceding economic analysis and makes some observations respecting the
economics' application in regulatory competition situations. Regulatory competi
tiont theory informally extends the Tiebout model, which mainly concerns local public
goods, to outputs of regulation. The shift of context can affect the model's application.
In some regulatory competition situations, such as corporate law, the model applies
with greater robustness than with local public goods. In other cases, such as
environmental law, the model's problematics carry over unabated.
A. A SUlTABlLlTY STANDARD FOR CLA.l.JVIS OF COMPETITIVE BENEFIT

1 . Implications for Legal Federalism's Devolutionary Presumption
The economics of jurisdictional competition suggest that legal federa}jsm
makes two unjustified predictive leaps. The first, shared by both race-to-the-top
and race-to-the-bottom proponents, views competition that fonna6vely influ
ences the terms of regulation to be an inevitable outcome of decentralization.
The economics identify signi ficant frictions, such as product bundling, mobility
costs, spillovers, .information asymmet1ies, and the lack of a public goods
entrepreneur, that inhibit competitive lawmaking in practice. These frictions
imply that regulatory subject matter requires categorization based on its degree
of structural suitability to competitive influence. Accordingly, legal regulatory
competition theory should avoid making a general prediction, and instead
articulate a suitability test.

24 J . BRETON,

supra

note

6 1 , at J 89. 233-34. The models also assume that any mobility-based

co1111petition between jurisdictions is not for the movement of people but resources. Besley & Case.
supra note 221, at 26.
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Second, legal federalism questionably predicts that, assuming decentralized
regulation subject to competitive influence, competition will produce a first-best
outcome. The economics provide no basis for predicting SJtable, long-term
equilibria in competitive lawmaking situations. Two factors exacerbate tllis

problem. First, the federal system holds out limitless possibilities for extemaliza
tion of costs, possibilities more likely realized given competitive behavior.
Second, given the Tiebout mechanism's failure to import a discipline that solves
public choice problems, any claim of welfare enhancement through devolution
must account for the possibility of junior-level interest-group rem-seeking.
The field of public economics continues to work on all of these problems, but
no general solutions have been forthcoming as of yet. This leaves the legal
literature overstating the connection between decentralization, competitive behav
ior, and efficient results.
This conclusion does not implicitly favor federalization. Nor does it contro
vert the independent claim of junior-level advantage that public economics
makes with the decentralization theorem. This emphasizes the more likely
satisfaction of preferences in small numbers situations,242 an observation rein
forced by the asymmetric information literature. The theorem also asserts
regulatory experimentation to be more likely when many jurisdictions confront
the same problem.243 Nothing in our analysis detracts from the force of these
points?44 But, the decentralization theorem makes claims of a llesser magnitude

242. Assuming of course that provision at a senior level of government holds no cost advantages.

See supra notes 61-65, infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
243. Serious doubts have been raised about the robustness of tltis claim. One p1roblem is its lack of a
profile of the levels of risk aversion of government actors at various levels. See Susan Rose-Acketman,
Risk Taking wzd Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593. 6 1 4- 1 6
( 1980) (arguing that because local politicians are more risk averse than are federal, one should expect
innovation at the federal level). In addition. just as law may be analogized to product, so too may it be
analogized to technology. Unlike many technological innovators, lawmakers seeking returns on invest
ment face a public goods problem. Moreover, once technical complexity is present, product competition
alone does not ensure innovation, as shown by the application of the economics of network effects, see
Klausner, supra note 122, at 789-824, and patent races, see Ayres. supra note 153. at 241 -46, in the law
as product context.
244. We have more doubts about the robustness of the Leviathan theory of public choice literature,
see supra notes 57-60 and accompanyjng text, which advances the idea that decentralization acts as a
constraint on budget-maxintizing bureaucrats. Few of the empirical srudies support the thesis that size
of government vmies inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization. See James Heil. The Search for
Leviorhan Revisited, 19 PUB. FIN. Q. 334 ( I 9 9 1 ) ; Wallace E. Oates, Searching for Levialhan: An
Empirical Study. 75 Alvt. EcoN. REv. 748 (1985). But see Randall W. Eberts & Timothy J. Gronberg,
Can Competition Among Local Covemments Constrain Co!•ermne/11 Spending'· 24 ECON. REv. 2, 3, 7
( 1 988): Jeffrey S. Zax. Is There a Levia1han in Your Neighborhood?, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 560 ( 1 989)
(concluding that there is ··solid statistical evidence'' that decentralization constrains spending at the
metropolitan and county levels, if not at the state level). Oates argues that "there is not enough
lmambiguous Sllpport available to make a convincing case that decentralization in itself constrains
government size. If we want smaller government. then other measures are probably in order." Wallace
E. Oates, Federalism and Covemment Finance, in MODERN PUBLIC f£NANCE, supra note 9 1 , at 126.
148. We also note the appearance of a counterstory reflecting political devellopments of the pnst
decade-and-a-half, see Reiner Eichenberger, The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentraliw
rion, 47 KYK.LOS 403, 407-409 ( 1 994). Eichenberger contends that centralization weakens the demand
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than does the Tiebout model. The theorem speaks only in tenns of probabilities
and makes no absolute claims about the quahty of the projected result. As such,
it Jfolds easily into traditional federalism dialogues. All else equal, the states
have always gotten the nod, and the product experimentation point finds its
most famous articulation in Justice Brandeis's reference to the states as social
laboratories.245 Jurisdictional competition theory, in contrast, purports to pre
empt discussion about the appropriate level of regulation by ascribing determina
tive benefits to the states.
Our analysis also neither denies that jurisdictional competition occurs in the
real world, nor implies a presumption that jurisdictional competition i mparts
negative effects?46 States and localities routinely make taxing and spending
decisions under competitive stress, for example, with stadium deals for profes
sional sports teams and tax breaks for finns locating new plants.247 Competition
has shaped entire areas of law--corporate law being the prime example. The
corporate law system, although not first-best, brings the benefits of responsive
ness to business i nterests and technically expert decisionmaking?48 We even
agJree that regulatory competition appropriately may be tenned a federalism
vallue, at least at a broad structural level. We would not, for example, dispute a
prediction that relocation of factors of production would frustrate a state's plans
to form an industry cartel or confiscate the wealth of a class of firms.249
2. The Suitability Standard, the Race-to-the-Top, the Race-to-the-Bottom,
and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Legal federalism needs to be more closely aligned with the terms of the
public economics if it is validly to connect junior-level competition and eco
nomic welfare. Two structural adjustments should move the discourse in this
direction. First, the list of barriers to first-best competitive results should be
restated as a suitability standard. Second, the race-to-the-top and race-the
bottom concepts should be discarded as misleading.
A claim that competitive benefits redound from the vesting of regulatory
authority at the junior level will be more plausible when: ( 1 ) the regulation is

for public goods and as a result limits the size of the budget. /d. at 407-09. Citizens (I) opt out of the
system when government actors do not respect their preferences, (2) react to government rent-seeking
activities because they shoulder the resulting welfare and budgetary costs, and (3) respond to increasing
cen1tralization and govemment exploitation by enacting legislation that limits taxation and electing
politicians who support such initiatives. /d. at 407-09.
245. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 3 1 J ( 1932) (Brandeis, J .. dissenting).
246. Nor does our analysis imply rejection of the body of legal scholarship on regulatory competi
tion. To the contrary. we think that situation-specific legal <�pplications provide a useful source of
material for demonstrating the theory's shortcomings.
247. See Peter D. Eruich, Saving rhe Scates from Themseh·es: Commerce Clause Constraims on
Stale Tax Incentives for Business. 1 10 HARV. L. REv. 377 ( 1 996) (offering an excellent report on the
landscape).
248. Our view is articulated in William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, RegulatOIJ Competition,
Re;gulm01y Caplttre, and Corporate Self-Regulation. 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 ( 1995).
249. See Weingast, supra note 5, at 5.
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unbundled,

(2) the regulation implicates no substantial interconnections with
other jurisdictions or with later consumers, (3) all actors affected by the
regulation are highly mobile, (4) all actors are well-informed, and (5) competi
tive pressures registered by all actors affected by the regulation determine its

content. To the extent that one or more these variables does not obtain, the case
for competitive benefits weakens?50 Meanwhile, a proponent of a plausible

jurisdictional competition claim should be able to describe a causal connection
between the mechanism of competition and the projected benefits, showing the
impact on the alignment of interest-group politics and other factors influencing
regulatory outcomes in competing jurisdictions.
Claims of competitive detriment may be slightly easier to sustain under this
standard. A proponent must sbll demonstrate unbundled regulation and mobility,
but can omit positive showings respecting infom1ation, input by all affected
parties, and an absence of externalities. Additionally, there is a strong case for
relaxing the requirements of state-level mobility and well-informed actors when
jurisdictional competition theory is drawn on to support centralized wealth
redistribution policies. The point that negative competitive effects at junior
levels require a centrally managed redistribution poEcy has been central to
jurisdictional competition theory from the beginning. Nothing in the literature
of Tiebout problematics disturbs this application,251 and some very suggestive
empirical studies provide support for this application.252

250. Compare Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 34-35 (setting out a suitability test based on the
TieboUl model's assumptions and determining that exit will cause a "powerful tendency toward optimal
legislation·• to the extent four conditions are satisfied: ( I ) mobile people and resources, (2) a large
number of jurisdictions, (3) jurisdictions free to enact any law they desire, and (4) all consequences felt
within the jurisdiction); Rice, supra note 27, at 54-55. In our view this test is incomplete, because it
omits product bundling, limited information, and interest-group politics. See also Butler & Macey,
supm note 78, at 3 1 (adding a factor: "lawmakers must be forced to respond to adverse events such as
falling population, real estate prices, market share, or revenue. and other manifestations of voter
discontent that result from inefficient regulations.. ). We agree with Butler and Macey, but articulate a
longer list at a higher level of generality.
251. Wilson, supra note 193, carries this point to its logical conclusion and argues that, if the power
to set and implement redistributive policies is vested at multiple levels of government, then one level of
government may always undennine income policies promulgated at another level. !d. at 303-04.
Junior-level policy coordination remains a possibility. but might increase the overall costs of achieving
an optimum level of income distribution. Viewed through the lens of regulatory competition theory.
strongly stated, such coordination would be a diluted form of centralization. Thus the problems of
taxation and distribution can be solved only through coordination by the central government. Public
economists continue to add force to the redistribution point. See Roland Benabou, Equit
y and Efficiency
in Human Capiwl !nveSIJ/lent: The Local Connecrion. 63 REV. EcoN. STUD. 237 ( 1 996). Benabou
studies the relationship between human capital formation and decentralized school funding, demonstrat
ing that decentralized local school expenditure and taxes are important forces leading to highly
stratified communities. !d. at 251-53. He insists that this form of price discrimination cannot be
ameliorated by competition among communities for good types (there is no pure equilibrium because
the two communities would yield different levels of rents for developers) and that the city-suburb
relationship is inefficient. !d. at 250. 1n Benabou's view. efJiciency requires city-wide coordination
through a united local government or a monopolistic developer. /d. at 254-57.
252. See supra note 166. This point has been made powerfully in connection with recent welfare
legislation, although not so powerfully as to have had :m impact in Washington. See Paul E. Peterson.
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The retirement of the race-to-the-top and race-to-the-bottom concepts makes
sense for a number of reasons. The frictions that inhibit the Tiebout mechanism
may prevent a race from commencing i n the first place. Even given a race, the
unstable equilibrium discussion shows that the regulation likely would never
reac:h the top, and even i f it did, it likely would not remain there for long. In
addition, endless possibilities for dist01tive extemalization remain. As a result,
even with keen competition, central authority will have to make adjustments.
Race-to-the-top rhetoric obscures all of these points.
The race-to-the-bottom concept should be retired because it does not provide
an effective basis for challenging weak claims for competitive benefits. The
con,cept unnecessarily concedes the existence of intense junior-level competi
tion, and its all-purpose prisoner's dilemma story has been rebutted persua
sive:ly?53 Meanwhile, the tax competition literature shows that an i mportant
point about distortive competition has been overlooked i n legal discussions: A
showing of downward directed competition does not presuppose

a

prisoner's

dilemma. An assumption of government myopia and an open economic concept

of an externality provide a sufficiently capacious framework.254 The myopia
assumption, although controverted within public economics, resonates well i n
legal contexts. Finally, nothing i n the economics per se delegitimizes political
and public i nterest justifications for centralization in legal contexts.
3. Scare Talk

One likely objection to our analysis o f the economics must be addressed.
Some contend that actual mobility is unnecessary for operation of the Tiebout
mechanism. Exit need not occur, it need only be threatened. To see this,
consider a decentralized regime in which: ( 1 ) factors of production are very
mobile, (2) the content of regulation figures into locational decisions, (3)
interest-group agreements determine the content of regulation in each jurisdic
tion, and (4) the attraction of new factors of production does not affect the
content of the interest-group agreements. Competition does not purposively
shajpe the law in this system. Yet, given mobility and the effect of regulation on
locational decisions, the regulatory status quo affects the movement of factors
of production. A prediction that movement could become a lawmaking influ
ence as conditions change over time is justified. Indeed, the potential for future
Devolution 's Price, J 4 YALE J. ON REG. I l l 1 12-!9 ( 1996) (citing additional empi1ical literature); Note,
Devo[v;,!g Welfare Programs to the Stmes: A Public Choice Perspective, I 09 HARV. L. REv. I 984,
T

1987-89 ( 1 996) (describing race-to-the-bottom effects in welfare context). [n practice, redistributive
programs are implemented at d1e state and local level and interjurisdictional pressures do not prevent
the existence of such programs. These pressures, however, do contain the magnitude of such programs.
For discussion of this point. see Kaplow. supra note 1 1 , at 472-79.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. We note, however. that foimal economics do confinn that
prisoner's dilemmas can be made out in jurisdictional competition situations. See supra note 2 1 8 .
254. Cf Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REv. 1 1 15, 1 1 47 ( 1 996) (arguing that localities acting in their own interest will not decide
optimally because they will not take regional interests into account).
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competitive influence could be characterized as a benefit incident 1to any decentraliz
ing initiative. Given this picture, regulatory competition legitimately figures into
policymaking calculations whether or not it presently influences regulation or is likely
55
to do so i n the future. It need only be a long-tenn possibility? 1he argument finds
support by analogy in the contestable markets approach to antitrust under which the
256
mere possibility of new entrants adequately disciplines the monopolist.
This good argument poses the question of whether the Tiebout model should
be applied on

an

"as if" basis. That is, even though the model is not robust, it

should applied in policymak:ing as though it were robust due to the continuing
possibility (however small) of long-run competitive effects. The question should
be answered in the negative with these preemptive competition arguments being
put to one side for situation-specific application. First, the contestable markets
view is rejected by subsequent contJibutions to the economics of monopoly. The
literature identifies a long 1ist of imperfections-including downward-sloping
demand, nonconvexities, and imperfect information-and concludes that poten
tial competition has limited effects and fails to provide a bas.is for a deregula
257
The analysis of the infirmities of regulatory competition
tory presumption.
works similarly. Given the frictions that inhibit real world appearance o f
Tiebout competition, preemptive competition arguments li.kelty become "cries
of wolf" over time. Initially plausible, they lose credibility in the absence of
5B
Even the first-time call for a preemptive response need
actual competition ?
not be determinative. The opponent of the preemptive initiative can still suggest
that the jurisdiction wait to see if the predicted competition actually occurs. At
that point� the issue becomes whether the wait-and-see optioJn entails possible
injury to the jurisdiction. Delay will have a cost only when the proponent can
259
Otherwise, the
show a first-mover advantage in a potential competitor state.
jurisdiction with a countervailing policy reason not to try to compete can wait,
60
ready to copy the first mover should competitive disadvantage occur?

B. 11\I!PLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY COMPETITION
The economics of jurisdictional competition focus primarily on local public
goods production and tend not to address regulatory competition situations. The

255. See. e.g., Pe1ry. supra note 36, at 738-46 (arguing that the SEC should amend its regulations tO
facilitate competition with foreign markets for equities. even though domestic companies still issue
equity at home, because such competition will arise in the future).
256. See Harold Demsetz. Why Regulace Utilities?, I I J.L. & EcoN. 55, 60-61 (1968).
'257. See STIGLITZ, supra note 123, at 119-125.
258. An exception for wealth redistribution policy again may be appropriate. Here the cry of wolf is
made when a local welfare regime threatens to draw poor people to the jurisdiction. Given the prejudice
against the poor in American society, the cry may prompt action on the lhjnnest of empirical bases.
259. See Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL L. REV. 745, 752- 8 1 8 ( 1 995) (discussing economics of first-mover
advantage in context of same-sex man·iage).
260. See Ayres, supra note I 53, at 246-51 (discussi"!g the ease of copycat re:sponses on the part of
follower states).
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transition to regulatory contexts can cause the precepts of the theory to apply
differently than in public goods situations. Much of the differential can be
assessed by grouping regulatory competition situations into two categories. In
the first, conflict of laws mles put firms or individuals in a position to select a
jurisdiction for the situs of a legal relationship, with jurisdictions competing for
their business. In the second, product competition across j urisdictional lines
prompts competitive lawmaking by governments either pursuing new factors of
production or attempting to confer competitive advantages on existing residents.
Both categories overlap at points with local public goods production and related
tax policy.

1 . Competition to Confer Legal Status
The clearest cases of regulatory competition arise when a conflict of laws
regime allows actors to choose a nominal jurisdictional situs for a firm, transac
tion, or other legal relationship. 1f the choice produces rents for the jurisdiction
in the folm of taxes, fees, transactional expenses, or enforcement expenses, then
the jurisdiction has an incentive to shape the applicable law to suit the selecting
actors' preferences. Corporate law is the classic case. Corporate actors may
choose their state of incorporation without regard to the location of the firm's
physical assets. The states have competed for chartering businesses for a
century, offering attractive codes and ancillary services in exchange for fran
chise tax revenues.
International competition for incorporations also has emerged, though on a
lesser scale. Because national tax systems vary in the bases on which they
prescribe jurisdiction, firms (and individuals) can exploit the systems' limita
tions by situating themselves and their transactions in offshore tax havens.261
What has gone for the chartering of firms also has gone for the registration of
ships.

A handful of leading jurisdictions of
fer regulatory havens to ship owners

worldwide?62 This pattern of competitive lawmaking extends beyond the siting
of commercial relationships. Liberal marriage and divorce mles can produce
tourist revenues for jurisdictions accessible to population centers with more
restrictive family law regimes.263

1985 Senate Commiuee Report identifies 29 tax haven jurisdictions worldwide. S ENATE
SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES, S.
REP No. 99-130, at 29-31, 33-34 ( 1 985). The largest of the states on the list are Austria, tbe
261.

A

COMM. ON Gov'TAL AFFAIRS, CRfME AND

Netherlands, and Switzerland. !d. at 33-34. Tbe report lists three distinguishing characteristics: low or
nonexistent taxes on foreign-source income, bank secrecy, and banks and financial institutions with a
dominant role in trade and commerce. !d. at 29-30.

262. The leading open registry states are Liberia, Panama, Singapore, Cyprus, and Vanuatu. Jane M.
Wells, Comment,

Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries. 6

MAR. LAW. 22 1 , 221-223

(1981).

They offer easy registration procedures and free transferability, no income taxes, no restrictions on
manning by foreign nationals, and no other significanr domestic regulations. !d. Registration in an open
registry jurisdiction increases the market value of the ship. !d.
263. At one time Nevada divorces were the primary example. Today the question is whether the

point might hold for same-sex marriages. Brown, supra note 259, at 769-72.
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The literature of Tiebout problematics demonstrates why the sale of status
shows up i n practice as the clearest case of regulatory competition. Simply, here
the problem of the entrepreneurial government actor is solved. Nominally sited
legal relationships are unbundled legal products that can be sold separately to
foreign consumers. Their provision leads to a two-party transaction resembling
a conventional sale of goods. For customers of means, actual movement presents
a cost but not a barrier. Verifiability either presents no problem, as with
marriage and d ivorce, or may be delegated to the judgment of a legal profes
sional. Within corporate law, lawyers play an especially prominent intermediary
role. Reincorporating firms can choose among fifty state codes. These firms
base their decisions on information provided by their lawyers (and their invest
ment bankers). 264 Lawyers, in tum, draft the state codes selected by the reincor
porating firms. Their participation has contributed to an evolutionary convergence
on the basic terms of the fifty state codes and the appearance of a model code.
As a result, despite fifty alternatives, reincorporation presents a manageable
informational problem.
As to these relationships, law may approximate product. Status entrepreneur
ship, however, is not a game any status-providing jurisdiction can play. Particu
lar conditions tend to obtain in jurisdictions i n which product sales become
wrought into the lawmaking structure. Not all potential suppliers face sufficient
competitive incentives. Small jurisdictions tend to take leading competitive
roles. For example, about half of the corporations listed on the New York Stock
Exchange are i ncorporated in Delaware. Additionally, smaLl island states gener
aLly serve as tax havens, and Libe1ia and Panama lead i n the registration of
ships. The explanation prevailing for Delaware probably applies across the
board. Corporate franchise fees comprise fifteen percent of Delaware's tax base;
the same cash flow, however, would be a trivial percentage of the tax base of a
large state. Given a limited market, competitive success has a larger percentage
impact on the smaller budget of a small jurisdiction. Political and financial
incentives to create (or enter) a legal product market arise when there is the
possibility of a significant payoff. The incentive relationship, i n tum, lends
plausibility in the product market. The small jurisdiction's propensity for fiscal
dependence on its legal business provides a structural assurance that customer
interests will take precedence over all competing interests in local political
deliberations. 265
Finally, even though the status sale category shows that entrepreneurial
264. RoMANO, supra note 39, at 43-44; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an
lnteresi·Group Themy of Delaware C01porate Law, 65 1'Ex.

L. REv. 469, 493-94 ( 1 987). .

265. RoMANO, supra note 39. at 6-12. But even given such a clear-cut incentive favoring the

interests of a customer, integration with the rest of lhe federal system can create complications. For
instance, when enforcement is through private lawsuits, states do not fully control their product because
parties may sue elsewhere. See Hay, supra note 43, at

652. In the corporate law context, this incident of

federalism has complicated Delaware's incentive picture. Delaware must offer the plaintiff's bar
sufficient returns to induce litigation in the state while simultaneously maintaining a reputation for
privileging the interests of management. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 248, at

1898-1 900.
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government actors can exist in practice, there is no concomitant assurance that
incentives respecting status sales will be aligned to ensure first-best lawmaking.
First, status sales tend to entail minimal contacts between the granting state and
the customer. This permits the granting state to regulate without concern for
negative effects on parties in interest to the status relationship who lack a voice
as to the choice of jurisdiction. Corporate law demonstrates the operation of
such a distortive incentive structure. One interested group, corporate manage
ment, makes the locational decision while the statutory structure excludes from
the political decisionmaking process another group with a conflicting interest
266
As a result, rent incentives on the supply side are tied
corporate shareholders.
to management's interest on the demand side. Juridical path dependencies and
collective action problems prevent the shareholders from influencing the law of
any of the fifty states to make the competitive system work for their benefit. The
result is regulatory capture constituted by a competitively driven lawmaking
267
Because management's preferences vastly outweigh those of the
system.
26
shareholders, to most observers the resulting legal regime is suboptimal. 8
2. Competition for Factors of Production

Competitive regulation also can result from interactions between regulators
and actors in product markets. The clearest case occurs when rent-seeking
government actors (or private actors in a position to i n H uence those in govern
ment) seek to attract mobile factors of production, offering investment-specific
69
A more subtle case occurs when the regulatory
tax breaks or subsidies?
profiles of altemative jurisdictions affect these mobile actors' locational deci
7
sions ? 0 Jurisdictional differentials in environmental regulation give rise to

266. Macey and Miller offered the first public choice analysis of chaner competition. Macey &
Miller, supra note 264, at 483-509: see also Butler & Macey, supra note 78, at 679 (arguing that what
appears to be federal-state competition for bank charters is rent-seeking).
267. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 248, at 1888-1903; see also James D. Cox. Regulatol)'

Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for Reconciling Japanese cmd United Stmes Disclo
sure Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS i:l'H.L & COMP. L. REv. 149. 164-66 ( 1993) (warning that international

competition respecting securities registration could follow only from the utility functions of managers,
and will be desirable only if it benefits the interests of the issuer as a whole).
268. For the proposition that the state's responsiveness to the management interest refutes any
race-to-the-top claim for the system. see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 140, at 222, and Ralph
Winrer, The "Race for the Top ·· Revisired: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM L. REv. 1526, 1528
( 1989).
269. One should not assume that such competition is upward directed. See Leon Taylor, lnji'asrruc
wral Comperition Among Jurisdictions. 49 J. PuB. EcoN. 241, 244-48 (1992) (presenting a model in
which jurisdictions compete to attract a big-ticket plant project by investing in new infrastructure).
Under the assumptions of Taylor·s model, the contest involves net waste that might be mitigated by
central planning. !d. at 25 1 -52. Taylor stresses limitations on the result-waste should be expected
when the contest is long. involves many of contestants, and the infrastructure has limited alternative
uses. Jd. Taylor also notes that existing literature 011 regulatory competition for industry assumes that
the contest itself consumes 110 resources. ld. at 242; see also Enrich, supra note 247. at 382-405
(discussing the effects of interstate tax competition on local decisions of business).
270. In core cases of regulatory competition, competition for individuals, factors, or capital either
detetmines the shape of a legal regime or prompts pressure for its refonn. A conceptually related class
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such a case. Today, large firms choose among not only states, but also nation
states when investing in new plants.

27 1 As between two potential venues, a finn

might desire the location with less rest1ictive environmental regulation from a
cost perspective. Thus, capital mobility may compel a jurisdiction to choose
between attracting investment by absorbing the environmental costs of produc
tion, and sacrificing capital investment by charging environmental costs to
producers to satisfy residents' preferences for a clean environment. As a result,
competition for capital influences discussions respecting, and the shape of,
environmental regulation.
Capital mobility also arguably influences other regulatory regimes, such as
securities regulation. 272 A number of centers worldwide compete to provide
capital for any given financing. If investment institutions sited i n one of these
centers find their freedom of action l imited by local securities or investment
laws, and consequently lose business to foreign firms and capital markets, they
will argue that international competition justifies relaxation o f the local con
straints. Some of these deregulatory ini tiatives have prompted changes i n
domestic securities regulation while others have not.273

of legal conflicts ruises when a legal regime that is not determined by regulatory competition has
consequences for producers or consumers in a competitive product market that operates across
jurisdictional lines. For example, differentials in environmental regulation that impact the competitive
ness of local businesses have led to disputes in intemational trade law. Producers in states with less
restrictive environmental regulation get a cost advantage over producers in more restrictive states: the
disadvantaged producers. i f they cannot secure a relaxation of local regulation, seek retaliatory
sanctions against imports from less restrictive states. Viewed from the perspective of the more
restrictive states' lawmakers and producers, such a sanction is a competitive lawmaking response. But it
is anticornpetitive when viewed from the perspective of the goods market and its consumers, and may
run afoul of an international trade law regime. More generally, differentials in environmental regulation
have been stumbling blocks in the negotiation and ratification of liberalizing international trade regimes.
Trade law seeks to reduce distortions that result from regulatory competition. Tariffs, quotas, and
direct subsidies to export industries all seek to enhance the competitiveness of local producers, btl[
nevertheless are prohibited under the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 2 B.D.LE.L. 45, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 6 1 Stat. A-1 I , 55
U.N.TS. 187, and North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 1L.M. 605 ( 1 993). There
is a trade Jaw argument that defends retaliatory sanctions which respond to differentials in environmen
tal regulation that significantly lower the costs of producers in a less strict regime: a state's regulatory
laxity amounts to a production subsidy. In the well-known (but now moot) tuna controversy, the United
States tried unsuccessfully tO justify its retaliatory sanctions on this ''indirect subsidization" concept.
See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.LM. 1594 (1991); United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 1994, 33 I.LM. 839 (1994). For discussion of these
matters, see generally Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 1 1 .
27 L . See Perui Haaparanw, Competirion for Foreign Direct lnvestmems, 63 J. Pus. EcoN. 141,
143-46 ( 1 996) (showing that nation states employ subsidies when competing to attract investment by
firms).
272. International tax competition presents the case of maximum mobility. Multinational corpora
tions have proved adept at using internal transfer pricing tO shift income to lower tax venues. avoiding
the cost of physically shifting operations. After Britain and the United States cut corporate rates during
the l980s, Canada felt impelled to follow suit Jest its corporate taxpayers use paper ruses to shift
income out of the country. See Robert A. Green, The Fuwre of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of

Mulrinational En1e1prises. 79 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 18, 62 (1993).
273. ln the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission has taken limited steps to
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All the frictions that inhibit the appearance and impact of competition in local
public goods situations can bear on cases in this broad category of regulatory
competition. Competition, accordingly, cannot be assumed. Even the presence
of heated policy discussions about competition does not ensure its actual
presence. For example, it is unclear whether the tie between competition for
capital and environmental regulation actually influences real world locational
choices. Studies have shown repeatedly that environmental regulations do not
have a statistically significant effect on plant location decisions.274
The degree of inhibiting friction will vary with the particular subject matter.
The following discussion makes some observations about structural tendencies.
The discussion initially describes bow the tax competition models reveal a
theoretical possibility of distortive results when environmental regulation be
comes impl icated in competition for capital investment. The discussion then
proceeds to the problems of optimal numbers, mobility, information, and entre
preneurial incentives.
a. Externalities and Competitive Environmental Policy.

The tax competition

literature should not be cabined to tax policy discussions. Potential connections
between state fiscal policy and state regulatory policy make these models
pertinent to a range of regulatory competition debates. Tax policy, for example,
can be influenced by policies respecting investment and employment, and those
policies, in tum, can influence levels of regulation. A model that shows a
suboptimal trade-off of tax for new investment capital can be extended to
include trade-offs made respecting labor and environmental standards. Thus, it
comes as no surprise that a tax competition model already has taken a leading
role in the federalism debate in the field of environmental law.
The model is the Oates-Schwab model of environmental law competition.
This model, which has been commended as a theoretical base point for a
devolutionary legal policy, states outcomes that depend entirely on assumptions
respecting tax policy. As recently extended by John Wilson,275 the model
demonstrates that fiscal effects of state-based environmental regulation create a
potential for inefficiency whenever the regulating state proposes a suboptimally
constructed tax regime. The model thereby teaches an important lesson about
the appropriate concept of environmental externalities. Despite conceding that

facilitate cross-border financing and securities transactions. See Regulation S, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6863 [ 1 989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 84. 524 .(Apr. 24, 1990): Rule
15a-6 Under the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240. I 5a-6 (J 989); Rule l44A, 1 7 C.F.R.
§ 230.144A ( 1992). Nevertheless, the SEC has refused to accord mutual recognition to the home
country auditing standards and accounting principles of foreign issuers.
274. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regularion and the Compeririveness of U.S. Manufactur
ing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?. 33 J. EcoN. LtT. 132, 146-50 (1995); Arik Levinson,
Environmenral Regulations and IndusTry Locarion: International and Domestic Evidence, in FALR
TRADE. supra note 173, at 429, 443-50.
275. Wilson, supra note 173, at 402-09. Wilson is a principal contributor to the tax competition
literature. See John D. Wilson. A Theory of lnrerregiona/ Tax CompetiTion. 19 J. URB. EcoN. 296
(1986).
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interstate environmental externalities justify federal regulation, legal commenta
tors generally think in strictly physical terms, with cross-border pollution
emerging as the primary policy problem. The extended Oates-Schwab model
shows this conception to be unduly restrictive. Fiscal externalities must also be
'>76
cons1"dered .-

Economic theory states that firms should pay taxes in an amount equal to the

costs of the public goods they consume plus the external costs imposed by their
activities. The theory thereby connects tax levels to environmental regulation.
In theory, a polluting firm can be taxed in an amount equal to the cost of its
pollution with public goods thereby financed being retumed to the citizenry as
compensation for the pollution. Predictably, according to the Tiebout literature,
competition will force the optimal setting of this tax level; firm mobility will
prevent competing states from imposing a pollution tax greater than pollution
cost, while local zoning regulation will ensure that firms do not underpay.277
The Oates-Schwab model takes this a step further, showing that a regime of
environmental controls can provide a functional substitute for a regime of
pollution and taxation. Under the Oates-Schwab model, the cost-benefit trade
off occurs with the capitalization of the cost of the regulations. More particu
larly, instead of paying tax for the right to pollute, firms operate under
environmental controls that tie the right to pollute to thte hiring of additional
units of labor. The model assumes a fixed supply of labor,278 and assumes that
the states tax labor but not capital. Given these assumptions, payment for the
emissions comes not in the form of public goods financed by taxes, but in the
form of higher wages for factors supplied by residents. Each jurisdiction's
residents have an incentive to reduce emissions to the point at which their
marginal value from a cleaner environment equals their marginal loss in output
and employment.279 The states sort themselves according to their relative
preferences for pollution and wages?80
Wilson shows that land may be substituted for labor as the fixed factor in

276. See also A.L. Bovenberg & F. van der Ploeg, Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the
udHmr Marker in a Second-Besr World, 55 J. Pus. EcoN. 349, 356-65 ( 1994) (modelling environmental

and tax policy trade-offs on realistic tax assumptions and getting second-best results); James R.
Markusen et al., Competirion in Regional Environmental Policies When Plalll Locarions Are Endog
enous, 56 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 71-73 ( 1 995) (showing that, with absentee o•wners and endogenous plant
location, competition will result in significantly lower output taxes).
277. Wilson. supra note 173. at 394, 400. The leading models are Fischel. supra note 18, and
Hamilton, supra note I 09.
278. Oates & Schwab. supra note 77, at 336-37: c/ Wilson, supra note: 193. at 298 (fixed supply of
capital in model of tax competition).
279. Oates & Schwab, supm note 77, at 337-38; Wilson, supra note 173. at 403-05.
280. Wilson points out that this first-best result depends on the assumption of a fixed labor supply.
Wilson, supra note 173, at 408. A different resuJt is reached if one assumes. an upward slope in the labor
supply curve. Now the regulatory link between emissions levels and employment amounts to a
distortionary subsidy to labor. To reduce the subsidy, the permjtted amount of emissions must be
decreased to an inefficiently low amount. The rt>�ult is a NIMBY situati•on, i.e., a suboptimally strict
environmental regime. /d. at 405.
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Oates-Schwab?8 1 Given land use controls, a higher permitted level of emissions
results in higher land rents. B u t the trade-off between emissions and rents works
only to the extent that all rent recipients live i n the jurisdiction. With significant

absentee land ownership, the absentees will favor inef-ficiently lax standards,
while the residents will prefer inefficiently striict standards, exporting the cost to
the absentees. The actual result will depend on the jurisdiction's political
2 2
equilibrium. 8
The Oates-Schwab model similarly incorporates the possibility of a subopti
mally lax environmental regime when it introduces a tax on capital while
leaving environmental regulation tied to inputs of a fixed supply of labor.
Because the supply of capital i s not fixed i n the model, stricter emission
standards reduce the capital supply, which indirectly reduces tax revenues. The
cost of stricter emissions controls now exceeds the jurisdiction's w i l l ingness to
pay. Given interstate competition for capital,

a

race to relax environmental

standards and attract capital results?83 That result, however, i s avoided if the
model ties permissible emissions to capital rather than labor supply. If capital is
taxed at a rate equal to the environmental cost of an additional unit of capital,
efficient emissions regulation emerges. However, if the capital tax rate is higher
than the environmental (and other) costs of the investment, then a suboptimal
competitive situation results. Capital outflows, occw·, and governments, wishing
to recoup the loss in the tax base, lower environmental standards as they attempt
to increase the capital supply. Otherwise, if capital i s taxed at an inefficiently
low rate-that is, the tax yields less than the environmental and other costs
incurred in the jurisdiction-a propensity toward inefficiently high standards,
the NIMBY effect, results.284 Wilson concludes that jurisdictions should not use

environmental regulation as an instrument for attracting capita1.285 Subsidies

and tax reductions present lower-cost means to this end. To the extent that
jurisdictions adopt suboptimal capital taxation regimes, however, they likely
will employ environmental pohcy to inftuence investment levels?86 Unfortu
nately, jurisdictions have many incentives to tax capital suboptimally. Some
may skew capital tax levels due to their relation to employment leve1s?87
Alternatively, high transaction costs related to the collection of a capital tax may
cause the substitution of environmental policy as a mechanism for influencing
investment.288
Significantly, this discussion never generally predicts downwardly directed
results. Nor does it generally predict upwardly d irected results. The present state

28L !d. at 406-07.
282. !d. Here Wilson parallels the Oates-Schwab discussion of political conflict between blue collar
and white collar residents. Cf Oates & Schwab, supra note 77, at 345-49.
283. Oates & Schwab, supra note 77, at 342 45 : Wilson supra note 173. at 407.
284. Wilson, supra note 173. at 408.
285. See id.
286. !d. at 409.
287. !d. at413·15.
288. Jd. a t 4 1 1 -13.
-

..
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of learning provides neither a theoretical nor empirical basis for either predic
tion. Research, says Wilson, should be undertaken to enhance our understanding
of the incentives that cause governments to substitute environmental policy for
more effective fiscal tools.Z89 The key lies i n a better understanding of "political
" 9
market failures. 2 0

b. Optimal Numbers.

Optimal numbers are less of a concern with regulation

than with public goods, because words in a statute do not present the same scale
economy problems as the production of actual goods and services. Concerns
about scale economies, however, still remain, manifested in ongoing debates
between proponents of competi tive decentralization and proponents of interstate
regulatory conventions. Conventions, expected regularities of behavior,291 per
form a coordinating function analogous to a taxing sovereign's provision o f
traditional public goods. Though a range of behavior patterns may b e equally
rational, the selection of one behavior pattern within the range w i l l reduce costs.
With the rules of the road, for example, the uniformity resulting from conven
tions reduces accident costs. With standardized default rules for contracting
parties, uniformity economizes on the transaction costs of search, verification,
and coordinati on.Z92 Similarly, with product specifications, diversity across
jurisdictions can increase the transaction costs of compliance by foreign produc
ers, amounting to a form of protectionism. Harmonization, in contrast, can
produce scale economies and increased competition.Z93 Thus, given trade and
mobile factors of production, cost mini mization requires horizontal units to
operate together as a juridical system to some extent. Decentralization will
become suboptimal when the number o f jurisdictions is so large that diversity
begins to entail net costs.
Advocates of maximal decentralization respond with

a

spontaneous order

story. Efficient local legal regimes can evolve by trial and error, achieving
harmonization without requiring central adj ustment. The market then can bal
ance between regulatory diversity and harmonization. Mobile capital will gravi
tate to the jurisdictions with the best rules; those rules, having risen to the top,
will then serve as focal points for imitating jurisdictions?94 Hannonization
results on a bottom-up rather than a top-down basis.295

289. /d.

at 424.
at 396, 408. It should be noted that Wilson suggests several models and avenues of inquiry
in addition to those mentioned here. Tn any event, the theoretical result tracks the detailed responses to
Revesz, supra note 9, in the environmental law literature. See Esty. supra note 155, at 638-5 1 : Swire,
supra note 66, at 94.
290. !d.

291. 0A VID K LEWIS, CONVENTION:

A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 4 1 , 44 ( 1969).

Chamy, supra note 74, at 443-44.
293. Stewart, supm note 35, at 2043-44: see also Esty, supra note 1 5 5 , at 6 1 3-23 (showi ng how
technical complexities i m plic ated in environmental regulation make state regiUiation unfeas ible).
294. Cf. Klausne r, supra note 122. at 848 (firms have incentives to create products compatible with a
dominant product); Krauss, supra note 122. at 786-96 (describing the emergence of spontaneous order
as the dominant strategy in repeated "crossroads" g"mes).
295. The corporate law system prov ides an example of this process. See William W. Bratton,
292.
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Given complete factor mobility, intense competitive pressures, and stable
equilibria, evolutionary processes might produce the cost-benefit regime envi
sioned. These assumptions, however, are not safe. In practice, factor mobility
and competitive pressures on regulators are sporadic and vary in intensity.
Costly diversity, therefore, may persist over time. Given this dead weight cost,
centralized coordination that provides a uniform set of standards, whether
default rules or mandates, can economize on transaction costs. 296 In sum, any
claim that junior-level regulation ensures an optimal degree of uniformity
respecting regulation must be evaluated in the circumstances.
c.

Mobility.

Regulatory competition, like public goods competition, depends

on moblle factors of production, prompting discussion of differentials in particu
lar factors ' costs of movement. Competition for residents i s more likely among
localities within a state, or states within a federation, than among nation
states?97 Competition for capital, in contrast, may appear at all levels. In
advanced economies, capital's mobility will exceed that of labor, particularly
across national borders. Furthermore, the mobility of liquid financial capital will
exceed that of capital aheady invested in hard assets or locationally situated
through ties of goodwill.298 Incidences of regulatory competition w i l l reflect
these differentials. Competition for residents across national borders, like that
predicted by Tiebout, is unlikely. Instead, as evidenced in the area of securities
regulation, national regulators will compete by offering low-cost regulatory
products to highly mobile factors?99 In effect, the relatively immobile factors of
production-individuals in different countries or locations-wi l l use their gov
ernment to compete for the more mobile factors, capital and technology_3°0
At the state and local level, higher relative mobility for capital and technol
ogy may skew the appearance of jurisdictional competition i n a different
direction from that predicted by the Tiebout model. Given limited citizen
mobility, markets may not effectively discipline government actors to produce
public goods that match citizens' preferences. Simultaneously, tax policy and

Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44

U. TORONTO L.J.

401 ( 1 994);

William J. Carney,

Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of rhe Results of Competition, in INT'L

note 74, at 153.
296. Charny, supra note 74, at 436-37; cf Larry E. R.ibstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi , A n Economic
Analysis of Umform Swre Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 3 1 , 1 3 2 ( 1996) (studying adoption pauems of
REGULATORY COMPETITION. supra

unifom1 state laws and concluding, based on an exogenous and informal concept of efficiency, that a
combination of jurisdictional competition and interest-group politics causes higher adoption rates of
efficient statutes).
297. There is a trend toward greater international labor mobility. but its level is often overstated. See
Woolcock, supra note I 08, at 30 l . Movement of labor between countries remains too sma.ll to have
much economic significance. KRUGMAN. RETHrNKJNG, supra note I 04, at 1 8 1 .
298. See Green, supra note 272, at 57-58; Shaviro, supra note 46, a t 964.
299. See Cox, supra note 267, at 156-60. But even here in this most fluid of internat.ional situations,
a number of factors seem to be keeping capital lied to home markets. See Perry, supra note 36, at 708
(citing tax policy, the issuer's desire for a public profile. administrative costs, and domestic market
efficiency in accounting for fact that American companies still tend to raise equity capital at home).
300. Woolcock, supra note 108, at 306.
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indushial regulation could be heavily influenced as government actors chase
capital investment.301

d. Information.

The problem of asymmetric information will be ameliorated

in some regulatory competition situations by intermediaries who will appear to
collect and channel information to consumers for a fee. For Tiebout's relocating
individuals, networks of real estate agents probably will only slightly remedy
the information asymmetry problem. But, given the subject matter shift to
competition for regulatory goods across states and nations, the profiles of
informational intennediaries become more pronounced. As noted above, law
yers and investment bankers disseminate information about corporate law across
the fifty states. Similarly, large law firms provide the comparative expertise
necessary for consumer choice among regulatory regimes within the fifty states
and intemationall y.302 Because both the sellers and buyers of regulation will
consult these lawyers, who themselves move i n and out of government, the
lawyers' intermediary role will be far from passive. Nonetheless, they may
solve any serious problems of information availability about regulation (if not
of information cost). Generally, as the scale of regulatory consumer choice
expands from the local and mundane (the choices of individuals) to the far
ranging and grand (the choices of managers of capital), information asymme
tries pose less of a problem.
One other information problem merits mention. Law production results from
deliberative, political processes. If asymmetric information exists between com
peting lawmakers (as in the tax competition models previously discussed),303
then equilibrium matching of regulation and preferences is prevented.304 Alterna
tively, one jurisdiction may inaccurately predict the trade-off calculus prevailing
in another, setting its regulatory standard lower (or higher) than necessary.305
Subsequent attainment of accurate information will create an opportunity for a
cure, provided that other factors remain relatively stable. On the one hand,
given keen competitive pressures, neither interest-group deals nor political
stasis should impede an adjustment. On the other hand, given sporadic competi
tive pressures, adjustment may be painstakingly slow. The greater the capital
investment implicated by a particular regulation, the less problematic the infor
mation asymmetries.

supra note 6 1 , at 192.
Yves Dezalay, Between 1he Swre, Law and the Market: The Social and Professional Swkes in
1/ze Construe/ion and Definition of a Regulat01y Arena, in INT'L REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note
74, at 59, 64-69.
303. See supra text accompanying note 202.
304. See MAJONE, supra note 73. at 24: Bewley, supra note 88, at 720. International tax competition
has been described as an area of perverse effects resultjng from failings of technical understanding on
the part of taxing authorities. According to Green, supra note 272, at 59-60, manipulation of source
based corporate tax systems leads to competition, but not a competition related to levels of public goods
production.
305. Stewart. supra note 35, at 2059.
30l. BRETON,

302.
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As with local public

goods, credible predictions of beneficial regulatory competition require sus
tained attention to supply- and demand-side incentives.306 Compare a conven
tional producer of private goods with a regulator. In conventional product
markets, cost-benefit calculations on both the supply and demand side focus on
the price and quality of a single product and result in the consummation or rejection of
a two-pruty transaction. With regulation, however, the product's welfare effects often
present complex conflicts of interest. For example, with a new environmental regula
tion, government actors must consider welfare effects on ali constituents of polluting
fums residing in the jurisdiction, in addition to effects on the fums themselves and on
the residents who do (and do not) bear the cost of the pollution. Differential effects
present problems of preference aggregation and difficult political calculations.
The rent-incentives, electoral interests, and welfare concepts of multiple actors
are implicated. Additional complications result when bundles of issues become
tied together in the decisionmaking process. 307
This preference aggregation problem cannot easily be solved, making likely a
problem of winners and losers in the final political outcome. Some affected
actors may be dissatisfied with the regulatory result, whether or not competi
tively determined. According to the theory, the losers should protect themselves
by relocating to a more satisfactory jurisdiction. In the environmental regulation
example, polluting firms must disinvest in strict jurisdictions and reinvest
elsewhere; pollution-sensitive individuals must move from jurisdictions that
enact inadequate regulations. But the technical possibility of ex post exit does
not solve the lawmaker's ex ante preference aggregation problem. Bundled
regulatory products, information asymmet1ies, associational ties, cultural prefer
ences, and moving costs imply that exit will not be a viable option for all
dissatisfied parties. Given these frictions, the presence of junior-level competi
tion does not guarantee that the political process of trading off preferences and
policies operates as a Pareto superior preference-matching mechani sm.
A possibility of regulalOry capture also remains. An extension of the competi-

306. Indeed, even though the Tiebout model does not make this demand, such attention has been the
practice of many legal scbobrs. Discussions of regulatory competit.ion respecting product standards and
product liability are distinguished for their care to include consideration of probable lawmaker
incentives. The earliest such model projected a race by the states toward stricter product stand;u·ds than
they otherwise would prefer. Rice, supra note ?.7, at. 56-60. The ultimate cause is the product
manufacturers' inability to design and price so as to reflect differentials between r.he laws of more and
Jess strict states. ln Rice's model. legislative movement toward stricter standards is sparked by a class
of disadvantaged merchants. Solimine, supra note 43. at 72-73, supports McConnell, supra note 46, on
suboptimal product liability litigation, with an interest-group stOry. State supreme court judges. says
Solimine, are not fully insulated from interest-group pressure. ld. at 73. Finally, Hay. supra note 43. at
617-18. 651-52, rebuts McConnell by arguing that the states' pro-plaintiff conflicts rules allow states
more leeway to make their own liability rules less stringent, thus favoring their own manufacturers. The
credibility of any of these projections can be questioned. The point is that when they are included. the
black box is opened, enhancing the chances for evolution of an accurate description.
307. Infonnation problems also may inhibit preference sorting in the environmental aree4 See Esty,
supra note 155, at 63l.
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tive corporate law pattern to environmental regulation provides an illustra
tion.308 Interest groups favoring pollution could effectively capture regulators
throughout jurisdictions so that the number of clean air alternatives dwindles to
the point at which the regulatory decision might as well have been made by the

central government. Under this scenario of dwindling clean air alternatives, the
ion.
dissatisfied parties effectively lose exit as a possible solut

More generally, if a complex of variables connects competition and product
quality, then the outcomes predicted in regulatory competition models must be

stated in relative terms. Given qualified predictions, the evaluation of present or
projected regimes of competitive lawmaking may tum on descriptions of the
institutional contexts in which competition influences lawmaking309 and closer
attention to distortions stemming from interest-group politics.

CONCLUSION
The economics of jurisdictional competition have followed a standard social

science pattem during a four-decade history. After a confident start, ordinary
testing and critic ism has led to retrenchment. A tentative theory emerges today,

still heavily couched in enervating assumptions and enjoying only suggestive
empirical confirmations. Actors in public economics, dissatisfied with the con

struct, experiment with improvements and alternative strategies. Legal federal
ism should take this economics on its own terms. Thus, a plausible case for a
competitive solution to a regulatory problem requires a situation-specific demon
stration of both proj ected beneficial effects and the absence of perverse effects
identified in the economic literature. Lawyerly presumptions have no place.
Our claim that legal federalism does not reflect the terms, implications, and
problems of the formal economics on which it draws gives rise to an institu
tional question: given the competitive and critical nature of academic discourse,
why has there been such a long wait for an arbitrage corrective to this situation
of interdisciplinary information asymmetry? We answer by analogizing to the
efficient markets literature, which teaches that informationally efficient results
depend on the presence of an appropriate incentive structure.310 Simply, law and
economics are not incentive compatible, at least in this case.
Several factors explain the absence of incentives favoring thorough arbitrage

from public economics. 3 1 1 For example, legal jurisdictional competition is a

308. See supra texl accompanying notes 275-90.
309. Cf JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 61 (1992).
310. Few still contend that securities markets are strong-form efticient-if all relevant informalion is
already incorporated into market prices, then no one has a financial incentive tO invest in acquisition of
new infomtation. If, however. prices only partially rcftect the information level of the best-informed
trader, the requisile incentives can be included i n the description. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, On rhe lmpossibiliry of lnformatioHalfy Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 393, 401 ( 1980).
3 l l . The problem also may be derivative. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 77, at 333 (commenting
that "the lessons of theoretical economics have not bc.en well assimilated by urban economists" in the
Tiebout mold).
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disaggregated discussion. Applications and critical responses occur in separate,
well-defined subject matter categories such as local government and land use,
corporate, environmental, products liability, trade, and so forth. The subject
matter divisions amount to natural barriers to the circulation of information.
Local government and property law are the only applications with strong
subject matter affinities to public economics. Not surprisingly, these discussions
tend to be better informed. In addition, the sharpest criticisms of the theory take
the race-to-the-bottom perspective. These critics view competition as an intrinsi
cally i l legitimate influence on regulation, even as they share assumptions
respecting the presence and effects of competition with the theory's proponents.
A race-to-the-bottom proponent has little incentive to look to public economics
for useful ideas.
Broader structural disincentives also should be mentioned. Interdisciplinary
legal discourses do not necessarily replicate the c1itical incentive structures of
the natural and social sciences. Legal scholarship is normative, tending more
toward the support of policy positions than to accurate description. It therefore
may favor simpler (and often older) economic models that signal definite
bottom-line results. Reputational payoffs also may tend to favor an initial
arbitrage of a particular economic theory over a maintenance exercise that
marginally enriches a well-established interdisciplinary discourse. Indeed, to the
extent that a maintenance exercise casts doubt on an established policy position
supported by outdated economics, reputational disincentives may outweigh
incentives. There also may be a numbers problem. The number of legal scholars
applying economics greatly exceeds the number of trained economists produc
ing legal scholarship. As the complexity of economics increases, the number of
potential observers with

an

incentive to maintain the information level of the

legal literature becomes smaller. As this article shows, however, conective
incentives are not wholly absent in the legal context.
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